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ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION:
A LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION
Tanja Rapus Benton,* Stephanie A. McDonnell,' Judge
Neil Thomas,± David F. Ross,* & Nicholas Honerkamp+
I. Introduction
This article is a state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit
analysis of judicial decisions on the admissibility of expert
testimony on eyewitness identification problems. The basis
for the admission of expert testimony is analyzed, and then
the rationale used in those decisions is considered with
regard to the current data from psychological studies. This
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9
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 393
article also addresses the apparent disregard of social
science research by the judicial system.
H. Issues Raised in Daubert and McDaniel
Under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence, a witness generally may not
give "testimony in the form of opinions." An exception is
contained, however, in Rule 702 of the Federal version,
which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." 2 The Tennessee version of that
rule is the same with the exception of one addition; the
word "substantially" precedes the word "assist."
3
Additionally, Rule 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence
provides that expert testimony shall be disallowed where
"the underlying facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness," 4 a requirement not contained in Rule 703
of the Federal Rules.5
Under Rule 104(a), whether a witness will be
permitted to testify as an expert is first a determination for
the court. 6 Both Rules 104 and 702 are silent concerning
how that determination is to be made. 7 Under the Federal
Rules, the United States Supreme Court gave the necessary
guidance to the trial court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.8  The Tennessee Supreme Court
1 FED. R. EvID. 70 1(a); TENN. R. EvID. 70 1(a).
2 FED. R. EvID. 702.
3 TENN. R. EvID. 702.
4 TENN. R. EvID. 703.
5 FED. R. EVID. 703.
6 FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
7 FED. R. EvID. 104, 702.
8 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10
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provided similar assistance in McDaniel v. CSX
Transportation, Inc.9 Or did they?
In Daubert, the case went before the United States
Supreme Court after the trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant. The trial court did so because
the opinions expressed in the expert affidavits submitted by
the plaintiffs did not "have general acceptance in the field
to which it belongs"' 0 under the test articulated in United
States v. Kilgus."l The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying
upon Frye v. United States.12 After a granting certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and established a
new rule with respect to the admissibility of expert
opinions. Holding that the Frye test was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court first
examined Rule 402 to determine whether it required
"general acceptance" and found that neither Rule 402 nor
Rule 702 required such an analysis.' 3 The Court held that
the Frye test was a rigid requirement "at odds with the
liberal thrust of the Federal Rules, and their general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion
testimony."' 14 In its analysis of the factors that must be
applied to determine admissibility, the Court held that the
subject of the expert's testimony must be scientific
knowledge. 15  The Court used Webster's Third New
International Dictionary to define what constituted
9 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997).
10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.
Cal. 1989).
1 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
12 293 F. 1013 (1923).
13 Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, and
defines relevant evidence as that evidence which has "any tendency to
make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 402.
14 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. at 590.
11
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scientific knowledge. The Court emphasized that science is
a process, and "in order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method."' 16 The Court held that the use of
scientific knowledge as the basis of expert opinion
"establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."' 7  In a
footnote to that statement, the Court found that "evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity."'
' 8
The Court then examined the "assistance" language
of Rule 702 and stated that requirement goes to
relevance. 19 The Court returned to the requirement under
Rule 702 that there should be "a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry."2 °
Next, the Court turned to the factors that should be
considered by the trial court in ruling on the admissibility
of the expert's opinion. The preliminary assessment, which
the trial court must use, is "whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid.",21  The Court expressed confidence that federal
judges possess the capacity to make this assessment, an
assumption that will be placed severely in doubt later in
this article.
The first of four factors listed by the Court was
whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested,
also known as falsifiability. Next, the Court listed peer
review as a factor, though the decision then stated that in
some cases "well-grounded but innovative theories will not
16id.
171d.
18 Id. at 591, n.9 (emphasis omitted).
19 Interestingly, as will be discussed later, the citation given by the
Court for this issue is United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985), a case admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification.20 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
21 1d. at 592-93.
22 Id. at 593.
12
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have been published., 23 Although the Court relied upon
whether the theory has been published in a peer reviewed
journal, it failed to define the factors under which a journal
will be considered a peer review journal. The third factor
identified by the Court was the known or potential rate of
error, which the Court again failed to state how that
determination is to be made.24 Finally, the Court listed
"general acceptance" as a factor, citing Downing,25 but
again giving no guidance on how to define this factor. 26 In
its opinion, the Court stressed that the determination made
by the trial court should focus on the methodology, not the
conclusion.
27
At the end of its decision, the Court made a
significant comparison between science and law, the
ramifications of which could be momentous. The Court
stated, "There are important differences between the quest
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes
finally and quickly. 28 This statement implies that law is
not subject to perpetual revision, and, therefore, it implies
that under stare decisis the law should change little, even
though science may change dramatically.
This article will now address the assistance
provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in McDaniel.
29
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has provided more
guidance on this issue than the United States Supreme
Court, certain critical issues remain, especially when
considering cases decided after Daubert. One such issue is
the preliminary issue of the role of the trial judge under
231d.
24 Id. at 594.
25 753 F.2d at 1224.
26Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
27Id. at 595.
281Id. at 596-97.
29 McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 257.
13
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Rule 104. After Daubert, some suggest that the role of the
trial judge is not to become expert enough in the science
under consideration or to choose between conflicting
scientific theories, but simply to keep an opinion in the
form of pure speculation from the jury. On that issue,
however, Tennessee is more restrictive as compared to the
language in the Federal Rules of Evidence because of the
language contained in Rules 702 and 703 of the Tennessee
Rules of Evidence. Thus, Tennessee requires the following
assessment by the trial court:
The rules together [702 and 703] necessarily
require a determination as to the scientific
validity or reliability of the evidence.
Simply put, unless the scientific evidence is
valid, it will not substantially assist the trier
of fact, nor will its underlying facts and data
appear to be trustworthy, but there is no
requirement in the rule that it be generally
accepted.3 °
After making this statement, the court suggested that the
trial court "need not weigh or choose between two
legitimate but conflicting scientific views., 3 1  The
Tennessee Supreme Court then held that "it is important to
emphasize that the weight to be given to stated scientific
theories, and the resolution of legitimate but competing
scientific views, are matters appropriately entrusted to the
trier of fact."
32
Thus, if there are competing opinions which are
admitted because the methodologies are correct, the jury
must determine which conclusion is valid. The procedural
fact pattern in McDaniel was similar to that in Daubert. In
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McDaniel, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's
motion in limine to determine the admissibility of
plaintiffs experts. 33 After the hearing, the trial court ruled
that the evidence was admissible, but certified the issue to
the Court of Appeals, which declined to take the
interlocutory appeal.34 Upon application, the Tennessee
Supreme Court granted the appeal.35 Although the court
declined expressly to adopt Daubert, it gave a list of non-
exclusive factors for a trial judge to consider which are
almost identical to the factors in Daubert:
A Tennessee trial court may consider in
determining reliability: (1) whether
scientific evidence has been tested and the
methodology with which it has been tested;
(2) whether the evidence has been subjected
to peer review or publication; (3) whether a
potential rate of error is known; (4) whether,
as formerly required by Frye, the evidence is
generally accepted in the scientific
community; and (5) whether the expert's
research in the field has been conducted
independent of litigation. 
36
In adopting the foregoing list, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declined to adopt a standard for an epidemiological
study as a matter of law. 37 The defendant contended that
on a scale of 1.0 to 4.0, where 4.0 shows a high correlation
of causation between exposure and disease, the court
should adopt a relative risk of greater than 2.0.38 The court
31 Id. at 258.
34 i.
35 i.
36 Id. at 265.
37"d. at 258.
38 Id. at 259, n.3.
15
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declined. 39
Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court directed the
issue back to the trial court, stating:
We recognize that the burden placed on trial
courts to analyze and to screen novel
scientific evidence is a significant one. No
framework exists that provides for simple
and practical application in every case; the
complexity and diversity of potential
scientific evidence is simply too vast for the
application of a single test .... Nonetheless,
the preliminary questions must be addressed
by the trial court, see, Tenn. R. Evid. 104,
and they must be addressed within the
framework of rules 702 and 703.40
Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court, like the United States
Supreme Court, expresses great confidence in the ability of
trial judges, despite their lack of scientific training, to
properly sort out conflicting scientific opinions (often at
opposite ends of the spectrum) and make a decision on
admissibility. Then, to compound matters, if the judge
decides that the conflicting opinions are admissible, the
jury, often with even less training, is asked to make a
decision as to which applies, all because, according to the
decisions discussed later in this review, rigorous cross




41 J.L. Devenport et al., How Effective are the Cross-Examination and
Expert Testimony Safeguards? Jurors' Perceptions of the
Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 87 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1042-1054 (2002).
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III. Issues Raised in State v. Coley
4 2
In 1996, defendant Eddie V. Coley sought to
introduce testimony from Dr. Michael G. Johnson, an
expert in the field of eyewitness identification in a
Williamson County Circuit Court.43  The proffered
testimony included: information on the relationship
between stress and memory for an event; cross-racial
identification; the relationship between confidence and
accuracy; the effect of time on remembering; and the
suggestibility of the photographic lineup used in the case.
44
The State objected to the testimony on the ground that it
was unnecessary to help the jury decide the issue of
identification. The trial court agreed and excluded the
46expert's testimony. Coley was subsequently convicted of
aggravated robbery and sentenced to twelve years in jail.47
In 1998, the defendant appealed his conviction to the Court
of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification.48 Upon review, the court referred to its past
statement in State v. Ward,49 which stated that the "great
weight of authority in this country is that the study of the
reliability of eyewitness identification has not attained that
degree of exactitude which would qualify it as a specific
science." 50  Although the court recognized that this
statement may no longer be true, it found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's refusal to admit the
42 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000) [hereinafter Coley].




4 7 Id. at 833.
48 State v. Coley, No. O1CO1-9707-CC-00270, 1998 WL 712838, at *1
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Coley Appeal].
49 712 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
'o Id. at 487.
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testimony.51 At this point, the court did not adopt a per se
rule of exclusion of expert testimony regarding
eyewitnesses, but instead, stated that the issue was one that
should remain a matter for the trial court's discretion on a
case-by-case basis.52 In 2000, Coley renewed his request
for permission to appeal from the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. 53 This court, however, dealt a much harsher
ruling on the issue, proclaiming that the testimony was per
se inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence.54 The Tennessee Supreme Court held that:
Expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification arguably fails to satisfy the
plain meaning of this language. Eyewitness
testimony has no scientific or technical
underpinnings which would be outside the
common understanding of the jury;
therefore, expert testimony is not necessary
to help jurors "understand" the eyewitness's
testimony. Moreover, expert testimony
about the eyewitness's accuracy does not aid
the jury in determining a fact in issue
because the question whether an eyewitness
should be believed is not a "fact in issue"
but rather a credibility determination. 55
In reaching this decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court
cited two cases, State v. Ward56 and State v. Wooden,57
previously decided in the Tennessee Court of Criminal
51 Coley Appeal, 1998 WL 712838, at *3.
52 id.
51 Coley, 32 S.W.3d at 831.54 1d. at 838.
55 Id. at 833-34.
56 Ward, 712 S.W.2d at 485.
57 658 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
18
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Appeals. Interestingly, State v. Ward58 is the same case
that the Court of Appeals cited in Coley's initial appeal
stating that the unreliability of this sort of testimony was no
longer accurate. 59  The Tennessee Supreme Court
apparently overlooked this comment when it referred to the
case as a rationale for its holding. While the Court of
Criminal Appeals appeared to take a more liberal step
towards admitting this type of testimony, the Tennessee
Supreme Court did just the opposite. The court found that
(1) "expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification
simply offers generalities" and lacks scientific or technical
underpinnings; (2) "the subject of reliability of eyewitness
identification is within the common understanding of
reasonable persons"; (3) the testimony might "mislead and
confuse" the jury causing undue prejudice because of its
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness; and (4)
cross-examination and jury instructions are appropriate aids
in protecting the rights of the defendant.
60
This decision shut the door on expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identification in the State of
Tennessee. Therefore, defendants will never be permitted
to introduce this type of testimony at trial. How valid are
these conclusions reached by the Tennessee Supreme
Court?
IV. Overview of State and Federal Decisions on
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Testimony
The decision reached in Tennessee, and the
rationale used in making that decision, leads one to wonder
if this logic is representative of the thinking of judges
across the nation. If the decision in Tennessee was reached
58 Ward, 712 S.W.2d at 485.
" Coley Appeal, 1998 WL 712838, at *3.
60 Coley, 32 S.W.2d at 837-38.
19
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using the standards outlined in Daubert61 and McDaniel,6 2
then should similar trends be found in other jurisdictions?
In order to answer this query, we took the most direct
approach by delving into an extensive search of recent
rulings made across the nation on this exact issue. This
research analyzed published cases from each state and
federal circuit to determine how other courts are ruling on
the issue of the admissibility of expert eyewitness
testimony. While the most recent authoritative cases on the
issue are presented, it should be recognized that they may
or may not constitute cases in which the rule is established.
However, there will be some discussion of prior precedent.
This section will report the results of our comprehensive
search. Overall, the results indicate that judicial reasoning
and decisions for admitting or excluding eyewitness experts
are very inconsistent across the states and federal circuits.
Each case was analyzed for content and sorted
according to the ruling made by the court. There are two
broad approaches that can be taken by a court when ruling
on this issue. The first is known as the discretionary
approach. This approach leaves the admissibility and limits
of expert testimony to the discretion of the trial court, under
which appellate judges can affirm the admission or
exclusion of the testimony or remand the case to the trial
court for further analysis. This is the broadest category and
has been adopted by a majority of the courts. Within this
approach, several different decisions may be made, all of
which allow the appellate court to rationalize its reasons for
admitting or excluding the expert testimony on a case-by-
case basis. There are five types of decisions under the
discretionary approach: (1) those which admit the
testimony and declare that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence, (2) those which admit
the testimony and declare that the trial court did abuse its
61 509 U.S. at 579.
62 955 S.W.2d at 257.
20
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discretion in excluding the testimony, (3) those which do
not admit the testimony and declare that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, (4)
those which do not admit the testimony but claim that, in
general, the testimony could be admissible under other
circumstances, or (5) those which remand the case to the
trial court for further review.
The second type of approach taken by courts is
known as the prohibitory approach. This is a per se rule of
exclusion, prohibiting the exercise of discretion and the
admission of expert eyewitness testimony under any
circumstances. While it initially may appear that courts are
turning away from this approach to adopt the approach of
the majority in a discretionary view, our analysis reveals
that many courts are using the "discretionary" approach as
a guise, but are basically still operating in a manner that is
nearly per se exclusionary. Table 1 provides further
clarification for how a court may rule on the issues.
A. State Analysis
In the most recent cases involving an attempt to
introduce an eyewitness expert, the court admitted the
testimony in only four states (9%) and excluded it in thirty-
eight states (83%). The reviewing court remanded the case
back to the trial court for further review in four states
(9%).63 As shown in Table 2, the majority of states (98%)
take a discretionary approach to the issue, while only one
state (Tennessee) takes a prohibitory approach, ruling the
testimony per se inadmissible under all circumstances. Of
the states that take a discretionary approach, however,
fifteen states (33%) ruled that the testimony was
63 The review is based on only forty-six states because the issue of
eyewitness experts was not addressed in published opinions in the
District of Columbia and four states: Hawaii, Montana, New
Hampshire, and New Mexico.
21
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inadmissible, using harsh language to suggest a nearly per
se rule of exclusion. Twenty-two states (43%) ruled that, in
general, the testimony is admissible, but for the
circumstances of the particular case, it was not admissible.
It should be noted that in four of these cases, partial
testimony was admitted. These are marked with an asterisk
in the table.
Each court's rationale is shown in Table 3. A
review of the rationale used for exclusion of the testimony
quickly makes it clear that the problem of variability in
judicial decision-making on this topic largely lies in the
discretionary approach. The problem is that courts rarely
overrule a trial court's exercise of discretion. If the
defendant appeals a trial court's decision, the appellate
court will only review the lower court decision under an
"abuse of discretion" rule. This approach means that, even
though the evidence may be otherwise admissible, the trial
court decision will only be overturned if the court has
abused its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence or if
the exclusion was not harmless to the outcome of the case.
With this type of review, trial court decisions are rarely
overturned, which aids in keeping expert identification
testimony out of the court.
By looking at some examples of the rationale used
within each category, it is obvious that the rationale used is
inconsistent and varies widely. In Tennessee, the only state
with a prohibitory approach, the court was very forceful
and stringent in its logic in State v. McKinney, 64 a decision
made subsequent to and making reference to Coley.65
Eyewitness testimony has no scientific or
technical underpinnings which would be
outside the common understanding of the
jury; therefore, expert testimony is not
64 74 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. 2002).
6532 S.W.3d at 833-34.
22
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necessary to help jurors "understand" the
eyewitness's testimony. Moreover, expert
testimony about the eyewitness's accuracy
does not aid the jury in determining a fact in
issue because the question whether an
eyewitness should be believed is not a "fact
in issue" but rather a credibility
determination.
66
With this type of reasoning, Tennessee will never admit
expert testimony on eyewitness issues. Now, turning to the
rationale used within the discretionary approach,
unfortunately some of the same logic used in State v. Coley
is evident. 67 Fifteen states claim that they hold a
discretionary view, yet they use language similar to the
language used in Coley. For example, in Utley v. State, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held, "The question whether
these witnesses were mistaken in their identification,
whether from fright or other cause, was one which the jury,
and not an expert witness, should answer." 68 Thus, the
expert's testimony was a matter of common understanding
and would not assist the trier of fact. A similar example is
Johnson v. State, where the Florida Supreme Court found
that "a jury is fully capable of assessing a witness' ability
to perceive and remember, given the assistance of cross-
examination and cautionary instructions. ' ' 69 In this case the
court ruled, "Reliability of eyewitness identification is
within the realm of jurors' knowledge and experience."
70
Similarly, in State v. Gaines, the Kansas Supreme Court
"continue[d] to follow the previous line of cases and h[e]ld
that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification
6McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 302 (quoting State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831,
833-34 (Tenn. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 32 S.W.3d at 831.
68 826 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Ark. 1992).
69 Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d. 774, 777 (Fla. 1983).
70 id.
23
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should not be admitted into trial.' In the Oregon
decision, State v. Goldsby, the court even recognized that
"eyewitness identification evidence has a built-in potential
for error, but concluded that the law does not deal with that
potential by allowing experts to debate the quality of
evidence for the jury." 72 This rationale makes it quite clear
that the court renders this type of testimony unnecessary,
implying that the court would be highly unlikely ever to
admit it.
Within the largest category, May Be Admissible:
Discretion Not Abused in Excluding, twenty-two states
decided that while under some circumstances this type of
testimony may be admissible, under the facts of the
particular case, the testimony was not admissible. The
rationale used in this category generally suggests that
admission of eyewitness experts is possible, but not
probable. The barrage of reasoning amounts to little more
than general excuses. For example, in In re Williams, the
Alabama Supreme Court excluded evidence on the basis
that the expert was not familiar with facts of case and had
no personal contact with victim or knowledge of the
event.73 Similarly, in State v. McClendon, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the expert could not state his
opinion to a "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." 74
Also, in State v. Miles, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided that there was nothing to suggest that expert
testimony would be particularly helpful to the jury in
evaluating the specific eyewitness testimony. 75 A number
of courts (Indiana, Massachusetts, and Nevada) found that
there was other corroborating evidence, which eliminated
71926 P.2d 641, 649 (Kan. 1996).
72 650 P.2d 952, 954 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting State v. Calia, 514
P.2d 1354, 1356) (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992).
74 730 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Conn. 1999).
75585 N.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Minn. 1998).
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the need for an expert. 76 In summary, all thirty-eight states
that would not admit the expert testimony explain the
exclusion with reasons which are both general and
inconsistent.
However, four states did admit expert testimony
pertaining to eyewitness reliability. Three states (Alaska,
California, and South Carolina) found that the exclusion of
the testimony by the trial court constituted an abuse of
discretion, holding that the testimony should have been
admitted. As any number of judges would attest, reaching
this decision on an issue speaks volumes. Note that the
rationale used by these judges is in direct opposition to the
rationale used by judges who exclude the experts. For
example, in California's landmark case of People v.
McDonald, the court reasoned,
It appears from the professional literature,
however, that other factors bearing on
eyewitness identification may be known
only to some jurors, or may be imperfectly
understood by many, or may be contrary to
the intuitive beliefs of most. . . . We
conclude that although jurors may not be
totally unaware of the foregoing
psychological factors bearing on eyewitness
identification, the body of information now
available on these matters is "sufficiently
beyond common experience" that in
appropriate cases expert opinion thereon
could at least "assist the trier of fact."
77
Additionally, in the Alaska case, Skamarocius v. State, the
76 State v. Cook, 734 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 2000); Commonwealth v.
Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116 (Mass. 1997); Fraternal Order v. Denver, 926
P.2d 589 (Colo. 1996).
77 690 P.2d 709, 720-21 (Cal. 1984).
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court explained that the identification of the assailant was
the main issue of the case, and that the expert testimony
was relevant and would have been helpful to the jury.78
The court concluded that the error in exclusion was not
harmless.79 Finally, the same issue was addressed in State
v. Whaley, in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
found that the main issue was identification, and numerous
factors existed that could have affected the witness
identifications. 80 These three decisions hold great weight
on the admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony because
these appellate courts decided that the trial court's
exclusion of the testimony was arbitrary.
It is interesting to note that while the facts in many
cases are similar, judges manage to reach completely
contradictory decisions. Unfortunately, an analysis of the
most recent decisions in the federal circuits paints just as
bleak a picture.
B. Federal Analysis
An analysis of eleven circuits reveals that expert
testimony on eyewitness identification was not admitted in
any circuit. 81 The decisions within the circuits are broken
down in the same manner as the states. 82 As shown in
Table 4, none of the circuits currently take the prohibitory
approach on this issue. Three circuits (25%) found the
testimony inadmissible, using such harsh language that the
decisions can be construed as a per se rule of
inadmissibility. In United States v. Kime in the Eighth
Circuit, for example, the court concluded that the testimony
failed under the Daubert prongs because the scientific
78731 P.2d 63, 66-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
79Id. at 66.
80406 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 1991).
8 No published cases were found in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.82 See Table 2.
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evidence would not assist the trier of fact. 83 All three of
these circuits (Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh) defer to the
issue that cross-examination and jury instruction are
sufficient tools to address problems related to eyewitness
identifications. 84 With this rationale in place, just like the
rationale of the states in the same category, the expert's
testimony is unlikely to ever be admitted.
While recognizing that in certain situations this type
of expert testimony may be admissible, over half of the
circuits (64%) do not find an abuse of discretion in the
exclusion of the expert testimony. 85 The rationale used in
this category varies widely, just as we have observed with
the states' reasoning. For example, in United States v.
Brien, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the defense offered nothing as far as literature or data to
affirm the expert's conclusions after being repeatedly asked
for it.86 Other reasons for exclusion include the presence of
corroborating evidence (Fifth and Seventh Circuits), no
limited circumstances that call for expert eyewitness
testimony were present (Fourth Circuit), and the presence
of multiple eyewitnesses (Tenth Circuit). 87
One circuit stands apart from the rest in that it
decided that the exclusion of the testimony was an abuse of
discretion. However, in its decision in United States v.
Mathis, the Third Circuit decided that it was an abuse of
discretion to exclude the expert, but ultimately found the
exclusion to be harmless error. 88  The defendant's
conviction was upheld, after the court found that "portions
of [the expert's] proffered testimony should have been
3 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996).
84 See Table 4 for an example of a case from each circuit along with a
description of the decision.
85 Namely, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 10th Circuits..
8659 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995).
87 See Table 4 for an example of a case from each circuit along with a
description of the decision.
88 264 F.3d 321, 342-44 (3d Cir. 2001).
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admitted, [but] in the context of the record as a whole, his
testimony was highly unlikely to have caused a different
result."
89
In summary, this article has revealed significant
variability in the decisions of courts as to whether to admit
or exclude testimony from eyewitness experts. The
problem lies in the fact that the decisions reached are not
based primarily on the facts of the case, but instead based
on other factors like jurisdictional characteristics, personal
views of the judge, broad discretion granted to the trial
judge, and the ambiguity of admission criteria.
V. Scientific Literature on the Issues Raised in
Coley, Daubert, and McDaniel
Four main issues which need to be addressed
emerge from this review. First, can trial judges, who have
little scientific training, adequately evaluate the scientific
validity of expert testimony in order to make a decision on
admissibility? Second, is the subject of reliability of
eyewitness identifications common knowledge to
reasonable people-what, in fact, does the average juror, or
even the average judge know about eyewitness issues?
Third, does rigorous cross-examination and instruction by
the court serve as effective safeguard to prevent wrongful
convictions based on errors in eyewitness testimony?
Fourth, what can be said about the scientific integrity of
social science research-is eyewitness memory research
sufficiently reliable and valid to warrant expert testimony
on the subject? Fortunately, a large body of empirical
research exists that can inform and help clarify each one
these issues.
89 I. at 343.
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A. The Evaluation of Scientific Testimony
The existing rules and guidelines, such as Rules 702
and 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, place great
responsibility on trial judges because they require judges to
evaluate the merit and validity of scientific testimony
across diverse domains of knowledge without the benefit of
scientific training. Recent findings indicate that judges do
not possess the detailed and accurate understanding of
scientific methodology necessary to perform this task
effectively. In a 2001 study, researchers Gatowski,
Dobbin, Richardson, Ginsberg, Merlino, and Dahir
surveyed a national sample of state court judges about their
knowledge of the Daubert factors used to evaluate
scientific testimony. 90  These factors included:
falsifiability, error rate, peer review, and general
acceptance. 9' When asked to define these concepts, a clear
lack of comprehension was evident. Only four percent
were able to define falsifiability; similarly, only four
percent were able to define error rate.92  While judges
showed a better understanding of peer review and general
acceptance, there was little consensus about which factors
were most important or how to combine the four guidelines
in evaluating expert testimony. 93
Research also shows that judges' evaluations are
not sufficiently sensitive to problems in the quality of
expert testimony. For example, in a study where judges
were presented with expert testimony that varied in terms
of the presence or absence of methodological problems and
whether or not the research was peer reviewed, the quality
of the expert testimony had no impact on judges'
90 Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 433-458 (2001).
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evaluations. 94  When judges were given training in
scientific methodology, however, their evaluations of
expert testimony increased in accuracy compared to those
of their untrained counterparts even though serious errors in
evaluation were still made. 95 Judges are forced to use the
Daubert standard to evaluate the scientific integrity of
expert testimony, although most lack adequate scientific
training and requisite knowledge of scientific principles.
Whether judges can adequately evaluate expert testimony
in general, and more specifically, expert testimony about
eyewitness memory, is open to serious debate.
B. Is Knowledge of Eyewitness Memory Really
Common Sense?
One of the most commonly cited reasons for
excluding eyewitness expert testimony is that knowledge of
factors that can affect eyewitness accuracy is a matter of
common sense, and thus, jurors do not require assistance in
understanding eyewitness testimony. 96 The large body of
research that has examined people's understanding of
eyewitness memory has revealed significant shortcomings,
not only in the scope of the knowledge evidenced, but also
in terms of its general accuracy. In survey studies, where
jury-eligible citizens complete questionnaires about
eyewitness issues, large deficits have been found in what
people commonly believe to be true about eyewitness
94 See M. Kovera et al., The Effects of Peer-Review and Evidence
Quality on Judge Evaluation of Psychological Science: Are Judges
Effective Gate-Keepers? 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000).
95 id.
96 Benton, T. Rapus et al., Has Eyewitness Testimony Research
Penetrated the American Legal System?: A Synthesis of Case History,
Juror Knowledge, and Expert Testimony, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE
(R.C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., in press).
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memory. 97  Second, what people believe are important
factors affecting eyewitness accuracy are often not
diagnostic of, and sometimes are even irrelevant to,
eyewitness accuracy. 98  For example, the relationship
between witness confidence and accuracy has consistently
posed a problem for lay persons.99  While confident
witnesses are perceived to be more accurate, research
findings show that confidence is not a reliable indicator of
eyewitness accuracy.' 00 A large number of experimental
97 See id. See also ELIZABETH E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
(1979); R.C.L. Lindsay, Expectations of Eyewitness Performance:
Jurors' Verdicts Do Not Follow from Their Beliefs, in ADULT
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (D. F. Ross et al. eds., 1994); A. Daniel
Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness
Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE 13-40 (Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983);
John C. Brigham & Melissa P. WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and
Law Enforcement Personnel on the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349 (1983); Kenneth A.
Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common
Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior? 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
15, 30 (1982); Marcus D. Durham & Francis C. Dane, Juror
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior: Evidence for the Necessity of
Expert Testimony, 14 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSP. 299, 308 (1999); Saul
M. Kassin & Kimberly A. Bamdollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1241, 1249 (1992); Kevin McConkey &
Suzanne Roche, Knowledge of Eyewitness Memory, 24 AUSTL.
PSYCHOL. 377, 384 (1989); Elizabeth Noon & Clive Hollin, Lay
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior: A British Survey, 1 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 143, 153 (1987); George Rahaim & Stanley
Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common Sense: Juror and
Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
15 (1982); John S. Shaw et al., A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of
E yewitness Testimony, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 71 (1999).
98 Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in
Eyewitness Identifications, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440-448 (1979).
99 1d.
1oo ld.; R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 333-339 (1989).
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studies have demonstrated that eyewitness confidence is a
better predictor of mock juror verdicts than eyewitness
accuracy, indicating that jurors are swayed by the
believability of eyewitnesses. 101 Even more problematic is
that experiments show that laypeople have great difficulty
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate witnesses.
Mock jurors show a high level of belief in the testimony of
both accurate and inaccurate witnesses.102 Mock jurors
also tend to overestimate accuracy rates in eyewitness
identification situations, revealing an underlying belief that
eyewitnesses tend to be fairly accurate.' 0 3  Brigham and
Bothwell found that a majority of their survey respondents
(63%) believed that more than fifty percent of eyewitness
identifications made are correct. 104
Third, lay persons underestimate the importance of
101 See Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial
Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments,
26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 364 (2002); Brian L. Cutler et al.,
Nonadversarial Methods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence,
20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197, 1207 (1990); Steven Fox & H. A.
Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and
Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 215, 228 (1986); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations? 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 89 (1981); Lindsay, Mock-Juror Belief supra
note 100; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and
Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y &L. 817, 845 (1995).
102 Lindsay, Mock-Juror Belief supra note 100; R.C.L. Lindsay et al.,
Mock-Juror Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 447-459.
(1986).
103 Brewer & Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies, supra note
101; Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods, supra note 101; Fox &
Walters, The Impact of General, supra note 101; Lindsay et al., Mock-
Juror Belief supra at note 100; Penrod & Cutler, Witness Confidence,
s pra note 101.
John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective
Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 19, 30 (1983).
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good indicators of eyewitness accuracy. For example,
when mock jurors are presented with information such as
lineup instructions and fairness, exposure to mug shots,
retention interval, lighting conditions, cross-race
identifications, and weapon presence, which are all factors
relevant to witness accuracy, this information often fails to
impact verdicts.10 5 Overall, this body of research shows a
clear lack of correspondence between lay knowledge of
eyewitness issues and the preponderance of scientific
evidence. Thus, it follows that knowledge of eyewitness
memory is not a matter of common sense.
More recently, research has focused on the
knowledgeability of various professional groups who
interact directly with eyewitnesses, specifically assessing
what judges, attorneys, and law enforcement professionals
know about eyewitness memory issues.' ° 6 Unfortunately,
the research findings reveal similar deficits in knowledge
among professional groups as those observed with jury-
105 Jordan Abshire & Brian H. Bomstien, Juror Sensitivity to the Cross-
Race Effect, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 471-80 (2003); Cutler et al.,
Nonadversarial Methods, supra note 101; Cutler et al., The Reliability
of Eyewitness Identifications: The Role of System and Estimator
Variables, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233-58 (1987); Lindsay et al., Mock-
Juror Evaluations, supra note 102.
106 A.D. Yarmey & H.P. Jones, Is the Psychology of Eyewitness
Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE 13-40 (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B.R. Clifford eds., 1983); Tanja
Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense:
Comparing Jurors, Judges, and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness
Experts, 20 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115-129; Brigham &
WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys, supra note 97; S.M. Kassin et al.,
The "General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089-98 (1989);
S.M. Kassin et al., On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness
Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 50 AM. PSYCHOL.
405-416 (2001); Noon & Hollin, Lay Knowledge, supra note 97;
Rahaim & Brodsky, Empirical Evidence, supra note 97; Richard A.
Wise & Martin A. Safer, What U.S. Judges Know and Believe about
Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427-443 (2004).
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eligible citizens. 07
Across questionnaire surveys, attorneys as well as
law enforcement officers showed similar levels of overall
accuracy as potential jurors (approximately 45%).108
Further, like lay persons, attorneys and law enforcement
personnel expressed the belief that eyewitness
identification is relatively accurate. For example, in a 1983
study, Brigham and WolfsKeil found that a majority of
their sample of prosecuting attorneys (84%) and law
officers (63%) believed that ninety percent or more of the
eyewitness identifications they had observed were probably
accurate.l°9 Furthermore, the great majority of both these
groups believed that witness confidence is positively
related to accuracy."
0
Recent studies of judicial knowledge present a
similar pattern. Across studies, judges averaged
approximately sixty percent correct on eyewitness
knowledge questions, which is comparable to accuracy
rates obtained from lay jurors whose performance across
similar questionnaires ranged from thirty-five percent to
sixty-one percent."l1 Furthermore, judges tend to
overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. In
a 2004 study, for example, Richard A. Wise and Martin A.
Safer surveyed judges about their perceptions of the
reliability of eyewitness testimony and its relation to
wrongful convictions.' 12 Less than half the judges (43%)
indicated that eyewitness error contributes to at least half of
107 Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory, supra note 106; R. Seltzer et al.,
Juror Ability to Recognize the Limitations of Eyewitness
Identifications, 3 FORENSic REP. 121-137 (1990).
108 Noon & Hollin, Lay Knowledge, supra note 97; Yarmey & Jones, Is
the Psychology of Eyewitness, supra note 106.
109 Brigham & WolfsKeil, Opinions ofAttorneys, supra note 97, at 342.
11Old.
11 Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory, supra note 106; Wise & Safer,
What U.S. Judges Know, supra note 106.
112 Wise & Safer, supra note 106, at 428.
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all wrongful convictions." 3 It should be noted that greater
knowledge of eyewitness issues in this particular sample of
judges was also associated with a more cautious assessment
of the value of eyewitness testimony in general. 1
4
On the basis of these results, we conclude that not
only are the limitations of eyewitness memory not common
sense to jurors, these limitations are also not common sense
to judges, attorneys, and law enforcement officers. This
body of research clearly shows that the lack of knowledge
is diffused through the legal system, from the law officers
who are responsible for collecting and preserving the
integrity of eyewitness identification evidence to the judges
and jurors who are faced with evaluating the credibility of
eyewitness testimony. This conclusion raises an important
issue: if judges, attorneys, and jurors have insufficient
knowledge about factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, are
there effective safeguards in the legal system to detect
errors in eyewitness testimony and prevent erroneous
convictions?
C. Are Cross-Examination and Judicial
Instructions Effective Safeguards?
The legal system has historically recognized the
fallible nature of eyewitness testimony and, therefore, has
implemented various constitutional safeguards to protect
defendants from wrongful convictions based on erroneous
eyewitness identification. 115 The most commonly used
safeguard is the cross-examination of a witness, which is
widely believed to effectively protect defendants from
erroneous conviction. 116  While it is also the most
'13 1d. at 435.
114Id.
115 Winn S. Collins, Improving Eyewitness Evidence Collection
Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 529 (2003).
116 Christopher Walters, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1402, 1430 (1985).
35
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 419
commonly used rationale for the exclusion of expert
testimony, research findings challenge the use of cross-
examination as an effective protective tool. l l7 In a 1979
study, Gary Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay, and T.J. Ferguson"
8
showed that mock jurors were unable to differentiate
between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses based on
cross-examination."l 9 In a further experiment, professional
attorneys were used to cross-examine witnesses in a mock
trial, but this still did not improve jurors' ability to
discriminate between accurate and inaccurate
eyewitnesses. 1 
2 0
More recently, Devenport, Stinson, Cutler, and
Kravitz examined the effectiveness of this safeguard by
testing juror sensitivity to three types of bias in lineup
procedures-foil, instruction, and presentation format.'
2'
These types of bias consistently affect the suggestiveness
and quality of the lineup procedures.12 2 Foil bias is present
when the lineup foils do not match the description of the
culprit as given by the witness. 123 Instruction bias occurs
when the witness is explicitly told that the culprit is in the
lineup, or is not given the option to not choose a foil.
124
Presentation bias is related to showing witnesses
simultaneous lineups (where all the lineup members are
presented at the same time) versus sequentially presented
lineups (where each lineup member is shown one at a
time). 125  Sequential presentation allows the witness'identification decision to be based on the comparison of the
117 Devenport et al., Jurors' Perceptions, supra note 41; Gary Wells et
al., Accuracy, supra note 98.118 Wells, Accuracy, supra note 98.
119.d
12 0 See Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief, supra note 100.
121 Devenport et al., Jurors'Perceptions, supra note 41.
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lineup member to his or her memory of the culprit rather
than to the other lineup members. 126  If the purpose of
cross-examination is to focus on the credibility and
accuracy of an eyewitness identification, then its
effectiveness hinges on both attorneys' and jurors' ability
to recognize suggestiveness. This procedural problem can
detrimentally affect the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications. Research has found that jurors are most
sensitive to foil bias, somewhat sensitive to instruction bias,
and insensitive to presentation bias. 127 Overall, jurors were
weak in their ability to perceive suggestiveness when bias
was present in the identification procedure. 1
28
Thus, several reasons explain why cross-
examination may not be a truly effective safeguard. First,
as evidenced earlier, jurors, attorneys and judges all have
insufficient knowledge about factors affecting eyewitness
accuracy. Second, and more importantly, attorneys and
judges also lack awareness of specific factors, such as those
affecting the suggestiveness of lineup procedures. In a
study designed to examine whether attorneys are sensitive
to factors affecting lineup suggestiveness, Stinson,
Devenport, Cutler, and Kravitz found that while attorneys
rated foil-biased lineups as more suggestive than foil-
unbiased lineups, they rated sequential lineups as more
suggestive than simultaneous lineups. 129  This stands in
direct opposition to the research findings.' 30  Further,




129 See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Presence-of-
Counsel Safeguard? Attorney Perceptions of Suggestiveness, Fairness,
and Correctability of Biased Lineup Procedures, 81 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 64, 75 (1996).
130 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 603-47 (1998).
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lineup instruction and presentation.' 31
Similar results have been found among judges, who
rated foil-biased and instruction-biased lineups as more
suggestive than foil-unbiased and instruction-unbiased
lineups. 132 However, judges also rated sequential lineups
as more suggestive than simultaneous lineups.' 33  If
attorneys are not fully aware of the issues that can
compromise witness accuracy, then it is much more
difficult to cross-examine properly with respect to them.
Consequently, an attorney's ability to develop a truly
effective cross-examination strategy is impaired in cases
where eyewitness testimony plays a pivotal role.
Given the tremendous importance that accurate
eyewitness testimony has in relation to the justice system,
over the last few decades, federal and state courts have
encouraged judges to instruct jurors about the factors that
should be considered in the evaluation of eyewitness
evidence. 134  Such judicial instructions represent another
safeguard relied upon by the court, assumed to be effective
in preventing errors. In Neil v. Biggers, the United States
Supreme Court recommended five criteria on which
evaluations of eyewitness evidence should be based.
135
These include: (1) the certainty of the identification; (2) the
quality of the eyewitness' view of the culprit; (3) the
amount of reported attention paid to the culprit; (4) the
match between the description of and the actual appearance
of the defendant; and (5) the time elapsed between
131 Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective is the Presence, supra note
129.
13 2 1d.
13 3 See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective is the Motion-to-Suppress
Safeguard? Judges Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of
Biased Lineup Procedures, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211, 216-17
(1997).
134 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
135 id.
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witnessing the crime and the identification. 1
36
Unfortunately, research findings indicate that some of the
Biggers criteria are not reliable indicators of eyewitness
accuracy; yet these criteria are relied on by the court system
and, when they are satisfied, they are assumed to imply
eyewitness accuracy. 137 As previously delineated, research
shows that eyewitness certainty or confidence is not a
reliable indicator of identification accuracy, but this belief
is represented among the Biggers criteria!
The most widely used set of standardized
instructions arises from United States v. Telfaire.138 The
intent of these instructions is to assist jurors' evaluation of
eyewitness identification evidence, emphasizing to jurors
the importance of assessing whether the circumstances of
identification are, in fact, convincing in determining the
guilt of the defendant. 139 To this end, jurors are further
instructed to evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of the
eyewitness and to consider factors such as: (1) the length of
time the witness had to view the offender; (2) the lighting
conditions at that time; (3) any previous acquaintance with
the offender; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the
lineup identification. 14  What impact do these cautionary
instructions by the court have on jury decision-making?
Research has shown that judges' presentation of Telfaire
instructions neither sensitized mock jurors to potential
136 Id. at 199-200.
131 See Amy L. Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of
Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A Test of the Five Biggers
Criteria, 24 L. &HUM. BEHAV. 581, 582 (2000); Gary L. Wells & Amy
L. Bradfield, "Good You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessed Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Donna M.
Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v. Biggers Criteria
for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 348-
49 (1983).
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problems with eyewitness testimony, nor increased their
skepticism. 141
As a result, these findings have raised the question
of how comprehensible these instructions are to jurors.
When the Telfaire instructions were modified to be more
understandable to mock jurors, Edith Greene observed an
increase in skepticism towards eyewitness testimony.
142
Gabriella Ramirez, Dennis Zemba, and R. Edward
Geiselman, however, obtained less optimistic results in
comparing the impact of presenting both the Telfaire
instructions and the modified version on mock jurors'
evaluations of eyewitness testimony. 143  Rather than
improving decision-making, the Telfaire instructions
reduced mock jurors' sensitivity to the quality of
eyewitness evidence and either created skepticism in or
over reliance on the testimony depending on when these
instructions were presented to jurors.' 4  The more
comprehensible version of the instructions did not
adversely affect juror sensitivity, nor did it serve to
significantly improve it. 145 On the basis of these findings,
instructions by the court do not appear to have the desired
effect of improving jurors' ability to assess eyewitness
evidence because they do not seem to provide a clear path
for jurors to follow in evaluating an eyewitness.
Further, these findings speak to a more general
question related to'juror decision-making-how well does
the average juror assimilate and comprehend the plethora of
information presented in a case? Research indicates that
instructions presented to jurors are often misunderstood,
141 Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods, supra note 101, at 1205.
142 Edith Greene, Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony:
Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 276
(1988).
143 See Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary Instructions on
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either because they include numerous legal terms or
because they are often embedded within other lengthy
judicial instructions. 146  A large survey study of citizens
called for jury duty found that actual jurors understood
fewer than half the instructions they received at trial.
147
More generally, jurors often have difficulty comprehending
complex legal cases and the evidence presented to them.'
4W
These notable problems with interpretation and
comprehension of the information and instructions
presented in court appear to undermine the effectiveness of
judicial instructions as a legal safeguard.
D. On The Scientific Status of Research on
Eyewitness Issues
From this review, it becomes evident that courts
have created and followed rules that often contradict what
the accumulation of empirical research demonstrates on a
variety of fronts; yet, the legal system remains skeptical of
social science research. 149  It has been observed that the
system has failed to integrate procedures recommended by
leading social science researchers, thereby making the
courts an ineffective solution to a serious problem.'
50
146 See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Greene, supra note 142; LOFTUS, supra
note 97.
147 See Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in
Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 554 (1992).
148 See Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases,
TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65-68; Sonya Ivkovic et al., Jurors' Evaluations
of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003).
149 Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333
(2002); Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV.
231 (2000).
150 Collins, supra note 115.
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Keith A. Findley states, "[C]ourts have created rules or
followed procedures that ignore or even contradict what the
empirical evidence shows."' 51 He specifically addresses
the issue of expert testimony:
[H]ard evidence shows that jurors do not
understand the psychological processes at
work in an eyewitness identification and
tend to rely an unwarranted extent on such
identifications. . . .Nonetheless, courts in
many jurisdictions routinely continue to
exclude expert testimony designed to
educate jurors on these matters, often on the
ground that such information is within the
common knowledge of jurors .... 152
In addition, Donald P. Judges notes that despite the years of
research that social scientists have devoted to the study of
eyewitness identification evidence, experts within the legal
community remain "skeptical."' 153  "The law's generic
skepticism of social science risks deteriorating into a
counter-productive bias if the legal system fails to
recognize the genuine strides that social science has made
in recent decades."'
154
This skepticism and lack of knowledge about the
factors that affect eyewitness accuracy underlies not only
the misguided assumption that the understanding of these
issues is within the purview of "common sense," but also
the recurrent reasoning that eyewitness expert testimony is
not helpful to the trier of fact. Research indicates that
courts tend to be more critical of and look less favorably
upon expert testimony from social science researchers.
151 Findley, supra note 149, at 333.
'52 Id. at 334.
153 Judges, supra note 149, at 236-37.
154 Id. at 237.
42
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 426
Researchers Jennifer L. Groscup and Steven D. Penrod
conducted a study to assess how courts evaluated different
types of testimony, comparing testimony from police
officers to testimony from clinical and experimental
psychologists. 155 Groscup and Penrod found that testimony
from psychologists was admitted only about fifty percent of
the time, whereas testimony from police officers was
admitted about eight-six percent of the time. 1
56
Additionally, courts treated clinical and experimental
psychologists differently-testimony from experimental
psychologists was the least likely to be admitted, with an
admissibility rate of twenty-two percent, whereas their
clinical counterparts had an admissibility rate of fifty-six
percent.1 57  Questionnaire surveys further revealed a
tendency for judges to dismissively and negatively view the
158field of social science.
This negative perception of psychological testimony
is probably a reflection of the courts' difficulty in
evaluating the reliability of scientific testimony in general,
and more specifically, the reliability of this particular type
of scientific testimony.' 59  Several important aspects of
research on eyewitness memory need to be highlighted and
clarified in order to promote a change in attitude toward
eyewitness expert testimony and improve its evaluation by
the legal system. All of these aspects speak to the issues of
reliability and validity in this field of research. First, the
existing body of research on eyewitness memory is large
and well-established. To date, 469 eyewitness experiments
have been conducted in just the last four decades.'
60
155 Jennifer L. Groscup & Steven D. Penrod, Battle of the Standards for
Experts in Criminal Cases: Police vs. Psychologists, 33 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1141 (2003).
156 1d. at 1151.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1144-45.
159 Id. at 1145.
160 Steven Penrod & B. Bornstein, Generalizing Eyewitness Research,
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Second, a fairly substantial level of agreement exists
among eyewitness experts. Surveys of the opinions of
eyewitness experts on a large number of eyewitness
phenomena have demonstrated a relatively broad consensus
with regard to which variables do and do not impact
eyewitness performance. 161 Further, most of these issues
were viewed as reliable enough to be presented in court by
the majority of the experts.
Third, numerous meta-analyses of the eyewitness
research summarize and compare the findings across
studies, even those using different methodologies. 62 This
in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (R.C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., in press).
161 Kassin et al., The "General Acceptance, " supra note 106; Kassin et
al., On the "General Acceptance, " supra note 106.
162 BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION:
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); Brian Cutler et
al., Conceptual, Practical and Empirical Issues Associated with
Eyewitness Identification Test Media, in ADULT EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 163 (Ross et al.
eds., 1994); Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identifications: A
Social Cognitive Integration, 18 PERSP. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296,
301 (1992); Robert K. Bothwell et al., Correlation of Eyewitness
Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 691, 695 (1987); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A
Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness
Memory, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 687 (2004); Christian A. Meissner &
John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in
Memory for Facts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y
& L. 3, 35 (2001); Joanna D. Pozzulo & R.C.L. Lindsay, Identification
Accuracy of Children Versus Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 549 (1998); Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis
of Facial Identification Studies. 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 156 (1986);
Siegfried L. Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A
Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 327 (1995); Nancy M.
Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 413, 424 (1992); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-
Analytic Comparison, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 523 (2003); Nancy M.
Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review
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approach permits broader and more confident conclusions
to be drawn, not only about what variables affect
eyewitness accuracy, but also how they relate to each other
because the information from many studies has been
combined. By submitting research results to meta-
analyses, the reliability of research findings can be
empirically determined.
In addition to providing information about the
reliability of research findings, meta-analyses also provide
us with information about the external validity of this field
of research. External validity defines how well
experiments, in their structure and design, correspond with
real-world situations. 63  Researchers have consistently
found that a number of important eyewitness variables,
such as lineup presentation (i.e., sequential v.
simultaneous), weapon focus, stress, and the cross-race
effect, can actually have a larger impact on the performance
of eyewitnesses when the experimental context more
closely matches real witnessing situations.' 64  The
implications of this finding are substantial. As Penrod and
Bornstein reason, this result indicates that eyewitness
research not only possesses external validity, it also reveals
that eyewitness research may actually underestimate the
magnitude of the impact that certain variables have on
eyewitness performance. 1
65
Consequently, several conclusions can be drawn
from this review of eyewitness research. First, contrary to
the Court's statement in Coley, the field clearly has the
of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 283 (1997); Ralph
N. Haber & Lyn R. Haber, A Meta-Analysis of Research on Eyewitness
Lineup Identification Accuracy: Paper Presented at the Annual
Convention of the Psychonomics Society, Orlando, Fl. November 16,
2001.
163 DAVID ELMES, BARRY KANKOWITZ, & HENRY ROEDIGER, METHODS
IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981).
164 Penrod & Bornstein, supra note 160.
1611d. at 543.
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"scientific or technical underpinnings which would be
outside the common understanding of the jury," as it meets
the criterion for scientific knowledge as delineated in
Daubert and McDaniel. Specifically, in order to qualify as
scientific knowledge, an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method. Second, researchers
compile the eyewitness research data derived from the
scientific method, and use it to create a scientific knowledge
base than can be generalized to real-world eyewitness
situations. Third, as Penrod and Bornstein concluded, the
empirically established reliability of a number of
eyewitness phenomena warrants not only the general
consensus observed among eyewitness experts but also the
admission of expert testimony on these issues. 166 More
pointedly, the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness
issues is warranted as scientific knowledge.
Fourth, the idea that eyewitness experts will not
assist the trier of fact because eyewitness testimony is
common sense to jurors, and that research in this area has
no scientific or technical basis, is clearly wrong. When
viewed in light of research showing that errors in
eyewitness memory are the single greatest cause of
wrongful convictions, the omission of expert testimony is
dangerous to our justice system. This finding dates back to
the 1930s and continues to be a major problem facing the
legal system. 167 For example, in a National Institute of
Justice study conducted by Conners, Lundregan, Miller,
and McEwen, DNA analyses were used to exonerate
'66Id. at 551.
167 EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Garden City
Publishing Co. 1932); R. BRANDON & C. DAVIES, WRONGFUL
IMPRISONMENT (1973); BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW
(1995); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); R. Huff et al.,
Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518. (1986).
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twenty-eight individuals. 168  It was found that ninety
percent of these wrongful convictions were due to errors in
eyewitness identification. 169  Analyses of an additional
twelve DNA exonerations by Gary Wells, Mark Small,
Steven Penrod, Roy Malpass, Solomon Fulero, and C.A.E.
Brimcombe found a similar result. 170 Across these two
studies, the sample of wrongful identifications included
five individuals who were convicted of capital crimes,
received the death penalty, and were awaiting execution.
The magnitude of this problem was sufficiently
large enough to warrant the attention of Attorney General
Janet Reno. A group of thirty-four professionals, including
research psychologists, attorneys, investigators, and police,
were commissioned to develop guidelines that could be
used by law enforcement officials to properly collect
identification evidence.171 The product of the commission
was a 1999 Department of Justice publication entitled,
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.
172
This Guide is based on a compilation of research that
depicts how to properly conduct investigatory lineups and
reduce identification bias. 173  In September of 2003, the
government published a companion manual entitled,
Eyewitness Evidence: A Trainer's Manual for Law
Enforcement.174 The manual was developed, in part, from
a previous set of guidelines for collecting identification
168 Edward T. Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish
Innocence After Trial, 1996 U.S. Dept. of Just. Rep., NCJ 161258.
169 Id.
170 Gay Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification, supra note 130.
171 Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, United States Dept. of Just.,
Office of Justice Programs (1999) [hereinafter Guide].
172 l.
173 l.
174 John Ashcroft, Deborah J. Daniels, Sarah V. Hard, Eyewitness
Evidence: A Trainer's Manual for Law Enforcement, U.S. Dep't Just.
NIJ Special Report (2003).
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evidence published by the American Psychology and Law
Society and the American Psychological Association.
175
Clearly, these significant developments indicate that not
only is eyewitness evidence not a matter of common sense,
but highlight the strong scientific contribution that
eyewitness research has already made to social policy.
VI. Conclusion
Some of the conclusions to be drawn from the
above discussion are disturbing. First, a majority of courts,
both state and federal, appear to reject the data collected
and the conclusions reached by eyewitness researchers in
the area of social science. This rejection tends to confirm
the notion that the operation of the judicial branch of
government is largely insular, relying on its own
conclusions in areas more properly left to the expertise of
others.
Second, the Daubert decision has put judges in an
extremely difficult position because they are now required
to evaluate the validity and reliability of scientific research.
This requires judges to comprehend and apply difficult
concepts such as peer review, falsifiability, and error rate in
their evaluation of science. Judges, however, typically
receive no formal training with respect to these concepts;
they are rarely taught these in law schools, and the research
reviewed here demonstrates judges have very poor
comprehension of these concepts. Even in the judicial
dissent of the decision reached in Daubert, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said,
Questions arise simply from reading this
part of the Court's opinion, and countless
more questions will surely arise when
hundreds of district judges try to apply its
175 Wells et al., supra note 130.
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teaching to particular offers of expert
testimony.. . . I defer to no one in my
confidence in federal judges; but I am at a
loss to know what is meant when it is said
that the scientific status of a theory depends
on its "falsifiability," and I suspect some of
them will be, too.'
Thus, without out a solid understanding of science, how
could one expect consistency in the judicial evaluation of
scientific expert testimony or scientific evidence in general,
much less across divergent disciplines that use different
research tools and methodologies?
This situation would appear to guarantee a judicial
system that lacks reliability, consistency, and validity in
terms of reaching proper and accurate conclusions
regarding the credibility of scientific evidence.
Consequently, it may lead judges to simply "let it all in and
let the jury sort it out." Yet, as the eyewitness research
reviewed here reveals, jury members lack
knowledgeability, and, to compound matters further, they
obviously have less training than the trial judge. Thus, it
appears that neither the judge nor the jury serve as a
safeguard to the system with respect to the evaluation of
scientific testimony. This problem is further exacerbated
by the appellate standard of review, which affords almost
total deference to the trial judge under the abuse of
discretion standard. These types of decisions then seem to
be made for self-protection and result in a judicial system
that is highly resistant to change. With the reasoning of
Justice Rehnquist ringing loud and clear, the stare decisis
system of common law tends to lock in an incorrect
decision for a protracted period of time, thereby rendering
the system inflexible.
Perhaps one solution to this problem is to amend
176 509 U.S. 579, 600.
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Rule 702, return to the Frye standard, and look to the
acceptability of a scientific finding among experts in the
field. Another solution is to provide a stronger mechanism
for a trial court to utilize Rule 706, as suggested by Justice
Blackmun in Daubert.177 Under Rule 706, a trial judge,
faced with completely opposing opinions on an issue,
whether medical, engineering, or otherwise, may call an
independent expert to assess the methodology used by the
opposing experts, and who then provide the trial judge with
his opinion on admissibility of the scientific evidence.
178
This action would place the expert in the role of being a
"friend of the court" versus being viewed by the court as a
hired gun or advocate for the side who is paying his or her
fee.
Further, this article's analysis of this issue has
revealed additional problems. For example, we learn from
this investigation that appellate courts use terminology not
contained in Rule 702 time and time again. What does it
mean to "invade the province of the jury"? What is the
common or ordinary knowledge of a juror? How should a
battle of the experts occur if the gatekeeper is watching the
gate? If there is a battle of the experts, why is it bad if the
jury obtains more knowledge? Why does the system err in
favor of keeping information from the jury? How can a
court, in retrospect, possibly know if an error was
harmless?
Finally, if eyewitness memory were common sense,
then why are errors in eyewitness identification the leading
cause of wrongful convictions? Furthermore, why would
the Department of Justice perceive the problem to be of
such magnitude that it would develop and distribute a
Guide for law enforcement and a training manual for how
to use the Guide? In light of these developments and the
eyewitness research on which they are founded, to claim
17 7 Id. at 582.
178 FED. R. EvID. 706.
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that eyewitness memory is common sense to a jury and
non-scientific is simply nonsensical. Interestingly, the
Guide was not mentioned in a single case of our case-by-
case analysis.
One obvious solution to the problem is to admit
eyewitness experts, allow them to testify about the
difference between estimator and system variables, and
about how these variables impact eyewitness
identifications. Estimator variables are not under the
control of the legal system, but are related to characteristics
of the witness and the circumstances in which the
remembered event was experienced, such as the presence
or absence of a weapon, age of the witness, and lighting
conditions. 179
System variables, in contrast, involve the
procedures used by law enforcement to collect
identification evidence, such as how the lineup is
constructed and presented, as well as the nature of the
instructions that witnesses are given. 180 The expert could
also testify about whether or not the procedures used in a
particular case were consistent with the Guide, thus
providing an important source of information to the jury
concerning the procedural flaws that can adversely affect
eyewitness accuracy. Even if this information does not
eventually reach a jury, it still can play a pivotal role in
earlier stages of the legal process.
It is time for the judicial system to stop being an
island and start building bridges to other repositories of
information. After all, if a social science has enough
credibility to find its way into colleges, universities, and
government policy, why can it not be permitted to find its
way into our judicial system?
179 Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System
Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1546, 1557 (1978).
180 !d.
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Appendix
Table 1: Judicial Admissibility Decisions on Eyewitness Expert
Testimony
Approach Decision type Result Explanation
P
R Per se Testimony The testimony will be






























The trial court did not
abuse its discretionary




Although the testimony is
admissible in general, it
was not admitted in this
case; rationale suggests
admissibility of testimony
is possible but not
probable. This category
can also include cases in
which some testimony was
admitted but the
defendant appealed the
exclusion of the remaining
testimony.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretionary
powers in admitting the
testimony.
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The trial court abused its
discretionary powers in
excluding the testimony
when it should have been
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The reviewing court finds
that the trial court did not
properly review the expert
testimony and remands it
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Table 2: State and Federal Categorization by Approach
Prohibitory: Court
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inadmissibility.
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in general, the court
found that discretion
was not abused in
refusing to admit, and
rationale often suggests
admissibility of
testimony is possible but
not probable.
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May Be Admissible:
Discretion Abused in






May Be Admissible: South Dakota None
Discretion Not Abused
in Admitting testimony.









2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 439
Table 3: Decisions and Rationale by State
State Most Recent Case Ruling
1. Alabama Exparte Williams, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
594 So. 2d 1225 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
(Ala. 1992). Admit. Expert not familiar with facts of
case, had no personal contact with victim
or knowledge of event.
2. Alaska Skamarocius v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
State, 731 P.2d 63 Discretion Abused in Refusing to
(Alaska Ct. App. Admit. Trial court ruling overturned,
1987). testimony should have been admitted.
Trial court abused its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony because
the identification of defendant as the
assailant by the witness was weak and
uncorroborated.
3. Arizona State v. Nordstrum, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
25 P.3d 717 (Ariz. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
2001). Admit. The expert was permitted to
testify at length about a variety of
eyewitness variables, but was not
permitted to express any opinion about
the accuracy of the defendant's
eyewitness testimony or to address the
specifics of this case.
4. Arkansas Utley v. State, 826 Discretionary - Inadmissible. The
S.W.2d 268 (Ark. question whether these witnesses were
1992). mistaken in their identification, whether
from fright or other cause, was one which
the jury, and not an expert witness,
should answer. The experts testimony
was a matter of common understanding
and would not assist the trier of fact.
5. California People v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
McDonald, 690 Discretion Abused in Refusing to
P.2d 709 (Cal. Admit. Trial court judgment reversed.
1984). The exclusion the eyewitness expert was
not harmless error. The court found it
reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have
been reached in absence of this error, and
the judgment must be reversed.
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6. Colorado People v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Campbell, 847 Case Remanded. The trial court erred in
P.2d 228 (Colo. Ct. relying on Frye as a basis for excluding
App. 1992). the proffered testimony. This error was
not harmless, and the case was remanded
to vacate judgment and reevaluate the
admissibility of the expert's testimony.
7. Connecticut State v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
McClendon, 730 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
A.2d 1107 (Conn. Admit. The general principles should
1999). come as no surprise to the average juror.
He was unable to state his opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
8. Delaware Garden v. State, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
815 A.2d 327 (Del. Discretion Abused in Refusing to
2003). Admit but was Harmless Error. Partial
testimony allowed. Expert testified on a
variety of estimator variables but was not
permitted to testify on the
confidence/accuracy relationship. The
exclusion was ruled an abuse of
discretion but found to be harmless error.
9. District of No cases found.
Columbia
10. Florida Johnson v. State, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Held that
438 So. 2d 774 a jury is capable of assessing a witness'
(Fla. 1983). ability to perceive and remember, given
assistance of cross-examination and
cautionary instruction.
11. Georgia Johnson v. State, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
526 S.E.2d 549 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
(Ga. 2000). Admit. Abundance of corroborating
evidence.
12. Hawaii No Cases Found No Cases found.
13. Idaho State v. Pacheco, 2 Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
P.3d 752 (Idaho Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Ct. App. 2000). Admit. Court refused to allow expert to
testify on the memory or perceptions'of
See also State v. witnesses relative to the presence of a
Hoisington, 657 firearm on the ground that such testimony
P.2d 17 (Idaho would not assist the trier of fact. This
1983). court does recognize, however, that in
certain circumstances such testimony
may be of assistance to the jury.
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14. Illinois State v. Tisdel, 788 Discretionary- May Be Admissible,
N.E.2d 1149 (Il1. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
App. Ct. 2003). Admit. The record shows that the judge
considered the reliability and potential
helpfulness of the testimony, balanced
the proffered testimony against cases in
which this court has upheld the exclusion
of such evidence, and found that the
testimony would not assist the jury. The
court notes, however, that had the trial
court allowed the testimony, it would not
have been an abuse of discretion.
15. Indiana Cook v. State, 734 Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
2000). Admit. Defendant failed to establish the
factual predicate upon which his expert's
testimony would have rested. The
number of witnesses identifying
defendant as the shooter supports the
view that expert testimony in this case
would not have assisted the jury in
understanding the evidence or
determining any fact in issue.
16. Iowa State v. Schutz, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
579 N.W.2d 317 Discretion Abused in Refusing to
(Iowa 1998). Admit, Case Remanded. Per se
exclusionary rule overturned. The
exclusion of expert testimony is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and it was error to apply the
per se rule of exclusion. Case remanded
to the district court for a new trial.
17. Kansas State v. Gaines, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Reliability
926 P.2d 641 of eyewitness identification is within the
(Kan. 1996). realm ofjurors' knowledge and
experience. We continue to follow the
previous line of cases and hold that
expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification should not be admitted.
18. Kentucky Commonwealth v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Christie, 98 Discretion Abused in Refusing to
S.W.3d 485 (Ky. Admit, Case Remanded. Per se
2002). exclusionary rule overturned. Lack of
direct evidence against defendant so
expert testimony should have been
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admitted. Blanket exclusion of expert
testimony was due to the trial court's
incorrect belief that that the testimony
was inadmissible per se. Case remanded
for new trial to determine the relevancy
and reliability of the testimony under a
proper analysis.
19. Louisiana State v. Gurley, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Prejudicial
565 So. 2d 1055 effect outweighs its probative value and
(La. Ct. App. usurps jury's function. The testimony
1990). would not have been an aid to the jury.
20. Maine State v. Kelly, 752 Discretionary - Inadmissible. The trial
A.2d 188 (Me. court found that the testimony would not
2000). be helpful to the jury, and the court did
instruct the jury. Therefore, the court's
See also State v. conclusion that the expert's testimony
Rich, 549 A.2d would not be helpful is not clearly
742 (Me. 1988). erroneous, and its decision to deny funds
for that reason was within its broad
discretion.
21. Maryland Bloodsworth v. Discretionary - Inadmissible. Reliability
State, 512 A.2d of the witnesses and the identification is
1056 (Md. 1986). better tested by cross-examination than
by the opinion of an expert. Defendant
failed to make a case for the use of an
expert by failing to persuade the court
that the technique has general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community, and
the proffer is not sufficient to persuade
exactly what is even being offered to the
jury other than some generalized
explanation of the studies that have been
made. Nothing that has been proffered
suggests that it will be helpful.
22. Massachusetts Commonwealth v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Santoli, 680 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
N.E.2d 1116; Admit. No error in excluding the
(Mass. 1997). testimony where the physical evidence
and other facts provided significant
corroboration of the victim's
identification.
23. Michigan People v. Hill, 269 Discretionary - Inadmissible. The court
N.W. 2d 492 rejected defendant's assertion that the
(Mich. Ct. App. trial court erred in excluding expert
59
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 443
[1978). 1testimony on the process by which people
perceive and remember events and how
pretrial identification procedures could
affect this process. The expert did not
interview the eyewitnesses about whom
he was to testify and only observed them
in the courtroom. Also, the trial court
offered to let defendant pursue the matter
in closing argument.
24. Minnesota State v. Miles, 585 Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
N.W.2d 368 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
(Minn. 1998). Admit. There is nothing to suggest that
expert testimony on the accuracy of
eyewitness identification in general
would be particularly helpful to the jury
in evaluating the specific eyewitness
testimony. Numerous safeguards are in
place, and there was other corroborating
evidence.
25. Mississippi White v. State, 847 Discretionary - Inadmissible. Evidence
So. 2d 886 (Miss. did not rely on proven scientific
Ct. App. 2002). principles and court held that they had
been shown nothing to suggest that the
science about which the expert was to
testify is generally accepted.
26. Missouri State v. Whitmill, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Relates to
780 S.W.2d 45 the credibility of witnesses and
(Mo. 1989). constitutes an invasion of the province of
the jury.
27. Montana No cases found.
28. Nebraska State v. George, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Expert
645 N.W.2d 777 testimony on reliability of eyewitness
(Neb. 2002). identifications is unnecessary.




29. Nevada White v. State, 926 Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
P.2d 291 (Nev. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
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State, 839 P.2d
589 (Nev. 1992).
30. New No cases found No cases found.
Hampshire
31. New Jersey State v. Gunter, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
554 A.2d 1356 Case Remanded. Because there was no
(N.J. Super. Ct. preliminary hearing, we cannot say with
App. Div. 1989). any assurance whether the proffered
testimony would have actually assisted
the jury. Nor can we begin to consider
the reliability issue. Case remanded to
hold preliminary hearing to determine
scientific reliability of expert's
testimony.
32. New Mexico No cases found No cases found.
33. New York People v. Lee, 750 Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
2001). Admit. The trial court was aware of
corroborating evidence in addition to the
identification testimony. Given the
particular facts and circumstances, we
cannot say the trial court's denial
constituted an abuse of discretion.
34. North State v. Lee, 572 Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
Carolina S.E.2d 170 (N.C. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Ct. App. 2002). Admit. Testimony not case specific and
lacked probative value.
35. North State v. Fontaine, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Dakota 382 N.W. 2d 374 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
(N.D. 1986). Admit. Partial testimony allowed. Expert
testified on several estimator variables,
but was not allowed to answer a
hypothetical question concerning
accuracy. The court did not abuse its
discretion.
36. Ohio State v. Buell, 489 Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
N.E.2d 795 (Ohio Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
1986). Admit. Expert testimony regarding the
credibility of a typical witness is
admissible, but testimony regarding the
credibility of a particular witness is not.
37. Oklahoma Torres v. State, Discretionary - May Be Admissible;
1 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
61
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 445
Crim. App. 1998). Admit. While it might be that expert
testimony regarding eyewitness
identification would have been
admissible in this case, defendant did not
present any evidence to show what that
expert testimony would have revealed or
how the failure to present such expert
evidence prejudiced him.
38. Oregon State v. Goldsby, Discretionary - Inadmissible. Although
650 P.2d 952 (Or. eyewitness identification evidence has a
Ct. App. 1982). built-in potential for error, the law does
not deal with that by allowing experts to
debate the quality of evidence for the
jury.
39. Pennsylvania Commonwealth v. Prohibitory - Inadmissible. Testimony
Abdul-Salaam, 678 would give unwarranted appearance of
A.2d 342 (Pa. authority as to the subject of credibility, a
1996). subject which an ordinary juror can
assess.
40. Rhode State v. Martinez, Discretionary - Inadmissible. In general,
Island 774 A.2d 15 (R.I. the jury does not need assistance in
2001). determining the trustworthiness of an
eyewitness.
41. South State v. Whaley, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Carolina 406 S.E.2d 369 Discretion Abused in Refusing to
(S.C. 1991). Admit. Trial court ruling reversed and
case remanded. It was an abuse of
discretion to exclude the expert's
testimony concerning eyewitness
reliability because the main issue in this
case was the identity of the assailant, the
only evidence establishing the defendant
as the assailant was the testimony of the
two eyewitnesses, and other factors
existed which could have affected the
identification.
42. South State v. McCord, Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Dakota 505 N.W.2d 388 Discretion Not Abused in Admitting.
(S.D. 1993). The only case in which the prosecution
called an identification expert. The court
ruled that jurors do not possess an
expert's comprehensive training in
assessing the reliability of identification.
The court found that the trial court did
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not abuse its discretion in finding this
testimony as relevant.
43. Tennessee State v. McKinney, Prohibitory. Per se exclusionary rule.
74 S.W.3d 291 Expert testimony regarding eyewitness
(Tenn. 2002). identification is inadmissible and the
exclusion of such testimony does not
See also State v. violate a defendant's due process right to
Coley, 32 S.W.3d present a defense.
831 (Tenn. 2000).
44. Texas Weatherred v. Discretionary - Inadmissible. Appellant
State, 15 S.W.3d failed to carry his burden of showing that
540 (Tex. Crim. the proffered testimony was scientifically
App. 2000). reliable or relevant.
45. Utah State v. Maestas, Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
63 P.3d 621 (Utah Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
2002). Admit. The trial court is in the best
position to balance the probative value of
proffered testimony against the risk of
intrusion upon the fact-finding functions
of the jury. The trial court acted within its
discretion in excluding the testimony.
46. Vermont State v. Percy, 595 Discretionary - Inadmissible. Juries may
A.2d 248 (Vt. be made to understand psychological
1990). factors which affect accuracy of an
identification through cross-examination
and closing arguments.
47. Virginia Currie v. Discretionary - May Be Admissible.
Commonwealth, Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
515 S.E.2d 335 Admit. Partial testimony allowed. It was
(Va. Ct. App. not error to limit expert witness's
1999). testimony concerning the correlation
between eyewitness certainty and
accuracy, and those other areas of
witness's proffered testimony which were
within the common knowledge and
experience of the jurors.
48. Washington State v. Nordlund, Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
113 Wash. App. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
1033 (Wash. Ct. Admit. During voir dire, the trial court
App'. 2002). found that the potential jurors' answers
demonstrated that they already
understood each of the factors the expert
wanted to explain.
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49. West State v. Taylor, Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
Virginia 490 S.E.2d 748 Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
(W.Va. 1997). Admit. The testimony would not have
affected the overall outcome of the case.
Fees to hire an expert were denied.
50. Wisconsin State v. Blair, 473 Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
N.W.2d 566 (Wis. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
Ct. App. 1991). Admit. All topics proffered were within
the common knowledge and sense and
perception of the jury.
51. Wyoming Engberg, v. Meyer, Discretionary - May Be Admissible,
820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. Discretion Not Abused in Refusing to
1991). Admit. The court recognizes the modem
trend more favorable to the admission of
expert testimony relating to eyewitness
identification, but holds that their
consistent rule is that the admission of
expert testimony is within the discretion
of the trial court.
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United States v. Brien,
59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir.
1995).
May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Abused in Exclusion.
The court of appeals sustained the
district court's ruling not to admit the
testimony on the ground that the defense
offered practically nothing as far as a
proffer of data or literature underlying
the expert's assumptions and
conclusions, despite being asked for it
repeatedly. There is no reason it
couldn't be supplied, and it was
necessary since the expert's testimony
"did not concern a single long-
established scientific principle."
Second United States v. May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Circuit Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 Abused in Exclusion.
Connecticut Ci. 1999). The court of appeals upheld the district
New York court's ruling that the expert could not
Vermont testify on the confidence-accuracy
relationship. It "would have confused
the jury's assessment of the officers'
credibility, thereby usurping their role."
Third Circuit United States v. Mathis, May Be Admissible. Discretion
264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. Abused in Exclusion.
Delaware 2001). Despite finding that the government
New Jersey abused its discretion in not admitting
Pennsylvania several pieces of the proffered
testimony, the court of appeals
ultimately decided that had the
testimony been admitted, the outcome of
the case would not have been different.
Harmless error.
Fourth United States v. Harris, May Be Admissible. Discretion Not
Circuit 995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. Abused in Exclusion.
1993). The court affirmed the district court's
Maryland judgment, finding that none of the
North
Carolina limited circumstances under which
South courts allow expert testimony on
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Fifth Circuit United States v. Moore, Not Admitted: Admissible, but
786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
Louisiana 1986). The decision whether to admit this
Mississippi testimony is squarely within the
Texas discretion of the trial judge and properly
so. This is not a case in which the
eyewitness identification testimony is
critical. Even if the identifications of the
defendants are completely disregarded,
the other evidence of guilt are
overwhelming.
Sixth Circuit United States v. Langan, Not Admitted: Admissible, but
263 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
Kentucky 2001). The court of appeals affirmed the
Michigan judgment of the district court in that it
Ohio agreed that the testimony failed to meet
the second prong of Daubert, which
requires that the proposed testimony fit
the issue to which the expert is
testifying. The court agreed that the
"hazards of eyewitness identification are
within the ordinary knowledge of most
lay jurors."
Seventh United States v. Not Admitted: Admissible, but
Circuit Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826 Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
(7th Cir. 2000). The court denies the defendant's motion
Indiana for the appointment of an eyewitness
Wisconsin identification expert because "the facts
of the case do not create an unusual or
compelling situation in which the aid of
an expert witness is required" and "as
the Seventh Circuit has stated, cross
examination, cautionary instructions,
and corroborating evidence can obviate
the need for expert testimony on
eyewitness identification."
Eiehth United States v. Kime, Inadmissible.
Circuit 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir.
1996). The court agrees with the district's court
Arkansas ruling to not admit the testimony for
Iowa several reasons: the testimony fails to
Minnesota qualify as "scientific knowledge" under
Nebraska Daubert's first prong; it fails under the
North Dakota second prong because it would not assist
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United States v.
Labansat, 94 F.3d 527
(9th Cir. 1996).
South Dakota
Tenth Circuit United States v. Smith, Not Admitted: Admissible, but
156 F.3d 1046 (10th Discretion Not Abused in Exclusion.
Colorado Cir. 1998). The district court did not abuse its
Kansas discretion in excluding the testimony.
New Mexico The district court considered the matter
Oklahoma in detail, conducting a lengthy Daubert
Wyoming hearing. There were five eyewitnesses
identifications, not one.
Eleventh United States v. Smith, Inadmissible.
Circuit 122 F.3d 1355 (11 th
Cir. 1997). The court explains that, under the prior
Alabama panel precedent rule, it is bound by
Florida earlier panel holdings. Expert testimony
Georgia not needed because the jury could
determine reliability under the tools of
cross-examination and jury instruction
to highlight particular problems in
eyewitness recollection. The defendant
was successful in this case in getting the
district court to instruct the jury about
cross-racial identification, potential bias
the trier of fact since the evaluation of
eyewitness testimony is for the jury
alone and the testimony would intrude
the jury's domain; the minimal
probative value is outweighed by the
danger of juror confusion; the concerns
were adequately addressed in jury
instruction; and the testimony was
supported by several other witnesses.
Inadmissible.
The court upheld the district court's
denial of the defendants request for
funds to hire an expert on eyewitness
identification because "as we have
previously explained, 'the admissibility
of this type of expert is strongly
disfavored in most courts' and any
weaknesses.. .can ordinarily be revealed
by counsel's careful cross-examination."
The defendant has not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that he was
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in earlier identification, delay between
even and time of identification, and
stress. Therefore expert testimony not
needed.
No cases found.D.C. Circuit
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ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL ALLOCATION OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE VOTES*
Christopher Duquette*& David Schultz::
I. Introduction
The Electoral College is an American political and
constitutional curiosity. The constitutional framers
believed it would produce "extraordinary persons" as
presidents because they would be selected by "men most
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station" of
the presidency.' Its more recent defenders, such as Martin
Diamond, have justified it as either a constitutional system
meant to protect individual and minority rights or a
mechanism to overcome regionalism. 2 In Diamond's view,
along with the principles of separation of powers and
checks and balances, it was necessary to thwart the dangers
of factionalism that a popular government posed.3  Some
have noted that, with an Electoral College, national
recounts are unnecessary, as only the votes cast in disputed
jurisdictions would need to be recounted.4
* The authors acknowledge Rick -Hasen of Loyola Law School (Los
Angeles) for his thoughtful comments on this article, as well as Hester
Peirce from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission for
her editorial suggestions.
+ Research Staff, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia.
* Professor, Graduate School of Management and Department of
Criminal Justice and Forensic Science, Hamline University, and School
of Law, University of Minnesota.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 444 (James Madison) (Modem Library
1937).
2 Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration
of the Framers'Intent, 53 AMER. POL. SCI. R. 52 (1959).
3 id.
4 RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 224-27 (2001). See
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Yet, the Electoral College also has its detractors. It
has been criticized as undemocratic, as denying individual
liberty and the fundamental right to vote, and as no longer
serving the purpose for which it was established.
5
Following the 2000 presidential election-where George
Bush lost the national popular vote to Al Gore but won the
Electoral College vote-those criticisms intensified.6
The 2000 election was not the first to showcase
these peculiar aspects of the Electoral College. In 1800, for
example, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr deadlocked
with equal numbers of electoral votes.7 The House of
Representatives decided the election in favor of Jefferson.
8
In 1824, Andrew Jackson received the plurality of popular
and electoral votes, yet lost to John Quincy Adams in the
House of Representatives. 9 In 1876, Samuel J. Tilden
also Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 396 (2001)
(examining the various issues surrounding the administration of
presidential elections, including state recounts).
See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES:
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1992).
6 See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE
SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR
PRESIDENT (2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How
THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); ABNER GREENE,
UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 22-26 (2001) (reviewing
criticisms of the Electoral College); DOUGLAS KELLNER, GRAND THEFT
2000: MEDIA SPECTACLE AND A STOLEN ELECTION (2001); POSNER,
supra note 4, at 224-27 (reviewing criticisms of the Electoral College);
Jack N. Rakove, The E-College in the E-Age, in THE UNFINISHED
ELECTION OF 2000 201, 221-27 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
7 Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were running as a team. At the
time, each elector could cast two votes. The candidate receiving the
most votes was elected president, and the number-two vote recipient
was elected vice president.
8 DUMAS MALONE & BASIL RAUCH, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY: THE
GENESIS AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 323-327
(1960).
9 Id. at 430-32.
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received more of the popular vote than did Rutherford B.
Hayes, but disputes in Florida regarding who to recognize
as electors resulted in a compromise that awarded the
presidency to Hayes.' 0 Again, in 1888, Grover Cleveland
received more popular votes than Benjamin Harrison, but
Harrison became President with a majority of the electoral
vote." For some, these elections reveal the undemocratic
character of the Electoral College. 12
Others maintain that the Electoral College deRresses
voter turnout' or creates a system of wasted votes. 14 Still
others see the Electoral College as discouraging the
formation and support of third parties. 15 Ralph Nader and
Green Party backers articulated this criticism in recent
presidential races. 16  A further criticism of the Electoral
College arises from the practice of all states-except for
Maine and Nebraska-to award all of their electoral votes
to the presidential candidate receiving the plurality of the
10 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B.
Morris, eds., 1988); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE
DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 (2004).
11 GREENE, supra note 6, at 22 (for a review of the historical problems
with the Electoral College).
12 For a review of these claims, see generally GREENE, supra note 6;
POSNER, supra note 4.
13 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote and Election 2000, in THE
UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 75, 96 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
14 An example cited is a situation where an overwhelming majority of
the population in a state has one preference, causing some in the
minority in that state to abstain from voting. See GEORGE C.
EDWARDS, III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA
(2004) (arguing that the Electoral College serves to disenfranchise
many voters not living in competitive states).
15 Thomas M. Durbin, The Anachronistic Electoral College: The Time
For Reform, 39 FED B. N.J. 510 (1992).
16 Nader Brushes Off Spoiler Role, Lubbockonline (November 15,
2000), available at
http://quest.lubbockonline.com/stories/lll500/nad_1115006860.shtml
(last visited on September 7, 2006).
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popular vote in their states.' 
7
In light of the history and criticism levied against
the Electoral College, it is worth asking whether awarding
electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis is unfair or, more
importantly, unconstitutional. In the 1966 case Delaware
v. New York, the Supreme Court refused to hear an original
jurisdiction case that would have argued that question. 18 In
particular, the Court was asked to decide whether the state
winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes
violated the "one person, one vote" standard that had been
articulated in Reynolds v. Sims. 19 Without comment, the
Court declined review, leaving in doubt how to interpret the
unexplained denial.2°
Since 1966, two conditions have changed,
suggesting that the constitutionality or fairness of the
winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes should
be revisited. First, in 1966, the reapportionment and "one
person, one vote" jurisprudence was in its infancy. Four
decades later, it is more constitutionally developed in terms
of its application and scope. 21 Second, under the winner-
take-all method, the occurrence of a scenario similar to
what happened in Florida in 2000 was likely. That scenario
very nearly happened in the 1960 election, when Texas and
17 GREENE, supra note 6, at 25; POSNER, supra note 4, at 231, 239;
GERALD M. POMPER, The Presidential Election, in THE ELECTION OF
2000 125, 150 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 2001). During the 2004
presidential election, voters in Colorado rejected a state ballot measure
to amend the state constitution to award that state's electoral votes
proportional to the popular-vote vote breakdown. See Colorado
Secretary of State, Colorado Amendment 36: Selection of Presidential
Electors, available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/tb-
final99.htm (last visited July 10, 2006).
18 Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
'9 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20 385 U.S. at 895, reh 'g denied.
21 Specifically, by the time Delaware v. New York was filed, it was not
clear how far the one person, one vote jurisprudence would be legally
applied.
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Illinois represented the margin of John F. Kennedy's
victory over Richard M. Nixon, amid serious allegations of
irregularities in both states.22 When these allegations
arose, they brought the inequities in the operation of the
Electoral College to the forefront.
This article will present a new method of assessing
the inequities of the winner-take-all method states use to
allocate electoral votes, and will show that such a system
produces significant inequities in the voting power of
citizens across states. 23 In so doing, the article makes two
claims. First, states do have broad power to choose
electors, but that power must be read in light of the current
voting rights and reapportionment jurisprudence. Second,
the "one person, one vote" standard for reapportionment
calls into question the fairness, if not the constitutionality,
of the winner-take-all approach for awarding presidential
electors.
In effect, this article argues for the repeal of winner-
take-all methods for selecting electoral votes. It contends
that if the Court were to hear a case like Delaware v. New
York today, notwithstanding what Article II of the
Constitution says, a candidate or state could make a case
that the winner-take-all method of awarding presidential
electors is unconstitutional.24 In the alternative, this article
22 THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1960, 350-65
(Atheneum 1961).
23 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 396 ("The need for uniformity itself is
echoed in the Constitution, which requires a uniform day for choosing
presidential electors. On the other hand, each state picks its own
electors for the Electoral College, so equality in the weighting of votes
across states is affirmatively rejected in the Constitution.").
24 Whether the Court would entertain and accept the argument is a
matter of debate. Even if it did not, one can still argue that the
inequities in voter strength across states created by the winner-take-all
method contribute to the existing criticisms of the Electoral College,
and thereby add more fuel to why states should abandon this
presidential election selection system in the interest of protecting the
voting rights of their citizens.
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advocates that states abandon winner-take-all systems on
their own in the interest of fairness and enhancing, in many
cases, the influence that their citizens have in the selection
of the president.
To make these claims, this article briefly discusses
the constitutional power that states have to select their
presidential electors. 25 This article then provides a brief
discussion of the right to vote in the context of
reapportionment, especially as it is relevant to the Electoral
College and presidential selection.26 Next, it provides a
new way to assess the relative weighting of electoral votes,
making the case that the winner-take-all allocation of
electoral votes leads to distortions. 27 Finally, the article
argues that those distortions violate the "one person, one
vote" constitutional standard.28
Overall, this article contends that even if the
Supreme Court is unwilling to address the constitutionality
of the winner-take-all method, as a matter of law or public
policy, states might wish to consider eliminating this
method of allocating electoral votes. While the winner-
take-all method can have the effect of boosting the
influence of some states' citizens in presidential elections,
it does so by marginalizing the influence of voters from
other states.
II. State Power and the Electoral College
From the text of the Constitution, state legislatures
appear to have plenary power to determine the selection of
their presidential electors. Article II, Sections 2 through 5
of the Constitution, read in conjunction with the Twelfth
Amendment, describe the process for the selection of the
President. According to Article II, "Each State shall
25 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Part IV.
28See infra Part V.
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appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress." 29 Indeed, in the only two cases
where the Supreme Court has adjudicated Article II,
Section 2, the Justices have given states broad authority to
determine how electors are selected.3 °
In McPherson v. Blacker, 31 the State of Michigan
enacted a law changing the selection of its electors. The
Secretary of State challenged this law as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting this challenge, the
Court interpreted the Constitution as giving state
legislatures "plenary authority to direct the manner of
appointment" of its electors. 32  According to the Court,
Michigan was free to determine how its electors would be
chosen, subject to the limitations of its state constitution. 33
Bush v. Gore34 is the only other case in which the
Court has directly addressed the state power over the
selection of electors. In this case, the Court considered
whether the manner of counting the ballots in the disputed
Florida 2000 presidential election violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35  In
ruling that it did, the Court built upon its voting rights and
reapportionment jurisprudence, indicating that the right to
vote was "protected in more than the initial allocation of
the franchise." 36 Specifically, the Court extended the right-
to-vote protection to the counting of ballots. The Court
limited this holding, however, by noting that while the
29 U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 2.
30 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
31 146 U.S. at 1.
32 Id. at 25.
33 id.
14531 U.S. at 98.
35 Id. at 105.
36 Id. at 104.
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Constitution does not grant individuals the right to vote in
presidential elections, states do.37 More importantly, the
Court, quoting McPherson, reiterated that the State's power
to determine the selection of their electors is plenary.
3 8
In addition to the per curiam opinion in Bush v.
Gore, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, also discusses the authority of states to conduct
presidential elections and select electors.3 9  The Chief
Justice first noted how the text of the Constitution imposes
upon states a duty to select its electors. 40 In imposing that
duty, Rehnquist cited McPherson for the proposition that
the Constitution "convey[s] the broadest power of
determination and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to
define the method of appointment."4  Thus, as with the per
curiam opinion, the Chief Justice seems to suggest that
state legislatures have broad discretion to select their
electors and conduct presidential elections. In fact, as part
of this deference, Congress enacted Title 3 U.S.C. § 5 to
present state legislatures with a "safe harbor" for their
determination of how electors are to be selected, if disputes
over them are challenged in Congress. 4 2 This safe harbor
provision, along with the text of the Constitution,
necessitated that the Court review "postelection state-court
actions" by the Florida Supreme Court to be sure that these
judicial proceedings did not trample upon the power of the
State Legislature to determine the manner of selection for
its electors.43 In effect, the power of legislatures to pick
their electors is so plenary that it might alter or affect the
normal separation of powers within a state such that their
37 id.
38 i.
39 Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J. and Thomas, J. concurring).
4° d. at 112.
41 Id. at 113 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27) (internal quotation
marks omitted).421d. at 113-14.
43 1d. at 114.
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courts might not be able to second guess how they
determine presidential selection."
Notwithstanding Article II, Section 2, McPherson,
and Bush, the near plenary power of states to award their
electoral votes does not mean that states can otherwise
violate the Constitution. For example, could a state decide
to let only women or whites vote in presidential elections or
serve as electors? Discriminatory practices that use race or
gender as a factor have been declared unconstitutional in
many circumstances. 45 The use of race in reapportionment
has also been found to violate the Constitution.
46
Legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act, 47 has declared
discrimination in voting based on race illegal. Overall, the
argument that the plenary power of states to allocate
electoral votes must be qualified; such power cannot be
exercised in violation of other constitutional and statutory
limits.
48
The Supreme Court has also noted the uniqueness
of the presidential selection process and has been willing to
address how states conduct presidential elections. For
example, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,49 the Supreme Court
441d. at 112-13.
45 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars the intentional use of race by
governments); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (ruling by
a four person plurality that classifications on the basis of gender are
suspect); Gormillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that
the use of race in districting violates the Fifteenth Amendment);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding
classifications on the basis of race are suspect).
46 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 620 (1993); Gormillion, 364 U.S. at 339.
See also infra Part III.47 See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
48 See generally Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush
v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential
Electors, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 535, 536 (2001) (arguing the Constitution
should be interpreted to place some limits on the ability of states to
deny citizens the right to select presidential electors).
49 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
78
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 462
was willing to place limits on how states determine ballot
access for presidential candidates. In Burroughs v. United
States,5 ° the Court considered whether the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act applied to political committees seeking to
influence the selection of presidential electors. Ruling that
it did, the Court argued that, even though the power to
select electors resided with the states, Congress has the
authority to pass legislation to ensure that money does not
corrupt the electoral process.51
In Moore v. Ogilvie,52 the Court held that the "one
person, one vote" principle applied to petition gathering for
the selection of presidential electors. At issue was an
Illinois law regulating petition signatures for new parties,
as it was applied to "independent candidates for the offices
of electors of President and Vice President of the United
States from Illinois." 53  The law, which mandated a
geographic dispersion for signers, was held to violate the
"one person, one vote" standard because of the burden it
created by mandating that signatures be obtained in at least
fifty counties.54 The Court noted that, because of the way
the population was distributed in the state, residents in
some counties would have an easier time securing
signatures than in others. 55  If "one person, one vote"
applies to petition gathering for electors, would it not also
apply to how the electors are allocated?
Anderson, Burroughs, and Moore all demonstrate
that the power of states to select their electors is not
absolute. That power is subject to qualifications. While
the Court in Bush v. Gore declared that individuals have no
right to vote in presidential elections unless the states grant
'0 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
" Id. at 545.
52 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969).
531 d. at 815.
54 id.
5 Id at 819.
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such a power, 56 the Court stipulated in Moore that: "All
procedures used by a State as an integral part of the
election process must pass muster against the charges of
discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote. 57
This prophylactic against discrimination must apply, as the
Court stated in Bush v. Gore-when it extended the "one
person, one vote" standard of Reynolds to presidential vote
counting-to "more than the initial allocation of the
franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner
of its exercise." 58 Thus, in cases where states have granted
individuals the right to vote in presidential elections, that
right mandates that they not arbitrarily interfere with
awarding that right or in counting the presidential ballots.
Il. Voting Rights, Representation, and
Reapportionment
The Bush v. Gore holding that the Constitution does
not guarantee the right to vote in presidential elections
cannot be applied in isolation. The Court has also held that
voting is a fundamental right protected under the
Constitution, 59  especially in the context of
reapportionment. 
60
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates
that the federal government take a federal census every ten
years for the purpose of apportioning representation in the
House of Representatives. 6  The decennial census forms
the basis for the reallocation of House members among the
states based on population changes. Nothing in the plain
text of the Constitution, however, requires states to draw
House districts of equal population size or to redraw
56 531 U.S. at 104.
7 394 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted).
58531 U.S. at 104.
59 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
60 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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districts to reflect changes in population.
Therefore, elected officials often seek to manipulate
the apportionment process to their benefit by drawing lines
that will favor their re-election efforts. During the
nineteenth century, the majority of the nation's population
lived in rural areas, thereby giving those areas significant
political representation both in Congress and the state
legislatures. 62 By the early to mid-twentieth century, the
population centers had shifted to the cities. 63  Yet state
legislatures, still controlled by rural interests, refused to
reapportion and redistrict, for doing so would diminish the
power of the rural areas. 64  In addition, many states,
particularly in the South, were reluctant to redistrict
because urban areas were more heavily populated by
Blacks.65  Thus, efforts to forestall reapportionment
sometimes had a racial motive.
66
In 1946, after efforts to challenge the
malapportionment at the legislative level failed, the
Supreme Court reviewed whether the numerical inequality
in the apportionment of Illinois congressional districts was
constitutional.67 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter
stated that apportionment issues were nonjusticiable
political questions best handled by the legislatures and not
the courts. 6 8 Redistricting was a "political thicket" that the
courts would do well to avoid. 69
In 1962, however, the Supreme Court reversed
itself. In Baker v. Carr,70 the Court rejected the Colegrove
62 DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND




66 Id. See also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 339.
67 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
68 Id. at 554-55.
69 Id. at 556.
70 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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holding that reapportionment issues are political questions.
Instead, the Court held that issues alleging
malapportionment raise important constitutional questions
that are within the purview of the judiciary. A few years
earlier, the Court used the Fifteenth Amendment to strike
down a districting scheme in Alabama meant to dilute
African-American representation.7 1  Race was not a
permissible factor for the legislature to consider in
reapportionment.72
After Baker, the Supreme Court ruled on numerous
reapportionment issues. In Reynolds v. Sims,73 it held that
the right to vote was diluted if some districts were more
populous than others and that state legislative seats must be
drawn according to a "one person, one vote" standard. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated, "Legislators
represented people, not trees or acres."
' 7 4
The Court has since extended the "one person, one
vote" standard to other reapportionment contexts. For
example, in Westberry v. Sanders,75 the Court mandated
that congressional districts must be apportioned in a
manner that achieves numerical equality. In Avery v.
Midland County,76 the Court applied the "one person, one
vote" principle to local government units. Moreover, in
Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado,77 the Court
rejected state analogies to the United States Congress
where the Senate was apportioned by geography and the
House by population. The Lucas Court mandated that all
legislative seats must respect the "one person, one vote"
standard.78 In more recent cases, such as Karcher v.
71 Gormillion, 364 U.S. 339.
72 id.
7' 377 U.S. at 533.
74 Id. at 562.
7' 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
76 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
77 377 U.S. 713 (1964).71 Id. at 738-39.
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Daggett79 and Brown v. Thomson,80 the Court demanded
strict numerical equality for congressional districts while
permitting a deviation of approximately five percent from
equality at the state level to accommodate local
governments and avert the breakup of political subunits.
The Reynolds v. Sims8 1 line of cases establishes that
within the context of voting rights and reapportionment, the
"one person, one vote" standard is essential to the
protection of franchise and that the unequal weighing of
votes is unconstitutional. However, in Delaware v. New
82York, the Supreme Court declined to consider the
substantive merit of whether the "one person, one vote"
standard applied to the Electoral College. Is there reason to
think that the Court erred in not accepting the case and
reviewing the question on its merits? Might the winner-
take-all allocation of states' Electoral College votes violate
the "one person, one vote" standard?
IV. A Statistical Analysis of the Inequities That
Follow From Winner-Take-All
The events of the presidential election of 2000 left
many uneasy with the Electoral College. In that election,
the margin of victory for Republican George W. Bush over
Democrat Albert Gore was a mere 537 popular votes in
Florida. 83 Those votes-out of nearly six million cast in
the state-swung the State's twenty-five Electoral College
votes 84 to Bush, who ultimately defeated Gore by a mere
79 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
'o 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
81 377 U.S. at 533.
82 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
83 ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO
THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001).
84 In 2000, Florida cast twenty-five Electoral College votes. By the
2004 presidential election, Florida was allotted twenty-seven Electoral
College votes.
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four votes (271-267) in the Electoral College. 85 For five
weeks after the polls closed, the election's outcome
remained in doubt as the Bush and Gore camps battled in
the courts over the disputed Florida electors. 86 It took the
intervention of the United States Supreme Court to settle
the battle and determine the outcome of the election in
Florida, and thus, the nation. 87
While the exceedingly narrow margin in Florida in
2000 was atypical, the phenomenon of some states' small
margins of victory disproportionately influencing an
election's outcome was not. The winner-take-all allocation
of each state's Electoral College votes ensures that it will
happen in every election. Under winner-take-all, some
states' votes will count for more than others in determining
the outcome. This effect happens whether the election is a
cliffhanger or a landslide. All that changes from one
election to the next is the magnitude of its effect.
As noted earlier, the operation of the Electoral
College in electing the President is provided for in Article
II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. Each state's
Electoral College vote allotment is equal to the size of its
congressional delegation. The total number of electors is
equal to the total number of members of the Congress, plus
two "shadow" Senators and one "shadow" Representative
for the District of Columbia. At present, the United States
Senate is comprised of 100 members and the United States
House of Representatives is comprised of 435 members.
Adding the three "shadow" D.C. electors gives the
Electoral College its present total of 538 electors. 88 The
8 5 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
2000 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2001). The final margin when the
Electoral College convened was 271-266, as one of Gore's electors
refrained from voting for Gore.
86 See generally GREENE, supra note 83.
87 531 U.S. at 1046.
88 The District of Columbia is allotted three Electoral College votes to
compensate for its lack of a congressional delegation.
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Electoral College convenes in December following a
November presidential election, where a majority of the
electors is required to elect a President.89 Therefore, for an
Electoral College of 538 electors, 270 electors is the
minimum number required to win the presidency. In the
absence of a majority, the election is determined by the
House of Representatives, with each state's delegation
counting as one vote.
90
Others have noted how the Electoral College
disproportionately weighs the votes of smaller states
relative to larger states.9 1 This disproportionate weighting
occurs because each state's Electoral College votes are
equal to the sum of its votes in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The House votes are
apportioned on the basis of population, with each state
guaranteed at least one representative, regardless of
population. But the Senate votes are not; each state
receives two Senate votes, regardless of its population. For
example, California, which has 35 million residents,
receives the same number of Senate votes as Wyoming,
which has only 380,000 residents. As a result of the "plus-
two" Senate bonus, smaller states pack a slightly larger
Electoral College punch relative to their populations than
do larger states.
More significant, though, is the effect of the winner-
take-all allocation of each state's Electoral College votes.
At present, in all but two states, Maine and Nebraska, the
Electoral College votes are allocated to each state's
popular-vote winner. Such a winner-take-all allocation is
not mandated by the United States Constitution. Rather,
89 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (detailing the presidential selection
process in the House of Representatives should no candidate receive a
majority of the electoral votes).
91 See, e.g., John F. Banzhaf, III, One Man:3.312 Votes: A
Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 303
(1968).
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the Constitution provides that each state's electors shall be
appointed in a manner to be determined by its legislature.
92
The only stipulation is that a sitting member of Congress
cannot also serve as an elector. 93
Because the Constitution allows state legislatures to
determine how electors are appointed, it is not surprising
that all of the states-with the exception of Maine and
Nebraska-have opted for a winner-take-all allocation. At
the state level, such a course of action is a rational one.
Allocating electors on a winner-take-all basis boosts the
likelihood that candidates will visit a state and pay attention
to its concerns. For example, if Oregon, with its relatively
small population, is shaping up as a swing state, a last-
minute trip to the state might appear attractive to a
candidate. If the trip went well, it could have the effect of
swinging the full complement of the state's Electoral
College votes come Election Day. Candidates would be
less likely to court the state's voters if the state's Electoral
College votes were allocated on some other basis.
Clamoring for national candidates' attention, almost every
state ends up with a winner-take-all allocation.
What may be rational at the state level, however,
can lead to distortions at the national level.94 The winner-
take-all effect ensures that small swings in state-vote
margins can disproportionately influence the national
Electoral College count. In a close election, such swings
can even determine the winner. The extreme case is the
2000 presidential election, where 537 popular votes in
Florida represented the difference in awarding the state's
92 U.S.CONST. amend. XII.
93id.
9" An analogue is the states' competition for "pork-barrel" spending in
the United States Congress. Each state's congressional delegation
serves as an advocate for that state's spending priorities. To the extent
that they are successful, they boost the size of the federal budget.
Either taxes must be raised or deficits must accrue to finance the added
spending.
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twenty-five Electoral College votes, and, ultimately, the
election, to Bush over Gore. Four years later, in the
presidential election of 2004, the margin of victory for
Bush over Democrat John F. Kerry was the 119,000 votes
in Ohio that swung that state's twenty Electoral College
votes.95 In the presidential election of 1976, the margin of
victory for Democrat Jimmy Carter over Republican Gerald
Ford amounted to 175,000 votes in three critical states:
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Texas. 96  Nearly half of Carter's
297-240 Electoral College vote margin over Ford was
attributable to his winning Ohio.97  Carter won Ohio's
allotment of twenty-five Electoral College votes by a
margin of 11,116 popular votes.
98
Moreover, the winner-take-all effect holds
irrespective of the "plus-two" bonus. When each state's
electors are allocated on a winner-take-all basis, distortions
can arise. The "plus-two" bonus only serves to magnify the
effect of those distortions.
It is possible to quantify the magnitude of the
distortion that arises in each presidential election from the
winner-take-all allocation of each state's Electoral College
votes. The critical element is the number of swing votes-
the votes that represented the margin of victory for the
winning candidate. This is the number of votes that swing
a state to the winning candidate. 99 The rest of the votes for
each major-party candidate offset each other. Thus, the
95 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
2004 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2005).
96 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
1976 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1977).
97 Id. One of Ford's electors defected to vote for Ronald W. Reagan
when the Electoral College convened.
98 Id.
99 The swing votes have also been called "wasted votes." JAMES P.
LEVINE & DAVID W. ABBOTT, WRONG WINNER: THE COMING
DEBACLE IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 22-24 (1991); Lani Guinier,
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1606 (1993).
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swing votes are the ones that are of particular interest.
The key to this analysis is to determine the relative
impact of each state's swing votes in an election. The
impact of each state's swing votes is calculated by dividing
the number of Electoral College votes at stake by the
popular vote margin of victory for the winning candidate.
Invariably, the margin of victory dwarfs the number of
Electoral College votes, and the resulting fraction is tiny.
For ease of interpretation, each state's fraction can be
normalized with respect to the middle-ranking state for that
election. The states can then be ranked in order of their
swing voters' Electoral College impact for each election.
Begin with the most recent presidential election,
which occurred in 2004. Recall that Bush defeated Kerry
by a 286-252 electoral vote margin, and by 3.5 million
popular votes. Table 1 presents the state-by-state Electoral
College swing-vote impact rankings, for the fifty states plus
the District of Columbia. The results are normalized with
respect to that election's middle-ranking state, Alaska
(AK).
Table 1: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 2004
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact Impact Impact
WI 18.57 AR 1.28 TN 0.69
N.M. 13.34 AZ 1.27 WY 0.68
IA 11.38 MO 1.21 S.C. 0.64
N.H. 9.57 CA 1.18 GA 0.60
NV 5.09 W.V. 1.14 MS 0.58
PA 3.61 VA 1.07 N.Y. 0.57
OH 3.21 VT 1.05 KY 0.49
HI 2.36 R.I. 1.02 IN 0.47
DE 2.32 AK 1.00 KS 0.44
OR 2.28 CT 0.96 TX 0.44
MI 2.25 IL 0.90 NE 0.44
MN 2.23 MD 0.81 AL 0.41
CO 1.84 S.D. 0.79 D.C. 0.40
FL 1.55 N.D. 0.77 ID 0.39
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N.J. 1.55 N.C. 0.77 MA 0.36
WA 1.38 MT 0.71 OK 0.34
ME 1.35 LA 0.70 UT 0.28
Wisconsin topped the list of states for the 2004
election. Its ten Electoral College votes were won by Kerry
by a margin of 11,813 popular votes. Its popular-vote
margin was smaller than that of any other state, relative to
the number of Electoral College votes at stake. Only New
Mexico (N.M.) and New Hampshire (N.H.) had smaller
popular-vote margins, and they both carried fewer Electoral
College votes. Alaska (AK) was the median state. Bush
won its three Electoral College votes by a margin of 65,812
popular votes. At the bottom of the list was Utah (UT). It
gave Bush its five Electoral College votes by a margin of
385,337 popular votes. Note the contrast between the top-
ranking state and the bottom-ranking state. The popular-
vote margin in Utah was over 30 times larger than that in
Wisconsin, yet it swung only half as many Electoral
College votes.
As the table shows, each swing vote in Wisconsin
carried 18.57 times the Electoral College impact of a swing
vote in Alaska. Each swing vote in Utah carried 0.28 times
the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Alaska.
Therefore, Wisconsin's swing votes packed sixty-six times
the punch of Utah's swing votes.
Next, consider the 2000 presidential election. Bush
won 271 electoral votes, while Gore only received 267
electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 500,000 votes.
Results for the presidential election of 2000 are presented
in Table 2.
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Table 2: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 2000
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact _ Impact Impact
FL 1115.40 MI 1.98 WY 0.82
N.M. 327.31 WA 1.90 KY 0.82
WI 46.17 DE 1.68 AK 0.81
IA 40.47 LA 1.59 R.I. 0.81
OR 24.79 HI 1.42 CT 0.75
N.H. 13.29 VA 1.41 MD 0.73
NV 4.44 CO 1.32 N.J. 0.71
MN 4.09 GA 1.03 OK 0.71
MO 3.35 CA 1.00 MT 0.70
TN 3.28 S.D. 1.00 KS 0.64
OH 3.05 MS 1.00 NE 0.59
W.V. 2.92 IL 0.93 TX 0.56
ME 2.87 N.D. 0.90 ID 0.48
PA 2.87 N.C. 0.90 D.C. 0.47
AR 2.69 S.C. 0.87 N.Y. 0.46
VT 2.46 AL 0.87 MA 0.39
AZ 1.99 IN 0.84 UT 0.38
As those who recall the election of 2000, and its
ensuing legal battles, it is not a surprise that Florida (FL)
occupies the top spot. Bush won Florida's twenty-five
Electoral College votes by the razor-thin margin of 537
popular votes. The median state was California (CA). The
state of California had fifty-four Electoral College votes in
2000, the most of any state, but it also had the largest
popular-vote margin-for Gore-of 1,293,774 popular
votes. 100 Relative to other states, California's popular vote
margin was not disproportionate given the number of
Electoral College votes at stake. Finishing last again was
Utah. Its five Electoral College votes went to Bush by a
margin of 312,043 popular votes. Id.
The implications of the state-by-state ranking are
100 California cast fifty-five Electoral College votes in the 2004
presidential election. STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2000 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2001).
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striking. A swing vote in Florida carried over one thousand
times the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in
California. A California swing vote, in turn, carried nearly
three times the Electoral College impact of a Utah swing
vote. Again, the explanation pertains to the winner-take-all
allocation of each state's electors. To the victor goes the
spoils-no matter how small the margin of victory. The
Florida-Utah comparison shows how great the disparities
can be. In the case of a large state with a razor-tight margin
versus a small state with a runaway victor, the disparities
can be huge. In Utah, one-fifth as many Electoral College
votes were at stake as in Florida; yet Utah's popular-vote
margin was almost 600 times that of Florida. As a result,
each of Florida's swing votes carried nearly 3,000 times the
Electoral College impact of a Utah swing vote. What was
already a close election came down to a mere 537 votes in
one state due to the winner-take-all allocation of each
state's electors.
Both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were
closer than average.' 0' Each election also featured a
notable third-party candidate-Ralph Nader. 1°2  Now
consider the presidential election of 1988, which was not a
cliffhanger and lacked a major third-party candidate to
siphon votes from the Republican and Democratic
candidates. 1°3  In 1988, Republican George H.W. Bush
101 In Electoral College terms, they were the two closest of the last
twelve presidential elections since the size of the Electoral College
increased to 538 electors when Alaska and Hawaii joined the union.
The last twelve elections saw the winning candidate receive an average
of 388 Electoral College votes.
102 Nader received 2.7% of the popular vote in 2000 and 0.4% in 2004,
but received no Electoral College votes in either election. STATISTICS
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2000 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 2001); STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 2004 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2005).
103 The 1992 and 1996 elections saw Democrat William J. Clinton
prevail over Republicans George H.W. Bush and Robert J. Dole,
respectively, by comfortable Electoral College margins. Both elections
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defeated Democrat Michael S. Dukakis by an electoral-vote
margin of 426-112.1°4 Bush's popular-vote margin over
Dukakis was seven million votes. 10 5  No third-party
candidate received more than one percent of the vote.1
0 6
The state-by-state rankings for the 1988 presidential
election are provided in Table 3.
Table 3: Relative Electoral College Impact of a Swing Vote, 1988
Presidential Election
State Relative EC State Relative EC State Relative EC
Impact Impact Impact
VT 5.57 R.I. 1.34 TN 0.65
WA 5.35 N.D. 1.23 OK 0.65
IL 4.01 WY 1.20 N.J. 0.60
PA 3.78 CO 1.19 ID 0.60
MD 3.19 MI 1.10 N.C. 0.60
W.V. 3.08 MN 1.08 MS 0.57
N.M. 3.07 AK 1.02 NE 0.57
MT 2.96 IA 1.02 N.H. 0.54
S.C. 2.40 ME 1.00 S.C. 0.54
WI 2.20 MA 1.00 AL 0.54
N.Y. 2.15 LA 0.96 GA 0.52
CA 2.12 KY 0.93 AZ 0.45
MO 2.10 NV 0.87 IN 0.44
OR 1.98 KS 0.85 VA 0.42
HI 1.88 AR 0.81 D.C. 0.36
CT 1.73 OH 0.77 UT 0.36
DE 1.54 TX 0.67 FL 0.35
also saw a significant third-party challenge from H. Ross Perot, who
received 19% of the popular vote in 1992 and 8.4% in 1996. His
candidacy helped keep Clinton from receiving more than 50% of the
popular vote in either election. STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1992 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1993);
STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
1996 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1997).
'0 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
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The 1988 election demonstrates that even in an
election that was not a cliffhanger and lacked a major third-
party candidate, the winner-take-all allocation of Electoral
College votes can lead to distortions. In this case, Vermont
(VT) was positioned at the top of the list. In Vermont, a
popular-vote margin of 8,556 votes made the difference in
assigning the state's three Electoral College votes to
Dukakis. The middle state, and the one with respect to
which the others were normalized, was Maine (ME). Its
four Electoral College votes went to Dukakis, who won its
popular vote by a margin of 63,562 votes. Florida (FL)
held the last position. Although Florida had the smallest
popular-vote margin of any state in 2000, it had the largest
popular-vote margin in 1988. Its twenty-one Electoral
College votes were won by Bush based on a 962,184
popular-vote margin. 107
In the 1988 election, a swing vote in Vermont
carried 5.57 times the Electoral College impact of a swing
vote in Maine. It carried 16 times the impact of a swing
vote in Florida. The ratio of the top-to-bottom state was
smaller for the 1988 election than for either the 2000 or
2004 elections. Still, the existence of a disparity for the
1988 election, and a sizable one at that, reinforces the
finding that the winner-take-all allocation of Electoral
College votes gives some states' voters a greater influence
on an election's outcome than other states' voters.
Each presidential election is different; some are
landslides, while others are cliffhangers. Some display
more regional variation than others. Some feature
significant third-party challenges. Yet, each of these three
elections saw great variation across states in the magnitude
of a swing vote's Electoral College impact. An indicator of
the Electoral College disparity in each presidential election
is the ratio of a swing vote's Electoral College impact in
107 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
OF 1988 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1989).
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the top-ranked state to that of the bottom-ranked state.
Again, the top-ranked state is the state with the smallest
popular-vote margin relative to the number of Electoral
College votes at stake, and the bottom-ranked state is the
state with the largest relative popular-vote margin. In the
preceding tables, the ratios were calculated for the 1988,
2000, and 2004 elections. Table 4 presents the ratios for
every election dating back to 1960, the first presidential
election in which the current number of 538 Electoral
College votes were at stake.
Table 4: Top-Ranked State/Bottom-Ranked State Ratios, 1960-2004
Presidential Elections
Election Top-Ranked Bottom-Ranked EC Impact Ratio
State State
1960 HI MA 832
1964 AZ R.I. 63
1968 AR MA 71
1972 MN FL 7
1976 OH UT 88
1980 MA UT 288
1984 MN UT 209
1988 VT FL 16
1992 GA D.C. 54
1996 NV MA 59
2000 FL UT 2,905
2004 WI UT 65
The table demonstrates that sizable disparities have
been present in every presidential election since 1960. In
1960, a swing vote in Hawaii (HI), the state with the
smallest popular vote margin relative to its number of
Electoral College votes that year, carried 832 times the
Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Massachusetts
(MA), the largest-margin state. That election was a close
one, with Democrat John F. Kennedy prevailing over
Republican Richard M. Nixon by 303 to 219 in the
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Electoral College, and by 100,000 popular votes. 1° 8 The
election of 1972 was a landslide for Nixon over Democrat
George McGovern, when Nixon received 521 Electoral
College votes to McGovern's 17 and won 18 million more
popular votes. 10 9 That election saw a swing-vote impact
ratio of seven for the top-ranked state, Minnesota (MN), to
the bottom-ranked state, Florida (FL). Its ratio was the
smallest of any of the twelve elections since 1960. The
largest Electoral College landslide occurred in 1984, with
Republican Ronald W. Reagan prevailing over Democrat
Walter F. Mondale by an electoral count of 525 to 13.110
Reagan's popular-vote margin over Mondale was 16.9
million votes, slightlyX smaller than that of Nixon over
McGovern in 1972.1 In that election, the swing-vote
impact ratio of the highest state, Minnesota (MN), to the
lowest state, Utah (UT), was 209.
The Bush-Gore cliffhanger of 2000 was the outlier.
It exhibited, by far, the largest swing-vote ratio of any of
the last dozen elections. In that election, a swing-vote in
Florida carried 2,905 times the impact of a swing-vote in
Utah. The key was again the tiny margin in Florida, where
a mere 537 popular votes swung the state's twenty-five
Electoral College votes to Bush. Only two elections since
1960 saw smaller popular vote margins in any states-
Hawaii in 1960 and New Mexico in 2000. But, neither
108 Third-party candidate Harry F. Byrd received fifteen Electoral
College votes in Alabama and Virginia. STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1960 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1961).
109 McGovern won only the Electoral College votes of Massachusetts
(fourteen) and the District of Columbia (three). STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1972 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1973).
110 Mondale's thirteen Electoral College votes came from Minnesota
(ten) and the District of Columbia (three). STATISTICS OF THE
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state carried anywhere near the twenty-five Electoral
College votes that Florida had in 2000.112
In general, the closer elections saw larger disparities
and the landslide elections saw smaller disparities. The two
elections that saw the largest disparities, 1960 and 2000,
were close elections. The two elections that saw the
smallest disparities, 1972 and 1988, were landslides. The
explanation is that a close election is likely to see more
states decided by small margins than would be the case for
a landslide election. Close elections tend to have more
close states than landslide elections. Still, even a landslide
election can have some states decided by narrow margins,
like Minnesota in 1984.113 The key is the variation
between states. If the election victor's popular-vote margin
of victory was uniform across all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, then there would be no Electoral
College swing-vote disparity. In that case, the nation's
swing voters would be evenly distributed across the land.
A swing vote in one state would carry the same Electoral
College impact as a swing vote in another state.' 14 It is
when the distribution is uneven, and each state's Electoral
College votes are allocated on a winner-take-all basis, that
disparities arise. The uneven distribution means that small
shifts in some states' swing votes can swing
disproportionately large numbers of Electoral College votes
from one candidate to another.
As long as there is variation in candidate
preferences from one state to the next, the winner-take-all
allocation of Electoral College votes ensures that there will
"' In 1960, a margin of 115 popular votes swung Hawaii's then-three
Electoral College votes to Kennedy over Nixon. In 2000, a margin of
366 popular votes was the difference in awarding New Mexico's five
Electoral College votes to Gore over Bush.
113 STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
OF 1984 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1985).
114 It would not be precisely the same, due to the "plus-two" bonus in
the distribution of electors among the states, but it would be very close.
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be disparities. Of course, state-by-state variations in
preference are inevitable in a large, diverse nation such as
the United States. In a pluralistic nation of 300 million
people scattered unevenly across fifty states, differences
will exist from one state to the next. In the most recent
election cycle, these differences have even spawned the
shorthand of "red states" versus "blue states." The "red
states" favor the Republicans, and the "blue states" favor
the Democrats. The state-by-state differences are a fixture
of the electoral landscape. Since they have persisted and
will continue to persist, the winner-take-all allocation of
Electoral College votes in presidential elections ensures
that there will continue to be disparities in the value of each
vote. These disparities have occurred in each of the last
twelve presidential elections and will continue to occur.
V. Constitutional Concerns About the Winner-
Take-All Allocation of Electors
Why are such disparities in the allocation of
Electoral College votes problematic? They are suspect
because of the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote"
rulings in Reynolds and its progeny. "One person, one
vote" does not really exist when one state's swing votes
carry tens or hundreds or even thousands of times as much
impact as another state's swing votes on a national
election's outcome. Clearly, it is inequitable, but is it
unconstitutional? To be able to articulate such a claim
before the courts, three hurdles would have to be
surmounted.
First, one would have to deal with the objection that
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that state
legislatures may direct how electors are selected. This
clause, especially as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
McPherson v. Blacker115 and Bush v. Gore,116 gives states
115 146 U.S. at 1.
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plenary and almost absolute power to implement their
presidential vote. There are several responses to this first
objection.
What is being challenged is not the authority of
states to allocate electoral votes, which is clearly provided
for in the Constitution. Rather, the issue being challenged
is the winner-take-all method of allocating those votes. As
noted earlier, contrary to what the Court indicated in Bush
v. Gore117 and McPherson v. Blacker,118 the power of state
legislatures to allocate electoral votes is not unlimited.
Cases such as Anderson v. Celebrezze,119 Burroughs v.
United States,120 and Moore v. Ogilvie,121 illustrate the
Supreme Court's willingness to place some limits on the
processes state legislatures implement in running their
presidential elections, to draw limits on ballot access,
political corruption, and most directly, to select presidential
electors in conformity with the "one person, one vote"
reapportionment standard. 1
22
Second, even within Bush v. Gore, 123 the logic of
the majority opinion-that state legislatures cannot set up
an arbitrary process for the counting of votes-seems to
suggest limits on the power to select electors. Under the
holding of Bush v. Gore, it is doubtful that a state
legislature could enact a law indicating that in counting
ballots, total discretion to ascertain voter intent is left up to
election judges. Bush v. Gore stands for the claim that the
Equal Protection clause limits state legislatures in their
discretion to count votes.
116 531 U.S. at 98.
1171d.
118 146 U.S. at 1.
"9 460 U.S. at 780.
120290 U.S. at 534.
121 394 U.S. at 814.
122 See supra Section II.
123 531 U.S. at 98.
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Finally, as noted earlier, 124 it seems unlikely that a
state legislature could limit franchise rights in a presidential
election to only whites, and it also seems absurd to think
that it could state the same rule for determining who is
chosen as an elector. Overall, state legislatures may have
broad authority to select their electors, but contrary to what
Bush v. Gore and McPherson indicate, that power is not
really plenary and beyond question.
A related hurdle or objection to challenging the
winner-take-all method in court is to argue that if the
winner-take-all method of awarding Electoral College votes
is unconstitutional, it would follow that the equal allocation
of senators to big states and small states is also
unconstitutional. Here, one can respond by stating that the
equal allocation of senators to all states is provided for
under the Constitution, and the Court already ruled on that
issue in Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado. 1
25
In addition, some may argue that if one can
challenge the winner-take-all method of selecting
presidential electors as unconstitutional under the "one
person, one vote" standard, then why is the representational
schema of allocating two senators and at least one house
member to each state, regardless of population, not also
subjected to the same argument. Two responses are in
order. First, unlike the representational schema for the
House and Senate, which is constitutionally mandated and
clearly described in Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, the winner-take-all method is not
constitutionally mandated or specified in the text. Instead,
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, and the Twelfth
Amendment merely delegate to state legislatures the power
to select their electors without specifying a format.
126 127 128Second, in Reynolds, aer and Lucas, the Court
12 4 See supra Section H.
125 377 U.S. at 713.
126jd. at 571-76.
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discussed the relationship between state representation
schemes and the "federal analogy" to the Senate. In these
cases, the Court noted the historical differences between
state and federal representation, the purposes behind the
federal system, and why they are different. 129 In effect, the
Court rejected the analogies based upon constitutional text
and history. Similarly, if one were to challenge the Article
I, Sections 2 and 3 congressional representational plan as
violating the "one person, one vote" standard, the Court
would dismiss the claim because the text of the
Constitution provides for such a system.
A third objection or hurdle to address is that even if
one could show that state legislative authority to select
electors is not unlimited, a question still exists whether the
"one person, one vote" standard would apply. Would
challenging the allocation of electors be different from
simply questioning the constitutionality of the means by
which states are initially awarded electors?
Thus, a challenge to one method that a state
legislature uses to allocate electoral votes is not a challenge
either to their overall authority to determine a method or to
the constitutionally explicit language determining the size
of a state's total number of elector votes. Yet, in terms of
whether one could raise a "one person, one vote" challenge
to the winner-take-all method, a few responses are also
possible. First, the Court already ruled in Moore v. Ogilvie
that "one person, one vote" applied within the context of
selecting presidential candidates at the state level. '
30
Second, Delaware v. New York establishes neither a
precedent that review of presidential elector selection is
non-justiceable nor that the "one person, one vote" standard
does not apply. Instead, Delaware v. New York arose at a
127 369 U.S. at 302-07.
128 377 U.S. at 738.
129 462 U.S. at 738-9.
130 See supra notes 52 to 55 and accompanying text.
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time early in the reapportionment jurisprudence. Now,
nearly two generations later, one could argue in the same
way Bush v. Gore pushed this line of cases to apply to the
counting of votes, the same logic of "one person, one vote"
should extend to the winner-take-all method of allocating
electoral votes. After all, allocating votes, or assigning
them to a particular candidate, is essentially the same as the
counting of votes, or they are at least conceptually related.
Third, if winner-take-all systems create
disincentives for some to vote,' 3 ' especially if these non-
voters are in a racial minority, and a voter could show that
a state retained this type of electoral vote allocation system
for discriminatory reasons, one might be able to argue that
the right to vote is being diluted in ways no different than
in situations found in the early reapportionment cases of the
1960s.1 
32
Finally, if the courts still do not wish to address the
constitutionality of winner-take-all systems, is the matter
dead? Not necessarily. States could on their own change
their own systems. The argument here is that winner-take-
all systems effectively either disenfranchise some of their
own cities vis-a-vis others within the state, or that such a
system contributes to a practice across forty-eight states
that hurts their own citizens' influence in the selection of
the President.
On balance, winner-take-all systems for the
allocation of presidential electors raise serious
constitutional questions that the courts should address.
Winner-take-all systems weigh votes differently. Some
voters' decisions end up counting much more toward the
outcome of a presidential election than votes of other
people under winner-take-all. Such systems would, thus,
seem to violate the "one person, one vote" standard that the
Court has held to govern the allocation and exercise of the
13' See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
'32 See supra Section III.
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franchise.
IV. Conclusion
The Electoral College was instituted as a
presidential selection system to give small states more
political influence and to offset regional factionalism that
might occur if the Chief Executive were selected by
popular vote. The Constitution permits state legislatures to
award electors in the manner of their own choosing. The
winner-take-all method that forty-eight states currently use
to select their electors evolved largely as a way to help
states maximize their influence in presidential elections.
Yet, such a system unfairly weighs the preferences of some
voters more than others. This violates the one-person, one-
vote standard articulated in Reynolds v. Sims, 133 and
subsequently applied to aspects of presidential contests
such as in Moore v. Ogilvie 1 and Bush v. Gore.1
3 5
Despite claims that the state power over selection of
presidential electors is absolute, case law suggests the
contrary. Instead, claims contesting the constitutionality of
some forms of state allocation of electoral votes should be
entertained by the courts, or at least by legislatures. While
the Court in Delaware v. New York was unwilling to
adjudicate "one person, one vote" claims in the context of
how electors are selected, subsequent maturity of the
reapportionment and right to vote case law, as well as the
continuing debate over what happened in Florida in the
presidential election of 2000, make it ripe to revisit this
issue, either judicially or in the alternative, in the state
legislatures.
133 377 U.S. at 533.
134 394 U.S. at 814.
135 531 U.S. at 98.
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POVERTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF KATRINA:
REIMAGINING CITIZEN LEADERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF
FEDERALISM
Gregory L. Volz*, David E. Robbinst, & Vanessa E. Volzt
"I'm walkin' on sunshine ... and don't it feel good!"
"Walking on Sunshine"
by Katrina and the Waves, 1983
I. Introduction
It is a cruel irony that a lead singer with the name
Katrina and a back-up band called the Waves performed a
pop song in the 1980s with bright lyrics and happy beat.
Many years later, a natural disaster bearing the same name,
backed by a surge of seawater, consumed the city of New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast. In the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, America and the rest of the world witnessed the
desperate side of the world's wealthiest nation. Many
people, who had neither time nor resources to escape the
storm's surge, and the destruction that followed, became
first-hand witnesses to America's failure to adequately
address its poverty problem. The world was shocked to see
Americans displaced and immobilized. Chilling reports of
the disintegration of the community with rampant
plundering and lawlessness punctuated media broadcasts.
The ravages of death and deprivation were graphically
* Gregory L. Volz is the Executive Director of the Community
Economic Development and Resource Center. Special thanks to Rev.
Tim Suenram, Rick Goldstein, Mike Froehlich, Joe Henwood, Ginger
Bernd, Tracey Farrigan, and Clint Bamberger for their helpful review
and comments.
t David E. Robbins is the President of the Board of CEDRiC.
Vanessa E. Volz received her J.D. from the University of Georgia and
her B.A. from Bard College. She is a staff attorney at the Rhode Island
Disability Law Center in Providence.
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depicted even as relief providers scrambled to address the
massive needs of the displaced and injured. The failed
infrastructure and lack of services to help the unfortunates
who remained behind to weather the storm resurrected the
national debate on poverty-who is responsible for giving
willing Americans the tools to remove themselves from
poverty to become contributing members of society?1
While the human and economic toll of this disaster
is incalculable, perhaps there is a bright side. The debate
over who is responsible for ameliorating poverty and
minimizing the divide between the "haves" and the "have-
nots," as evidenced by the seeming abandonment of the
"have-nots" during the initial days after Hurricane Katrina,
may have raised the awareness of the level and gravity of
the problem. In turn, this awareness may have created a
basis for a public will to effectuate change and the will to
develop a popularly sanctioned way to make the change a
reality.
A national response to poverty requires an
examination of lofty traditional values-such as equal
opportunity, economic security, and human dignity, which
accompany a contribution to the civilization we live in-
blended with a more practical examination of political
realities. Reference to political, legal, and sociological
literature over a lengthy time span details how Americans
view their nation and social heritage and the implications
these views create for current public policy development.
This literature leads to a key question-how can
this ambitious project find support? Neither our national
government nor the American people currently have a will
to address systemic poverty; and consequently no way, or
plan to fight poverty, can be implemented.2 Developing
1 While the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina displayed the failings
of America, particularly in connection with the poor, the coverage soon
subsided and with it, the urgency of poverty.
2 "With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can
succeed." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas Debate at Ottawa,
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that will is the first step to an anti-poverty program,
followed by the creation of a way--a plan. Just as no
financial institution would lend money for a business
venture without a rational business plan, it is irrational to
expect government to create and fund an anti-poverty
campaign without a comprehensive plan. An effective plan
must include citizen participation, the identification of
barriers, the evaluation of current programs, and the
creation of new strategies. In short, the sequence of events
in generating both the will and the way is central to an
effective anti-poverty strategy.
Our development of a way requires recognition that
only the federal government has the financial resources
needed to eliminate the root causes of poverty on a national
basis. 3 A serious federal response to poverty in America
could result in significant changes in public and private
agencies providing poverty services to the poor. Because
such changes can affect social service jobs, careers,
institutions, and political systems, anticipating bureaucratic
and local political resistance to new programs is a
prerequisite to the design of a comprehensive anti-poverty
initiative. Failure to pay attention to area politics will
result in well-intentioned plans being rendered ineffectual
at the local level. At the same time, understanding what
happens when new programs "hit the ground" in local
communities and capitalizing on local knowledge about
economic and social issues can greatly assist the
implementation of a new federal response to poverty.
Minimizing the angst of change for local service
agencies and political institutions requires effective
communication and coordination at all levels of
government-federal, state, and local. This effect might
best be accomplished by utilizing the inherent potential of
Illinois (August 21, 1858).
3 MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (Penguin Books 1962).
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shared government. Federalism, a product of the American
experiment in self-government, affords an effective
mechanism to target federally managed resources to
communities through locally developed anti-poverty
plans.4 Employed in this way, the resources of the federal
government and the strings that such funds would place on
them, can afford state and local governments an
opportunity to join with other local organizations in a
unique and dynamic collaboration.
Local political realities and bureaucratic resistance
marginalized past anti-poverty programs. 5 Many nonprofit
organizations rely on local political largesse for future
funding, which can affect their mission.6  Local political
interference gave the impression of afflicting some anti-
poverty programs created in the 1960s.7 Additionally,
4 The 13 colonies experimented with self-government under the
Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution. Under the
Constitution, the states agree to surrender certain powers to the
authority of a centralized governmental structure. As a result,
governmental power is bifurcated and shared by the federal government
and individual states. This arrangement affords a rich opportunity to
experiment with social policy such as anti-poverty plans. Indeed, it
affords a directed opportunity for development of programming
carefully tailored to the needs of the local community as established on
a local basis and geared to talents and commitment of the citizens
involved. See infra Part V.
5 Edward C. Banfield, Making a New Federal Program: Model Cities,
1964-68, in POLICY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: SIX CASE STUDIES 124-
158 (Allan P. Sindler, ed., 1973). Banfield argues that the complex
interplay of federal, state, and local authority and control was one of
the most difficult issues to overcome in the boldly ambitious, but
unsuccessful, Model Cities Program.
6 For example, Rick Goldstein, a Pennsylvania businessman, explained
that while working for a group of homeless Philadelphians, a local
public interest law organization representing the group was intimidated
in its efforts against a state agency by a fear of losing state funding.
Telephone interview with Rick Goldstein, in Philadelphia, Penn. (Jan.
20, 2006).
7 When asked to comment on the degree of local resistance to federally
funded legal services, the first Director of the Legal Services Program
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federal political factors can blunt the best-designed anti-
poverty programs.8 The most important factor in designing
a federal response to poverty is its interaction with state and
local political realities. Moreover, a serviceable plan can
only be written and enforced by local citizens
knowledgeable about economic and social conditions.
9
II. Situational Analysis
Designing an effective national anti-poverty
campaign cannot be done in a vacuum; it requires
recognition of and deference to local political realities.
Social and economic change is difficult to accomplish
created within the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1964, said,
"Political opposition and bureaucratic resistance arose from concern
that the Legal Services lawyers would be effective advocates against
the established order. The degree of opposition and resistance seemed
to develop in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the advocacy."
E-mail transmission from Clinton Bamberger, Director of Legal
Services, Office of Economic Opportunity (Jan. 25, 2006) (on file with
author).
8 See The War on Poverty:Then and Now, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20051114.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2006). A panel discussion about the War on Poverty revealed
that the centerpiece of the War on Poverty was a massive public works
project which was never pursued because President Johnson refused to
consider a tax increase in the 1964 election year.
9 See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE
RACIAL DIVIDE (Univ. of Cal. Press 1999) (arguing that only multi-
racial coalitions can achieve these results); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (Univ. of Chicago Press 1987); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR (Random House 1997). Wilson's seminal work over the past
twenty years has demonstrated that ghetto areas-normally defined as
census tracts where forty percent of the residents are living below the
poverty line-are plagued with a loss of jobs and a loss of functioning
social institutions-resulting in social isolation for the inhabitants of
those areas. Id.
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under the best of circumstances.' 0 The identification and
analysis of the enormous costs of poverty (i.e.,
ghettoization with blight, resulting in flight and
disinvestment, increased crime, tax base erosion, and lack
of job opportunities for residents trapped in these poor
areas) lead to the inescapable conclusion that change is
needed. "1
Although it seems nonsensical for the federal
government to ignore the costs of poverty, there has been
little attention, let alone action, to address the causes of
poverty in the last twenty five years. Clearly no holistic
will to address poverty exists today as it existed in
generations past. 12 At the dawn of the twenty-first century,
even as the national political scene is marked by the
emergence of religious groups as discrete and potent
political forces, no political will has surfaced to address
poverty, much less defeat it. 13 The poor do not vote in
large numbers and are ignored as a political force. 14 They
10 Our nation's experience with issues of slavery, civil rights,
prohibition, and women's suffrage bear witness to the upheaval that
often accompanies dramatic social change.
1 See infra notes 36-40.
12 Fifty years ago, President Harry S. Truman said, "We must declare in.
a new Magna Carta, in a new Declaration of Independence, that
henceforth economic well-being and security, that health and education
and decent living standards, are among our inalienable rights." See
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 967 (1992) (citing KANSAS CITY
TIMES, June 20, 1956).
13 Could this be because, in the late 1940s, the reality of the Great
Depression was still fresh in the collective conscience of American
families? Daily face-to-face contact with poverty by most Americans
resulted in a national resolve to tackle poverty. Radical political
change followed economic distress. By the late 1940s, almost all
politicians claimed to be liberals; no one wanted to be called
conservative. See ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A
HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM (Random House 1990).
14 See http://www.yvoteonline.org/noshows2000_details.shtml (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006). "The propensity to vote rises with income, from
a low of 33 percent among those with annual household incomes of less
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are implicitly, and perhaps explicitly, excluded from
participating in our democratic system. Absent political
power, the poor lack adequate means to lobby Congress for
programs to advance their economic interests.
Accordingly, public interest lawyers and active citizens
must fill the breach by advocating for the poor and
promoting the democratic participation intended by our
nation's forefathers.
The will to fight poverty is also depreciated by an
abiding cynicism about government's ability to effectively
address such social issues. This distrust is not new; it has
been evident for nearly fifteen years. 16  Despite a fifty
percent reduction in poverty during the 1960s, many now
accept the clich6 that, in the War on Poverty, poverty
won. 17  Today, with increased skepticism about the
effectiveness of government programs, many citizens balk
than $15,000 to a high of 70 percent among those with incomes in
excess of $75,000."
15 See http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues_03.cfm (last visited Feb.
17, 2006). "Nationally more than four million Americans are denied
the right to vote as a result of laws that prohibit voting by felons or ex-
felons." This number includes thirteen percent of all African-American
males.
16 RICHARD PARKER, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH: His LIFE, His
POLITICS, His ECONOMICS 624 (2005). "Asked whether they trusted
their government to 'do the right thing' all or most of the time, by the
end of the Bush Administration in 1992, three out of four Americans
said they didn't." See http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm
(confirming this mistrust has stayed essentially the same over the past
15 years). In 1994, Peter Hart assembled polling data showing the
public was willing to devote resources to fighting poverty but had little
confidence in the government implementing those programs. See
FIGHTING POVERTY IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
ATTITUDES (Ctr. for the Study of Policy Attitudes, 1994).
17 See Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, January 25, 1988,
available at
http://reagan2020.us/speeches/state-of the union_1988.asp (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006). President Reagan said, "My friends, some years
ago, the federal government declared war on poverty, and poverty
won." Id.
110
2:3 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 494
at the idea of increased spending for anti-poverty programs.
They see little proof that government can reduce poverty.
Yet, the public may be unaware of evidence to the
contrary. 18 If the case can be made that the economic costs
of poverty, especially over a long period of time, are more
expensive than the investment in social service programs
needed to address these problems, then a public demand
may generate politically-driven action. Of course, political
awareness and action are the precursors to additional
federal funding.
Anti-poverty plans need to be developed locally-
not nationally. A local plan will ensure local participation
by the stakeholders who can contribute their knowledge of
local economic factors, existing services and unmet
needs. 19  Each community has its own resources and
circumstances for the existence and magnitude of poverty
in its region. Local participation not only ensures an
accurate analysis of these conditions but could act as an
incentive to local communities. 20  The payoff for local
18 See Arloc Sherman, Public Benefits: Easing Poverty and Ensuring
Medical Coverage (rev. Aug. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/7-19-05acc.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). Key
findings are that the safety net cuts the number of Americans living in
poverty by half; furthermore, it reduces severe poverty and provides
medical coverage for tens of millions of Americans.
19 In Chester, an effort to understand the reason local residents could
not take advantage of employment and training services revealed that
they did not understand the complexity of this service because there
was no compendium of available programs and services.
20 See Edgar S. and Jean C. Cahn, The War On Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L. REV. 1318, 1352 (1964). This seminal law
review article led to the creation of the federally fumded Legal Services
Program within the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Cahns
accurately describe that a War on Poverty needs to include a
mechanism for dissenting points of view. It also articulates that a well
planned War on Poverty will constitute a monopoly on both services
and ideology necessitating a countervailing power of active citizen
participation. Unfortunately, despite two generations in which to have
learned this vital lesson, national and state public policy rarely do more
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communities could be a reward of federal money
(authorized by new federal legislation) to implement a plan,
which they themselves have designed. Federalism provides
the structure to carry out the needed planning and the
flexibility to allocate resources to respond to those local
priorities.
Once the sources and costs of poverty are fully
understood, the public will better grasp that poverty
reduction serves the citizenry's self-interests. This
awareness will galvanize public sentiment and energize
efforts to ensure the interests of the poor are promoted.2
Educating the populace entails underscoring both the
economic costs of poverty and highlighting its moral
injustice. An initiative worthy of consideration would call
upon Congress to fund programs that support groups that
advocate for the interests of the poor.23 If the American
than pay lip service to the importance of this issue.
21 Indeed, one of the "peculiar strengths of our form of government" is
its ability to foster experimentation in social and economic programs.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)
(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
22 See Lynn Neary, War on Poverty-40th Anniversary,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 1587522 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2006). President Johnson advised listeners that in
Washington almost everybody had a lobbyist except the poor; so he
stated that he was going to be the lobbyist for the poor. Id.
23 See KENNETH B. CLARK AND JEANNETTE HOPKINS, A RELEVANT
WAR AGAINST POVERTY: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS
AND OBSERVABLE SOCIAL CHANGE (1968). Clark argues persuasively
that the War on Poverty never planned for or gained support in the
major metropolitan areas. He further agues that political leaders of
both parties rendered the Community Action Program impotent. It
threatened the existing status quo and was viewed as unleashing forces
for real participation that might not be able to be satisfied. Clark calls
for a coalition of professionals and the poor in recognition that
the poor themselves have so far not been able to plan, sustain,
and bring to a positive conclusion effective programs for
social change. To expect that they can-as so many
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people do not believe that cronyism and lobbying can be
brought under control, then it is only fair that the poor have
their own advocates. Such an initiative would begin to
address the unjust power imbalance, which dominates
current political structures, and allow the poor to compete
with the myriad of other interest groups.
After educating the public and making an anti-
poverty program a priority, the next logical step would be
to require that any new federal legislation include a
comprehensive impact study. 24  This study would assess
the degree to which new legislation will positively or
negatively impact the poor.25 This measure would protect
against the launching of federal initiatives that, though well
intentioned, would ultimately be ineffectual due to
unanticipated local issues. As mentioned above, failed
initiatives create and perpetuate the public sentiment that
government is unable to alleviate poverty.
The reality of entrenched poverty amidst the
world's greatest wealth is glossed over by an age-old
mythology that everyone can succeed in America.26 The
Great Depression shook, but did not end, the belief that
there is employment for all, that employment pays a living
community action programs do--may be viewed as a subtle
rationalization for the maintenance of the status quo in the
face of inevitable failure. The alternative may be for
concerned, committed, and independent professionals to
develop machinery and organizations which would mobilize
the power of intelligence and concern on behalf of the poor.
Id. at 244.
24 A local impact study would assess the social, economic, and political
impact of all new legislation.
25 If we agree there is too much poverty.today, then we certainly do not
need more laws which ignore the needs of the poor. An impact study
could help ensure new laws do not add to the number of the
impoverished.
26 See GOLDMAN, supra note 13.
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27wage, and that all can economically succeed. Flawed
systems and free market economic forces can defeat the
most responsible individual initiative. Few would disagree
that the American concept of political freedom
transcends the legal protections embodied in law; rather, it
is a natural right, permanently seared into the American
psyche. Indeed, most Americans believe in the American
Dream-that hard work and sheer will make anything
possible. Yet, despite the broad and optimistic promise
subsumed within the abstract concepts of individualism and
self-sufficiency, the realities and complexities of modem
American life exclude people who lack economic security
and access to systems accompanying self-sufficiency from
consequential political freedom and the covenant of the
American Dream.
III. A Will to Fight Poverty
A. Reviewing Negative Myths
The problem of generating a national will to fight
poverty is exacerbated by the limited political power of the
poor, as well as the heterogeneous nature of those stricken
by poverty and the concomitant difficulty of efforts to
organize the poor toward concerted action. Our political
system is built on interest groups competing for power,
support, and funding.28 A dearth of political power leaves
the best interests of the poor dependent on the goodwill and
selflessness of others. Charity is a wonderful quality as it
27 See DOROTHY B. JAMES, POVERTY, POLITICS AND CHANGE (1972).
"Invariably, since the 1930's a majority of Americans have supported
only those welfare policies which have approached poverty by
attempting to enable individuals to cope more effectively within the
existing American economic, social and political system." Id. at 50.
28 The competitive forces influencing the evolution of social and
economic reform from the late 1860s to the early 1950s have been the
subject of scholarly discussion. GOLDMAN, supra note 13.
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can satisfy a donor's altruistic desires, and it is certainly
appreciated by the willing recipient, but a real solution to
poverty requires making people self-sufficient. Future anti-
poverty efforts should support efforts to help the poor
contribute to the common good, rather than make them
mere consumers of poverty services and government-
dispensed benefits. This recognition acts to restore a sense
of human dignity to the poor and offers additional
motivation for the public to address poverty.
Due recognition must be given to the persistent
historical and still-prevalent myth that the poor find
themselves in poverty because they are morally weak.29
Another popular excuse for why people do not help the
poor is the often-cited and sometimes misunderstood
Biblical quotation that the poor will always be with us.
30
The statement's context suggests that it was not meant as a
statement of perpetual fact or an excuse for failing to help
the poor.3 1  Conversely, the Bible contains numerous
29 The origins of this attitude derive from fifteenth century Switzerland
and John Calvin, whose doctrine of predestination suggested that
selection for eternal life was foreordained. Those who were saved
could be often recognized by financial wealth; those who would not be
saved were often economically disadvantaged, thus demonstrating that
they would not be saved. The stigma, if not the rationale, has carried
forward to our modem American culture. See generally CHAIM I.
WAXMAN, THE STIGMA OF POVERTY: A CRITIQUE OF POVERTY
THEORIES AND POLICIES (Pergamon Press, 1977). Waxman's thesis
underscores the element of a "middle-class" perspective which
denigrates distinct behavioral patterns and values of the poor as
aberrant. Id. at 13.
30 Mark 14:7. "For you always have the poor with you, and you can
show kindness to them whenever you wish; but you will not always
have me." Id. See also Matthew 26:11; John 12:8.
31 See Jim Wallis, GOD'S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG
AND THE LEFT DOESN'T GET IT 211 (2005).
[B]ecause of our isolation from the poor, American Christians
get the text wrong! We misuse it to justify ourselves and don't
realize how this story offers a deep biblical challenge to how
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references commanding help for the poor in both the Old
Testament and the New Testament.
32
we live ... We simply use it as an excuse: "The poor you will
always have with you" gets translated into "There is nothing
we can do about poverty, and the poor will always be there, so
why bother?" Yet that's not what the text is saying at all. The
critical difference between Jesus' disciples and a middle-class
church is precisely this: our lack of proximity to the poor. The
continuing relationship to the poor that Jesus assumes will be
natural for his disciples is unnatural to an affluent church. The
"social location" of the affluent Christians has changed; we
are no longer "with" the poor, and they are no longer with us.
The middle-class church doesn't know the poor and they don't
know us. Wealthy Christians talk about the poor but have no
friends who are poor. So they merely speculate on the reasons
for their condition, often placing blame on the poor
themselves.
Id.
32 See e.g., Leviticus 19:10, 23:22 ("leave comers of field unharvested
for the hungry to glean"); Matthew 25:35-40 ("whatever you did for
one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me"); 1
Corinthians 13:13 (virtues - "faith, hope and charity . . . and the
greatest of these is charity"). The Muslim religion, another
Abrahamic faith, also proclaims the importance of charity. It
implemented compulsory almsgiving ("zakat") and voluntary giving
("sadaqah") for social welfare. See THE HOLY QUR'AN: ENGLISH
TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS & COMMENTARY, MUSHAF AL-
MADINAH AN-NABAWIYAH (The Presidency of Islamic Research,
IFTA, Call and Guidance ed.) (1410 Hijrah 1990). See Sura 2 A. 177
("... it is righteousness-To believe in Allah, And the Last Day...
To spend of your substance, Out of love for Him, For your kin, For
orphans, For the needy, For the wayfarer, For those who ask, And for
the ransom of slaves; To be steadfast in prayer, And give Zakat....
Such are the people Of truth, the God-fearing."). Compare id. Sura 9
A. 60 (designating the recipients of sadaqah). "Zakat" derives from
the verb "cleansed"--indicating a purification of the donor's wealth.
The basis for the permissive gift of "sadaqah" is from the word for
"verification," as in verifying one's commitment to Allah. All three
religions emphasize the notion of private stewardship, or private
responsibility, for the poor. The Q'uran also emphasizes, like the
Bible, the importance of justice and righteousness. Id. at Sura 16 A.
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Some subscribe to the notion that the poor are lazy.
However, blaming the poor for having a "bad attitude" is
counterproductive, as it diverts attention from constructive
action. Moreover, some citizens are accustomed to public
assistance and fear accepting a job may do more harm than
good. They fear that they may fail in their quest to be
gainfully employed, which threatens their future livelihood.
Although a large number of welfare recipients have gone to
work over the past ten years, as a result of a healthy
economy and the sanctions of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Reconciliation Act,33 reduced opportunity for
welfare dependency has not reduced poverty.34  In fact,
poverty rates have increased each of the past four years,
despite the fact that the numbers of individuals receiving
welfare are at historically low rates. 35  These changes
suggest that systemic and structural forces are the primary
causes of poverty, not individual lack of initiative.
90 ("Allah commands justice, the doing of good.. ."). Compare infra
note 46.
33 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
34 See http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0831/p02s01-usec.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2006). This article confirms that the poverty rate in
2004 rose for the fourth straight year to 12.7% of the population. See
also
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/29/national/main 948088.shtml
(last visited Oct. 12, 2006). This article reflects that the poverty rate
fell from 12.7% to 12.6% which was considered statistically
insignificant. The article also stated that in 2000 the poverty rate had
been 11.3%. Finally, the number of Americans unable to afford health
insurance increased by 1.3 million during the same time period.
Although welfare rates have dropped by millions since 1996, the
persistence of poverty rates suggests that welfare reform was not an
effective policy to reduce poverty. It seems to have just increased the
number of working poor.
35 See Poverty in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). The
National Poverty Center describes the fact that poverty rates have risen
each of the past four years. Id.
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B. Establishing an Affirmative Argument to
Fight Poverty
If these unsupportable, but popular, negative myths
are properly understood and discarded, the articulation of
three key reasons justifying a societal effort to fight poverty
becomes meaningful.
1. Economic Costs
Fully exposed, the excessive economic cost of
poverty commands a prompt political response. Such costs
include: (1) losses caused by high rates of criminal activity,
the expenses of criminal justice and prohibitive
incarceration costs; 36 (2) huge entitlement costs paid to
impoverished families; 37 (3) diminished tax collection from
jobless or unemployable wage earners; and (4) lost creative
potential of impoverished citizens. 38  Other costs are less
36 Impoverished communities have more crime, and it costs the federal
government approximately $23,000 annually to incarcerate one convict.
State and county jails bear imprisonment costs of $20,000 a year to
incarcerate a convict. The total cost per year was a staggering $39
billion in 1999 and was projected to reach $41 billion in 2000. While
some might assert that the costs of crime are a direct result of poverty,
the correlation between crime and poverty is elusive. See The
Punishing Decade: Prison & Jail Estimates at the Millennium
http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/punishing/punishing.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2006) (noting that recent explosion in prison population bears little
correlation to economic conditions or other factors).
37 See Transcript of The War on Poverty: Then and Now, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20051114.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2006). See also
http://www.heritage.org/Research/welfare/test03O7Olb.ctm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2006). The total cost of means tested programs exceeds $434
billion.
38 The methodology of calculating the societal economic costs of not
nurturing the human creative potential of all our citizens is complex.
However, it is obvious that millions of children are not receiving the
kind of creative nurturing and programming which would maximize
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obvious, but no less real. For example, poverty is
frequently place-based, concentrated in certain
geographical areas because of the flight of more affluent
citizens, business disinvestment, increased crime, tax base
erosion, and public education failure, which all culminate
in depressed living standards. 39 Moreover, the societal cost
of poverty is hundreds of billions of dollars per year.40
2. Civic Harmony
Persistent and deepening poverty sows the seeds for
discontent, which is especially true where the prevalent
values place primacy on material gains. Our nation was
born of necessitous circumstances. 4' As the divide
their potential.
39 See WILSON, supra note 9.
40 Isabel V. Sawhill, Poverty in the United States in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2003),
available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/povertyintheUnitedStates.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2006). The total entitlement cost of poverty
approximates $500 billion annually. This figure is in the general range
of that cited by the Heritage Foundation. See heritage.org, supra note
37.
41 The Founding Fathers understood the British abuses of the colonies
and their affirmative efforts to prevent Americans from establishing
their own meaningful political process. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffsumm.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2007). Rankling under vexatious government imposed by colonial
power, the Patriots felt the necessity of revolt. See THOMAS PAINE,
COMMON SENSE (1776), available at
http://www.constitution.org/tp/comsense.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2007). Despite the perceived level of affliction, some historians have
questioned the actual depth of the subjugation imposed by British rule.
See THE REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T: A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT
OF 1776 (Richard M. Fulton ed., 1981) ("The Americans were not an
oppressed people; they had no crushing imperial shackles to throw off.
In fact, the Americans knew they were probably freer and less
burdened with cumbersome feudal and monarchical restraints than any
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between the poor and the rest of society widens, especially
given the currency of materialism, so too does the necessity
of allowing all citizens to meet their basic needs.
A distinct basis for the initiative rests on cultural
grounds. The future of American society has been
questioned based on cultural decline. In some measure, the
growth of crime is attributable to "the ebbing of religious
faith.,, 42  As we will discuss, a broad-based poverty
initiative consistent with the underlying concerns of
Abrahamic religions creates a legitimate and fixed reason
for societal action and may have the corollary effect of
promoting the relevance of religious institutions.43 In turn,
this initiative could reverse the perceived marginalization
of religion and herald an era of religious renewal.
Moreover, achievement of the core purpose of the anti-
poverty program would raise the level of society and
reduce the cultural slide.
part of mankind in the eighteenth century."). Id. at 20. See generally
SARAH PURCELL, SEALED WITH BLOOD: WAR SACRIFICE AND MEMORY
IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2002).
42 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 276 (1996). Judge Bork
observes that a key element in moral decay has been placed at the feet
of religious institutions that have demonstrated doctrinal flexibility
reflecting secular concerns. Id. at 280-86. Absent a firm mooring in
"major premises" from which moral reasoning emanates, religious
institutions become less important to their adherents. Id. at 279. But
see generally CLARENCE DARROW, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT
96 (Patterson Smith 1972). "There is no such thing as crime as the
word is generally understood... If every man, woman and child in the
world has a chance to make a decent, fair, honest living there would be
no jails and no lawyers and no courts." Id.
43 Even as Judge Bork decries the fading importance of religious rigid
doctrine, his criticisms underscore the possibility that a more motivated
and involved congregant may become more vested in a religious
institution and more attuned to the established values and traditions of
that institution. See BORK, supra note 42, at 279.
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3. Poverty as Injustice
Faith-based and social activists are motivated
primarily by values. 44 Those values place a premium on
fundamental ideals, which are part of our moral fabric.
Some believe that a true analysis of poverty amidst national
affluence portrays a disturbing moral indifference. Three
years ago a minister penned an article for a legal
publication and stated:
[T]he persistence of poverty, it seems to me,
is not so much an economic issue as it is one
of justice . . .. The truth is that our society
has the economic capacity to do almost
anything to which it grants importance. We
have the economic capacity to address
poverty. What seems to me to be lacking is
the political will; poverty is not granted
priority.
4 5
For thousands of years, religious circles have
46considered poverty an issue of justice. It is no surprise
44 In a culture dominated by materialism, it is often difficult to effect
values-based change in the absence of status and resources.
45 Tim Suenram, Minority Poverty and the Faith Community,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 157 (July-Aug. 2003).
46 The connection between "justice" and giving to help others is well-
established but not often recognized. The Old Testament's references
to contributions in order to help others are encompassed by the Hebrew
word "T'zedakah," which linguistically derives from "T'zedek"
meaning "justice." Justice, charity, and righteousness are integrated
concepts within the Jewish tradition. See THE TORAH, A MODERN
COMMENTARY 1308, (W. Gunther Plaut ed., URJ Press 2005) See also
Genesis 18:19 ("... teach [them] to keep the way of the Eternal, doing
what is right and just..."); Deuteronomy 16:20 ("Justice, justice shall
you pursue . . ."); Amos 5:24 ("Let justice well like water,
Righteousness like an unfailing stream."). In the twelfth century, a
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that the faith-based community and the legal sector have
been identified as the best qualified to address poverty.
Properly presented, the moral argument outlined is
responsive to those who say there is no connection between
poverty and morality.
Since the founding of our nation, there has always
been a pervasive sentiment that in America there is
opportunity for all. As a result, many Americans-
particularly the poor-have looked to the government to
provide employment where the private sector could not.47
Yet, the government by itself is ill-equipped to meet this
need. Without citizen leadership and business
participation, poverty cannot be addressed in a holistic
manner. Fortunately, our federal system, which divides
power among the three branches of government, provides
an adaptable vehicle to communicate and coordinate the
"best practices" within local jurisdictions.
Jewish philosopher opined that the highest and noblest form of
"t'zedakah" was offering a person the dignity and independence to earn
a livelihood. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, LAWS OF
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE POOR, Chapter 10:7. One prophet stressed the
importance of t'zedakah in declaring that through t'zedakah would God
be established. See Isaiah 54:14. Compare supra note 32.
47 The end of the American frontier, marked by the mass migration
from farms to cities, rapid industrialization, and not then fully-
comprehended market forces, resulted in massive unemployment. See
LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN
CHICAGO 1919-1939 281-82 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) This
period crested with the Great Depression, where one in four Americans
could not find work. Id. In 1935, Fortune Magazine asked Americans
of all income levels, "Do you believe that government should see to it
that every man who wants to work has a job. The Fortune Survey,
FORTUNE, July 1935, at 67. Eighty-one percent (81%) of those
considered lower middle class, eighty-nine percent (89%) of those
labeled poor, and ninety-one percent (91%) of blacks replied in the
affirmative, while less than half of those people defined as
"prosperous" shared this view. Id. Somewhat aghast, the editors of
Fortune concluded, "public opinion overwhelmingly favors assumption
by the government of a function that was never seriously contemplated
prior to the New Deal." Id.
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IV. A Comprehensive Plan to Fight Poverty
A. Federalism
In accordance with the prevailing normative values,
the existence of poverty is immoral and unjust.
48
Moreover, as the disparity between the haves and have-nots
widens and threatens our nation, it commands a national
will for public action. Next, that will must translate into
effective action, a way to fight poverty, through a local
anti-poverty strategy or plan. The will should be nationally
established and nationally funded, but the way would be
best designed and implemented locally. This design allows
the ingenuity of the federal system to maximize the benefits
to American citizens based on local requirements and
concerns.
Currently, the federal government requires local
jurisdictions and states to submit two planning documents,
which are described below, that deal with the expenditure
of federal dollars related to community development. 49
Although the federal government is the funding source, the
state and local governments prepare the plans. This
requirement means that fifty different anti-poverty
strategies may be developed in each of the fifty states, and
among local jurisdictions, thousands of opportunities to
experiment with bold anti-poverty strategies.
Our proposal for an effective anti-poverty strategy
suggests that the federal government would agree to
finance local plans developed under the leadership of local
coalitions in local jurisdictions. The federal government
would not allow the financing to be released until the plan
48 See supra notes 29, 31 & 42.
49 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, The
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complied with participation requirements, local matching
fund requirements, and innovative criteria. A local
government would submit the plan, but the committee of
local citizens should ideally be independent from local
political vicissitudes. 50 Since a local planning committee
is in charge, but relies on local agency involvement, there
should be less resistance from local agencies implementing
the plan.
B. Planning
The Consolidated Plan (ConPlan) is a Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) program that must be submitted
every five years. 51 Jurisdictions describe their method for
distributing federal community development and housing
dollars locally. 52  Each ConPlan describes a community's
needs, resources, priorities, and proposed activities to be
undertaken with this HUD funding. It is both an application
and a plan, and it offers (1) a collaborative process
establishing a unified vision; (2) a comprehensive housing
affordability strategy (CHAS); (3) a statement of long- and
short-term community development objectives; (4) an
application for funding under multiple funding sources; and
(5) a stated anti-poverty strategy describing funding
resources used to assist individuals in poverty. While
HUD seeks an articulation of anti-poverty strategies in
"brief and concise" form, examination of the actual
50 It should be noted that the original Founders' ideal of not having a
central government composed of career politicians would greatly
benefit the plan proposed.
51 See Consolidated Plan, supra note 49.
52 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Guidance
on Preparing Consolidated Plans for Fiscal Year (F1) 2005 Funding
Cycles: June 24, 2004, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/toolsandguidance/guida
nce/2005guidance.doc (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).53See Consolidated Plan, supra note 49.
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strategies submitted by recent grantees raises questions as
to the effectiveness of what appear to be simplistic anti-
poverty plans.
54
During our research, we examined an informal
sample of anti-poverty strategies to determine their
effectiveness. We drew our sample from cities based on
their diversity in size and geographic location. The cities
studied included: Syracuse, New York; 55  Jackson,
Mississinni; 56  Los Angeles, California; 57  Lafayette,
Indiana; Clackamas, Oregon; 59 Phoenix, Arizona; and
Decatur, Alabama. 6 1  These anti-poverty submissions,
14 See id. at 4.
55 City of Syracuse Consolidated Plan 2005-2006, available at
http://www.syracuse.ny.us/pdfs/12/ConPlan2005-2006.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17, 2006).
56 Jackson, MS: Consolidated Plan for 1995 Executive Summary,
available at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl 8/plan/ms/j acksoms.html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2006).
57 Los Angeles County's Anti-Poverty Strategy, Poverty in Context,
Poverty in Los Angeles County [hereinafter Los Angeles ConPlan],
available at
http://www.lacdc.org/resources/consolidatePlan/cp/Sec 10.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2006).
58 City of Lafayette, Indiana, Five Year Strategic Plan, Chapter 6 Anti-
Poverty Measures, available at
http://www.lafayette.in.gov/Content/global/File/plan/Chapter%206.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
59 See Clackamas County, Oregon, Housing and Urban Development
2003-2005 Strategic Plan, available at
http://www.co.clackamas.or.us/cd/packets/conplan4.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17, 2006).
60 See City of Phoenix, Arizona, Consolidated Plan for 2000-2005,
Chapter 7, Strategic Plan, available at
http://phoenix.gov/GRANTNSD/conplan.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2006).
61 City of Decatur, Alabama, Community Development, Consolidated
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while varying in length and detail, nonetheless uniformly
fall short on substance.
For example, while HUD requires collaboration
among community agencies, none of the sampled plans
integrated members of the poor as part of their anti-poverty
strategy. 62  Moreover, none of these plans mention the
inclusion of members of the poor in discussions of poverty
solutions. 63  Input from the community to be utilized in
crafting real solutions to poverty, however, has been
recognized as an indispensable but difficult-to-achieve
component of anti-poverty work for decades.
64
Even the collaborative efforts that were mentioned
in these ConPlans-combining resources and
brainstorming by like-minded poverty agencies-seem to
fall short of effective results. While collaboration is
inherently difficult, it is absolutely essential when engaging
in anti-poverty work.65  Los Angeles's reference to
"networking and collaboration" rings hollow when it is
followed by a vague mention of "[n]ew partnerships with
common anti-poverty goals that include housing providers,
service providers, funding agencies, and employers;
%20Plan%202005-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
62 See the entirety of the Consolidated Plans of Syracuse, New York;
Jackson, Mississippi; Los Angeles, California; Lafayette, Indiana;
Clackamas, Oregon; Phoenix, Arizona; and Decatur, Alabama, supra
notes 55-61.
63 Id. (Author's conclusion reached after analyzing the Consolidated
Plans).
64 See CLARK & HOPKiNS, supra note 23. Case-in-point, several years
ago while working with a client, we learned that second and third shift
jobs were virtually unobtainable because local bus service ceased at
6:00 PM. As providers, we did not consider this to be an obstacle
because we had automobiles and rarely used public transportation.
Only by listening to the client, did we comprehend the significance of
this barrier to self-sufficiency.
65 The very complexity of poverty, multiple agencies providing
services, and bureaucratic rules and regulations necessitates trouble
shooting analysis to develop a coherent strategy.
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community education; and education of funding sources.
66
Clackamas, Oregon seems to be on a more promising track
with a plan to "provide leadership in the County, to identify
and resolve issues of poverty,"6 which at least recognizes
the need for leadership when developing anti-poverty
strategies.
Despite the dearth of specific collaborative
measures in these anti-poverty strategies, several plans
reinforce the notion of "self-sufficiency" among families
without effectively describing how that will be obtained or
measured. 68  Most of the anti-poverty strategies contain
broad statements that fail to express specific actions and,
most importantly, describe tangible and measurable
results.69 Additionally, legal requirements regarding public
notice are not well designed to achieve maximum citizen
participation.
70
Vague objectives and lack of accountability yield
little prospect for the federal program's success. Lafayette
66 Los Angeles ConPlan, supra note 57.
67 Clackamas County, supra note 59.
68 See Alabama ConPlan, supra note 61; Los Angeles ConPlan, supra
note 57.
69 Los Angeles' anti-poverty strategy, for example, states that
"[e]ducation and training are important for a low-income person to gain
the skills needed to obtain and maintain employment" without
providing any concrete strategies to make available and maintain such
employment. See Los Angeles ConPlan, supra note 57. Decatur,
Alabama's plan does not even bother to enumerate goals; instead, it
merely lists "activities and supportive services provided to participating
families." Alabama ConPlan, supra note 61.
70 See Gregory L. Volz et al., Higher Education and Community
Lawyering: Common Ground, Consensus, and Collaboration for
Economic Justice, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 505, 532. See also Scott
Cummings & Gregory Volz, Toward a New Theory of Community
Economic Development, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 158, 167 (July-Aug.
2003). What good are public notice requirements if few citizens
understand and/or participate in the public hearing process? One of the
authors has witnessed a public notice meeting at which zero residents
attended.
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admitted to this point when it noted in its most recently
submitted ConPlan that poverty had in fact increased since
their last plan. 7 1 Although the authors of the Lafayette
ConPlan did try to attribute part of the cause to a sluggish
post-9/11 economy, they also seemed to take some
responsibility for their ineffective initiatives in fighting
poverty.72
A second type of federal planning document is the
Continuum of Care Plan, which refers to a "community
plan to organize and deliver housing and services to meet
the specific needs of people who are homeless as they
move to stable housing and maximum self-sufficiency.
'" 73
The Continuum of Care Plan "includes action steps to end
homelessness and prevent a return to homelessness.
74
HUD has identified four fundamental components: (1)
outreach, intake, and assessment to (a) identify an
individual's or family's service and housing needs, and (b)
link them to appropriate housing and/or service resources;
(2) emergency shelter and safe, decent alternatives to the
streets; (3) transitional housing with supportive services to
help people develop the skills necessary for permanent
housing; and (4) permanent housing and permanent
supportive housing.75
71 See supra note 58, at 2.
72 Id. at 11.
73 National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, HUD Homeless
Continuum of Care, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/homeless/library/coc/cocguide/intro.pd
f (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
74 Id.
75 HUD, What Is the Continuum of Care, and Why Is It Important? in
Guide to Continuum of Care Planning and Implementation, available at
www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/homeless/library/coc/cocguide/intro.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2006); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Community Planning and Development,
Continuum of Care for States, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/homeless/library/coc/cocstates.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
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HUD emphasizes that a Continuum of Care
program should be a "collaborative process" and include
coordinated neighborhood and community development
strategies that will assist families in their move to more
76permanent housing. It also encourages a focus on
preventive strategies to help decrease the number of
homeless individuals. 77 The Plans, therefore, must include
long-rage solutions and plans, making them proactive
social policy solutions.
The Continuum of Care Plans, of course, address
only homelessness, and while homelessness comprises a
large portion of this country's impoverished population, the
Plan nonetheless is not focused on assisting those who
already have housing options. Glancing at a sampling of
Continuum of Care Plans from cities and states throughout
the country, however, exemplifies that a considerable
amount of thought, collaboration, and planning are
channeled into these strategies. In this respect, the
Continuum of Care Plans serve as a more useful template,
than do the Consolidated Plans required by HUD, as a
coherent and organized anti-poverty planning document.78
76 See Guidelines, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/toolsandguidance/guida
nce/local-.guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
77 id.
78 The City of Chicago, for example, recognizes that financial restraints
are not the only impediment in securing stable housing, and it therefore
includes wraparound services to achieve this end. See Chicago's
Continuum of Care Plan, available at
www.chicagocontinuum.org/archives/getting-housed-stayg-housd.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Chicago's Continuum of Care
Plan]. In some cases, support services will be required for life, and
may include job training, education, substance abuse treatment, and
health or mental health care services. See id. Since homelessness can
be described as falling off the ladder of economic empowerment, the
systematic approach used by a community to prevent homelessness and
provide needed services to homeless citizens is an effective model for
us to imitate in designing an anti-poverty strategy for a community.
The Chicago Plan, while more detailed than the other Plans, still lacks
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C. Coalitions
Ideally, a local anti-poverty plan needs to assess
local needs, increase communication among service
providers, coordinate existing programs, gather new
resources, design an implementation strategy, and clearly
define how it will assure accountability. This work can
best be accomplished through the work of a coalition which
would include individuals representing a wide array of
stakeholders. Stakeholders would include, but would not
be limited to, representatives from the many sectors
directly involved in the impoverished community including
major institutions which are not poor such as hospitals,
universities, businesses, and faith-based institutions.
Many people in the public interest law field might
specific details, particularly in regard to accountability. See id.
Additionally, the examination of other Continuum of Care Plans
provides similar reports. See State of Georgia, 2005 Balance of State
Continuum of Care, available at
www.dca.state.ga.us/housing/HousingDevelopment/programs/downloa
ds/2005_CoCPlan.pdf [hereinafter Georgia Report] (last visited Sept.
5, 2006); Berkley Housing Department, Berkeley Homeless Continuum
of Care Plan, available at
www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/housing/CCP/ccpll.html [hereinafter Berkley
Continuum of Care Plan] (last visited Sept. 5. 2006). Both of these
continuum of care plans provide extensive information on their
respective region's homeless demographics and population. See
Georgia Report supra; Berkley Continuum of Care Plan supra.
Berkeley recognizes that "there is a need to improve coordination
particularly between homeless service providers and providers of
services used by homeless people, but which are available to clients
regardless of whether they are homeless or not," but the Plan did not
very convincingly articulate a way to compensate for this discrepancy.
See Berkley Continuum of Care Plan, supra. Similarly, Georgia
recognized that the planning necessary to confront homelessness could
not be confined solely to the "homeless-only" service providers and
resources. See Georgia Report, supra. The state has engaged in
forming taskforce committees and implementing training programs, but
it still appears uncertain that an effective strategy has been established.
Id.
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not recognize the importance of nontraditional institutions
to community coalitions. 79  The coalition should also
include participation from community residents as well as
individuals involved in public education, workforce
development, social service, criminal justice, public
interests, philanthropies, and government.
80
William Julius Wilson has written that only a multi-
racial coalition can mobilize the necessary political support
and financial resources to implement an intervention
strategy capable of resolving the structural causes of ghetto
poverty.8' The planning committee, which could develop
the anti-poverty plan and potentially become an advocacy
coalition, should be trained and encouraged to develop
creative and innovative policies and programs. Over time,
the committee will build chemistry and trust among the
participants. Community lawyers from the public interest
law sector could play a pivotal role ensuring that all sectors
of society are represented including the poor. It is
doubtful that any other professional class has the
perspective and knowledge of the local social service
network to analyze funding streams, detail the effectiveness
of existing services, recruit needed coalition members, and
79 Over the past ten to fifteen years, higher education has produced an
impressive body of work in poor communities. Additionally, some
visionary academic presidents recognize the obligation of all higher
education institutions to help solve America's greatest problems. For
example, eight years ago, Al Bloom, President of Swarthmore College,
addressed the role of higher education and challenged his colleagues to
start "thinking together how our educational institutions might best
contribute to eliminating poverty from this nation." Al Bloom, Speech
at the First Annual Philadelphia Education Network for Neighborhood
Development Conference (Oct. 22, 1997) (on file with authors).
80 The coalition must be allowed to develop its programs without
becoming a pawn in local political squabbles. The coalition should
develop a proactive written expression of how it will ensure that
tolitics do not dominate its operations.
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE,
supra note 9.
82 See Volz, Higher Education, supra note 70.
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encourage accountability for precious financial resources.
The maturation of the coalition will be one of the
most significant aspects to the success of the proposed anti-
poverty plan. When these groups internally develop trust
and confidence that their planning will receive financial
support, their commitment will further develop a national
will to fight poverty. 83  If these individual coalitions or
planning committees network, then they could learn from
each other, inspire each other, create synergies, and reduce
institutional inertia. Combined, these consequences create
an effective engine of change to overwhelm the forces of
poverty.
V. Work
Employment is the great crucible in our polarized
political world. Work must be a priority of any anti-
poverty strategy or plan. If the government cannot help
individuals who want to work but are unemployed through
no fault of their own, then it fails in one of the very
purposes for which it was created-to provide security for
its citizens. 84 One of the most sacred and core values of the
United States has always been equal opportunity. Equal
opportunity has been a persistent and traditional value ever
since its recognition at the birth of the country.
Unfortunately, those individuals who lack the basic
necessities-to live, to provide for their families, or to have
83 Recognition of different aspects of the role of individual
organizations, the internal culture of each, and the impact of each
organization's "personality" on collective action can serve as a check
on counter-productive activity.
84 See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER
(Basic Books 2004) (showing how President Roosevelt began asserting
that economic opportunity as we had known it no longer existed, that a
new concept of freedom required economic as well as political
freedom, and that the government owed its citizens the basic necessities
of life).
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the human dignity that comes with producing something of
value to society-are estranged from those values.
If everyone had a job paying a living wage, which
would adequately provide for his or her family, then little
or no poverty would exist. 85 Since insufficient financial
resources cause poverty, the most direct anti-poverty
strategy would focus on work, employment training and
work support, and establishing living wages for all those
individuals who want to work. Moreover, each local
jurisdiction, rather than the federal government, is best
situated to determine the primary causes of labor market
failure in its own jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions will
conclude that the focus of their anti-poverty plans should
concentrate on public education reform; others will
articulate that the employment and training system needs
restructuring. Many jurisdictions may focus on racial
prejudice, while some will focus on regional economic
development strategies. Each local community has the
collective capacity to analyze and understand what would
lift its citizenry up to self-sufficiency. Additionally, local
coalitions can generate unique plans targeted to their
community's needs. Ultimately, each plan's potential to
help citizens go to work will be its litmus test for success.
Nonetheless, local anti-poverty plans are the most effective
way to ensure that the right of equal opportunity is a reality
and not a platitude.
86
85 Richard Taub, What if Everybody Had a Job? SHELTERFORCE, at 8
(Sept./Oct. 1996), available at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/89/everyon-job.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2006) (hard copy of the article in possession of the authors).
Taub argues "that, if every able-bodied person in a community had a
job, many of the other problems and solutions to them would decline in
importance." Id. at 8. He suggests that the focus of urban solutions
should not be placed on "how to deal with the consequences of
unemployment and lack of income but [on] how to deal with... the
lack of income" in the first place. Id.
86 SUNSTEIN, supra note 84, at 68. Professor Sunstein points out that, in
the famous Commonwealth Club Address on September 23, 1932,
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Forty years ago, when the fledgling Legal Services
Program attempted to obtain support from the established
legal community, its first president Clint Bamberger
challenged the American Bar Association. He reminded
the ABA that:
Our responsibility is to marshal the forces of
law and the strength of lawyers to combat
the causes and effect of poverty. Lawyers
must uncover the legal causes of poverty,
remodel the system which generates the
cycle of poverty and design new social,
legal, and political tools and vehicles to
move poor people from deprivation,
depression, and despair to opportunity, hope,
and ambition. 87
We now know that a lack of coherent local planning
to fight poverty is at the root of the "cycle of poverty." Yet
the question remains: how can we change systemic and
structural forces that result in generations of poverty
without a plan to lead a community? Therefore, a coherent
anti-poverty plan should focus on connecting poor residents
to the regional and local economy. Solutions to
concentrated poverty require a link between poor citizens
and the economy. 88
Lawyers can contribute significantly to refocusing a
local community's attention to the need for family-
sustaining employment for all adults. In addition to
Franklin D. Roosevelt described a transformation of citizen rights
growing out of the Depression. Id. at 71. Roosevelt said, "Every man
has a right to live, [which includes] a right to make a comfortable
living." Id.
87 EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 120 (Transaction Books
1978).
88 See generally Taub, supra note 85.
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performing a connective or intermediary function between
institutions such as hospitals, universities, real estate
developers, and government agencies who all possess the
capacity to wield influence and shape policy, lawyers can
help interpret funding streams and planning programs.
More specifically, public interest lawyers can reduce the
isolation so visible in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Additionally, an organized social or economic movement
can profoundly change the way our society views an issue
and, consequently, influence the way laws are drafted.89
Properly trained and seasoned in public interest law,
lawyers are indispensable agents for needed change.
One recent report demonstrates that Americans
increasingly recognize that poverty requires a response not
only by the federal government but by state and local
government as well. 9°  Carefully cultivated, this
89 The disability rights movement of the twentieth century serves as a
prime example of the impact that organized social awareness can
create. Prior to the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, society
viewed a disability as a medical condition that needed to be cured and
viewed people with disabilities as "unfortunates." See Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L. J. 1, 12 (2004).
Disability advocates, however, successfully argued that a disability is
not merely a medical condition that inhibits the potential of a disabled
person; rather, it constitutes discrimination necessitating civil rights
protection and accommodations for people who have disabilities. Id.
The disability advocacy movement effectively shifted the focus of how
to assist individuals with disabilities from providing public entitlements
to empowering individuals by giving them civil rights. Id.
90 See University of Georgia, Peach State Poll, Georgians See Poverty
as a Major Problem for the State (May 20, 2004), available at
http://www.cviog.uga.edu/peachpoll/poll.php?date=2004-05-20
("Report & Analysis" link) (last visited Sept. 19, 2006). This 2004 poll
found that Georgia residents perceived poverty as a serious issue and
believed that state and local government played a more important role
in fighting poverty than the federal government. Id. Interestingly,
those Georgia residents polled saw the role of the ordinary citizen as
the most important in efforts to fight poverty. Id. If this poll fairly
reflects nationwide grassroots opinion, the coalition concept offered
will resonate with the American people. Interestingly, when asked if
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recognition could generate a popular expectation for local-
and state-dominated responses to federal edicts. Locally-
driven leadership is more suited to designing workforce
development systems responsive to local labor force
deficiencies. Assisted by competent and inspired legal
leadership, citizen coalitions could become a powerful
instrument for economic justice.
VI. The Will and The Way
In order to generate the will for proposed change,
the proposed plan must (1) stress that structural and
systemic forces in each of America's communities require
active community participation to address local poverty
issues; (2) acknowledge that the societal costs of poverty
are immense and apprise the public of these costs; (3)
emphasize that the injustice of poverty is unacceptable and
its elimination is a moral imperative; (4) draw attention to
the media attention paid to poverty in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina as it provides an opportunity to create a
needed national will driven by active citizen participation;
(5) act to restore the human dignity which accompanies the
ability to work and contribute to the common good; (6)
invest in the future, not only to reduce the various
economic and personal costs, but also to convert consumers
of poverty programs into taxpayers; and (7) create a
national response to poverty that will give deference and
responsibility to both state and local government.
Additionally, in its national response, the
government should (1) generate the political power to
provide block grant funds to the states; (2) form local
committees composed of representatives from all sectors to
develop a plan; (3) require advocates for the poor; (4)
poverty could be eliminated, seventy-five percent (75%) said no and
many of these gave the Biblical admonition that Christ said the poor
will always be with us as a justification. Id. See also supra note 30.
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compile impact studies that assess the effect, including
economic opportunities and costs, of all federal, state, and
local legislation on the indigent; (5) pay special attention to
ensure that recipients of poverty services are included in
the planning committees; (6) include higher education,
business, faith-based institutions, service providers, public
health, law enforcement, local government, and other local
institutions that devote resources to poverty issues need in
the coalition; (7) detail what local resources will be
contributed, how the plan will be implemented, and who-
including representative recipients-will evaluate the plan
in order to ensure accountability; (8) adhere to each anti-
poverty strategy and plan; (9) include recommendations for
improving the efforts and assuring that allocated resources
are being deployed effectively in its evaluation process;
(10) implement recommendations after each evaluation;
and (11) create a self-perpetuating feedback loop to address
change and assure that the local plans remain effective and
responsive to the problems being addressed.
VII. Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina focused the world's attention on
the existence of America's poor. The mere existence of
large numbers of poor people, and the lack of planning to
serve their needs in an emergency situation, offered a vivid
picture of severe economic imbalance. From our earliest
days, equal opportunity has been a bedrock value of the
American experience. Today, that value has been relegated
to a subordinate position because of the preeminent
positions accorded wealth, status, and power.
The federal system developed by our Founding
Fathers offers the benefits of central funding and control,
while according local stakeholders meaningful input into
the development of programs addressing poverty.
Therefore, any realistic effort to address poverty demands a
change in the mindset of the public and the federal
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government's willingness to allocate sufficient resources to
local entities that can develop and implement programs to
eliminate poverty. Advancing the change in that mindset
can be promoted by publicizing the need for equal
opportunity and the high cost of poverty programs. Once
the public recognizes these ideas, a political imperative
should develop to fund the necessary anti-poverty
programs. Federal funding will be predicated on the
development of comprehensive, accountable, and effective
programs. At the same time, the public hue and cry may
prompt the development of local coalitions with the
knowledge, know-how, and savvy to create programs
geared to address the unique problems of local poverty.
Hopefully, the coalescence of these factors will
result in a change of policy and the development of
systematic programming to eradicate poverty and its
attendant problems that currently plague America. Perhaps
there are sunny days ahead if a rational recognition of the
plague of poverty can become a national priority and its
elimination is made possible through the implementation of
the program outlined in this article.
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TAKING NEW STEPS AGAINST DIGITAL SAMPLING:
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LAYS DOWN THE LAW ON DIGITAL
SAMPLING, BUT WILL IT REALLY IMPROVE INDUSTRY
PRACTICES?
Kelly Randall*
I. In Search of an Infringement Rule
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,' the
Sixth Circuit tackled an issue that has been plaguing the
music industry for nearly two decades. Digital sampling is
a staple of the rap and hip-hop creative process, but there is
very little precedent on or clarity about how to determine if
sampling infringes on a sound recording copyright. In
Bridgeport I, the defendant, No Limit Films, released the
film I Got the Hook Up (Hook Up) and included the song
"100 Miles and Runnin' ("100 Miles") on the film
2soundtrack . As with many typical rap songs, "100 Miles"
sampled from another song. The plaintiff, Westbound
Records, Inc. ("Westbound"), claimed co-ownership of the
sound recording copyright to the sampled song, "Get Off
Your Ass and Jam" ("Get Off"), by George Clinton, Jr. and
the Funkadelics. 3 Although No Limit Films obtained an
oral license from the co-owners of "100 Miles" to use the
song in the film soundtrack,4 Westbound claimed that "100
J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Tennessee College of Law;
B.Mus. 2000, Vanderbilt University, Blair School of Music. Author
also served as Editor-in-Chief of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW &
POLICY.
1230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) [hereinafter Bridgeport I].
2 Id. at 833.
3 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th
Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Bridgeport Il].
4 Bridgeport 1, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
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Miles" contained an unauthorized sampling of "Get Off."5
The process to determine whether digital sampling
amounts to copyright infringement is obscured by many
factors. Since many sampling cases are settled out-of-
court,6 the scarcity of case law does not provide a definitive
road map for making this determination. While the courts
are still in the evolutionary stages of creating a standard of
analysis for infringement created by sampling, 7 the lack of
clear guidelines or rules further complicates the process. In
light of an increase in litigation regarding digital sampling
and copyright infringement, the Sixth Circuit addressed the
need to clarify "what constitutes actionable infringement
with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted sound
recordings." 8 In Bridgeport II, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to No Limit
Films and established a new bright light rule for defining
sound recording copyright infringement. 9 The court held
that when someone digitally samples, it is a physical taking
of another's work and no further analysis, such as de
minimis or substantial similarity test, is required.' 0
The purpose of this case synopsis is to demonstrate
Bridgeport's departure from the traditional methods of
evaluating copyright infringement claims, as well as its
potential effect on the music industry and the courts that
review those cases. While this case addressed other issues
on appeal, this synopsis will focus primarily on
Westbound's claim against No Limit Films and the court's
establishment of a new bright line rule. Moreover, this
synopsis will not include the technical details of digital
5 Id. at 838.
6 Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling-A Clue Illuminated and
Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 124 (2003).
7id.
8 Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 397.
9 Id. at 395.10 1d. at 395, 399.
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sampling, as they are discussed in an abundance of
scholarly articles written on the topic. 11  While this
decision emphasizes the need for the new bright line rule
and "ease of enforcement,"12 it represents a broad departure
from the traditional model of determining whether digital
sampling amounts to copyright infringement. Furthermore,
such a departure may not result in the outcome that the
court anticipated. Rather, this decision may create a greater
divide between the analyses utilized by the Sixth Circuit
and other circuit courts of appeals for copyright
infringement cases.
II. Development of Copyright Infringement
Analyses
A. Groundwork for Analyzing Infringement
Although Baxter v. MCA 13 involved only a musical
composition copyright infringement, it provides a genesis
for the analyses used to determine copyright infringement.
In that case, the plaintiff was the sole copyright owner of
the musical composition "Joy,"' 14 which he claimed
composer John Williams copied for use in the "Theme
from E.T."' 15 After the district court found that the two
works were not substantially similar,' 6 the Ninth Circuit
laid the groundwork for analyzing a copyright infringement
claim. A claimant must prove (1) copyright ownership, and
(2) that the defendant copied a "protectible expression."'
17
To prove copying, a plaintiff may use circumstantial
evidence that (a) the defendant had access to the original
" Id. at 401.
1Id. at 398.
13 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
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work before his work was created, and (b) "substantial
similarity of both general ideas and expression between the
copyrighted work and the defendant's work."'
8
Furthermore, a plaintiff may also show a "'striking
similarity' between the works" to infer copying, where
there is no evidence of access. 19
In reviewing the case, the Baxter court applied an
"intrinsic" test of substantial similarity by relying on the
reaction of an ordinary lay person hearing the works.
20
Although the court used this analysis technique to
determine that the two works should be heard by the jury, 21
it rejected the defendant's argument that a similarity as
minimal as a six-note progression is not copyrightable.
22
In fact, the court highlighted the lack of a bright line rule
regarding what amount of copying constitutes
infringement. 23 Rather than opt to solve the problem by
establishing a rule, the Ninth Circuit left that determination
to the jury,24 preferring to determine infringement as a
question of fact rather than law.
B. Simplifying the Analysis for Unauthorized
Use
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers
Records, Inc. is one of the earliest sampling cases
involving unauthorized use. The defendant, artist Biz
Markie, sought the clearance to use the plaintiffs work,
"Alone Again (Naturally)," in his composition, "Alone
18 Id.
19 Id.





25 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Again. ' 26 However, his record label released the album
including "Alone Again" before the defendant could obtain
the necessary clearances. 2 The court used the defendant's
own actions in attempting to obtain a license, then
subsequently releasing an album with a song that included
an unlicensed sample, to prove that the defendant knew he
was violating the plaintiffs rights as a copyright holder.
28
Essentially, the court used the defendant's own knowledge
of unauthorized sampling to prove infringement, thus
simplifying the analysis to a process similar to the later
developed Bridgeport rule.
C. Defining Multiple Analyses for More
Complex Infringement
Two years later, a district court in nearby New
Jersey decided a more complicated sampling case using a
29less clear-cut approach. In Jarvis v. A&M Records, the
defendant used sampled portions of the plaintiffs
composition "The Music's Got Me" in his composition
"Get Dumb! (Free Your Body).",30 The court established a
three step process to prove copyright infringement, in
which the plaintiff must prove that (1) he is a valid
copyright owner; (2) the "defendant copied a protectible
expression"; and (3) the "copying is substantial enough to
constitute improper appropriation of plaintiffs work.'
' 1
Similar to the Baxter court's analysis, the Jarvis court
found that without the defendant's admission of unlicensed
sampling, copying can be inferred if the defendant had
access to the original work and the defendant's work is
26 Id. at 184.
27Id. at 185.
28 id.
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substantially similar to the plaintiffs. 3
2
In Jarvis, however, the defendant admitted to
unauthorized use of the sample, 33 and the court moved to
the third step in its analysis. The court analogized digital
sampling to "taping the original composition and reusing it
in another context." 34 This analogy allowed the court to
apply Professor Nimmer's doctrine of "fragmented literal
similarity," where "literal, verbatim similarity" exists
between the two works. 35 Digital sampling by definition is
a flawless example of "fragmented literal similarity." To
this end, the court further explained that "fragmented literal
similarity" infringement may decrease the value of the
original work even when only a small, but qualitatively
significant portion of the work was copied.36 While the
court found that both quantitatively and qualitatively
significant portions of a work can be protectible
expressions, it ultimately examined the infringing work's
effect on the original work's value to determine unlawful
appropriation. 37 On the other hand, the court noted some
material may not be "sufficiently original and/or novel"
and, thus, is non-copyrightable,38 but a "sufficiently
distinctive" work is copyrightable. 39  Jarvis illuminated
four of the main analyses for determining copyright
infringement: (1) substantial similarity, (2) fragmented
literal similarity, (3) quantitative/qualitative, and (4)
originality.
32 Id. at 289.
33 id.
34 Id. at 286.
35 Id. at 289.
36 Id. at 291.
37 id.
38id.
39 Id. at 292.
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D. Compacting the Analyses, But
Infringement Still Remains a Jury Question
Nearly a decade later, in Williams v. Broadus,40 the
court evaluated and compacted several analyses to
determine if sampling is unlawful.4 ' Plaintiff Marlon
Williams ("Marley Marl") sampled a portion of Otis
Redding's song "Hard to Handle" for his song "The
Symphony" without obtaining the proper permission from
42the copyright owner. Ten years after the release of
Williams' album, the defendant, Calvin Broadus ("Snoop
Dogg") sampled some lyrics and music from "The
Symphony" for his own song, "Ghetto Symphony. '43 The
defendant argued that due to Williams' own unauthorized
sampling, the plaintiff did not have a valid copyright, and
therefore, could not meet the first step in a copyright
infringement analysis.44 While the Copyright Act does not
protect a derivative work that has unlawfully used other
material,45 a "work is not derivative simply because it
borrows from a pre-existing work.",4 6 Rather, a work is
derivative if it infringes on the original copyright holder's
right to create a derivative work himself. 7 To establish
that a derivative work exists, the infringer must have copied
the work and done so to the level of unlawful
appropriation. 48 Once again, the substantial similarity test
is used to prove unlawful appropriation 49 by relying upon






41 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976).




49 1d. at *3.
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the ordinary lay listener's response to the two works.
50
The court further explained that this case is an
example of "fragmented literal similarity," 51 and offered
the de minimis doctrine that some literal copying may be so
quantitatively or qualitatively insignificant that it does not
amount to infringement. 52 The court acknowledged that its
de minimis substantial similarity analysis depends on the
significance of the copied material to the-original work.53
After compressing several analyses, the court found that a
material issue of fact remained as to whether the
defendant's sample constituted a significant portion of the
original work,5 thus continuing to follow the Baxter
precedent that infringement is a question of fact and not of
law.
E. Filtering Out Sound Recording and
Musical Composition Infringements
1. The District Court's Approach in
Newton I
In Newton v. Diamond, 5 the court distinguished
between musical composition and sound recording
copyright infringement. The plaintiff was the sole owner of
the musical composition "Choir, ' 56 but did not own the
sound recording copyright after he had licensed it to ECM
Records. 57 The defendants, the Beastie Boys, obtained a




" Id. at *4.
54 id.
55 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
[hereinafter Newton 1].
5 1Id. at 1246.
57 id.
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a six-second long sequence of three notes played over one
sustained note in their song "Pass the Mic." 8 Since the
plaintiff did not have a sound recording copyright
infringement claim, the court first used a process to filter
out the unique characteristics of the sound recording from
the musical composition. 59
The court concluded that a musical composition
copyright "protects only the sound that would invariably
result from" playing the written musical composition, 60 not
necessarily the actual sounds performed. While the
plaintiffs argument focused on this specific performance
technique, the court applied the following test to filter out
the performance from the composition by asking (1) what
is "unique" about the plaintiffs performance, and (2)
whether the defendant's own creation of a similar three-
note sequence would infringe upon the musical
composition copyright. 62  Next, the court employed the
originality analysis, explaining that "not every element of a
song is per se protected" and that copyright extends only to
the "original and non-trivial" elements of a work.63 The
court countered the plaintiffs focus on the originality of
the three-note sequence with prior case law. Similar cases
involving less than six notes were successfully protected
only where the notes were "qualitatively distinctive" when
accompanied by lyrics, went to the "heart of the
composition," were repeated frequently within the lyrics,
and were analyzed in both the sound recording and the
written composition.64 After using this filtering process,
the court found that any originality in the six-second
58M."
59 d. at 1249.
60Id. at 1251.
61 Id. at 1252.
62id.
63 Id. at 1253.
64Md. at 1254.
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sample comes from the sound recording, 65 and further held
that a small, common three-note sequence was not
protected by copyright. 
66
Lastly, the court employed the de minimis analysis.
While the court acknowledged that the three-note sequence
is not protected by copyright, it contended that the
defendant's use of the sample was nonetheless de
minimis. 67 Since a de minimis sample is not substantially
similar enough to be recognizable by the average
audience, 68 the court adopted a quantitative/qualitative
approach by asking whether the defendant's use of
quantitative or qualitative elements of the original work
"rises to the level of unlawful appropriation." 6 9 While a
quantitative analysis emphasizes the amount of material
copied,7 ° the qualitative analysis focuses on the
significance of the copied material to the original work.7'
Ultimately, the court noted that the qualitative analysis
depends on whether someone might recognize the source of
the material in question when performed outside the
context of the original work.72 Although a de minimis
analysis was not necessary with this particular sample, the
court's elaboration of the analysis began to solve the
problems associated with the lack of useful guidelines to
determine copyright infringement by digital sampling.
2. The Court of Appeals Refines the
Process in Newton II
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
65 Id. at 1256.
6 id.
6 7 id.
681 d. at 1256-57.
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court's holding in Newton I that the defendant's use of the
sample was de minimis.73 However, Newton II approached
the de minimis analysis in a different manner. Here, the
Ninth Circuit, like the trial court, began with a process to
"filter out" the elements associated with the sound
recording to address only the elements infringing upon the
musical composition.74 The court then incorporated the
substantial similarity, "fragmented literal similarity," and
the quantitative/qualitative analyses to establish that "the
substantiality of the similarity is measured by considering
the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied
portion in relation to the plaintiffs work as a whole."
75
The court determined that since the three-note sequence
appeared only once in "Choir" and was not any more
significant than other sections of the work, the sampled
portion was "neither quantitatively nor qualitatively
significant.
'" 76
Therefore, the Newton II court concluded that the
works were not substantially similar and the sample was de
minimis because the ordinary listener would not "discern
Newton's hand as a composer apart from his talent as a
performer" in the Beastie Boys' sample. 77  While the
dissenting judge acknowledged the analyses presented by
the majority were correct, she explained that a reasonable
jury could find substantial similarity in the works, and
disagreed with the grant of summary judgment for the
defendant.78
73 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Newton I1].74 /d. at 595.
751 Id. at 596.
76 /d. at 597.
77 Id. at 598.
78 id.
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F. Summary
Steadily, courts have established a framework for
determining what constitutes copyright infringement in
digital sampling cases. Borrowing from other infringement
analyses, courts have many options to evaluate digital
sampling's effect on copyright, while generally resolving
the issue as a question of fact. Such painstaking efforts to
set forth precedent should not be taken lightly. Relying
more on law review articles than case law, however, the
Sixth Circuit chose to depart from this precedent rather
than add to it.
11l. Bridgeport's Procedural History
A. The District Court Takes the Anticipated
Approach and Follows Precedent in
Bridgeport I
In Bridgeport I, the district court incorporated all of
the analyses, relying heavily upon the substantial similarity
and quantitative/qualitative analyses to find that the
defendant's use of the sample was de minimis and thus not
actionable. The court first focused on the originality of the
sample, concluding that a jury could find that the
arpeggiated chord from "Get Off' was sufficiently
"original and creative" and therefore a protectible
expression. 79  Next, the court pointed out that the de
minimis analysis balances the interests of the copyright
holders against the potentially "stifling effect" that strict
enforcement of copyright laws may have on the artistic
expression of new works. 8  In addition, the court
highlighted that the analysis is complicated by the scarcity
of case law on digital sampling and the "lack of a clear road
79 Bridgeport 1, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
"I1d. at 840.
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map for de minimis analyses."
81
After finding that the de minimis analysis was a
derivative of the substantial similarity test,8 2 the court
explained that applying either the quantitative/qualitative or
the "fragmented literal similarity" approaches used by other
courts would also show that this particular instance of
sampling "does not rise to the level of legally cognizable
appropriation. '"8 3 Therefore, the Bridgeport I court found
that the sampled material was a "mere fraction" of the
plaintiffs original work and therefore quantitatively
insignificant. 84  While reviewing the qualitative
significance of the sample, the court found that the mood,
tone, and purpose were not substantially similar enough
that an ordinary lay listener would recognize the
appropriation. 85 In a final note, the court emphasized that
copyright law's purpose is to "deter wholesale plagiarism,"
while striking a balance "between protecting an artist's
interests, and depriving other artists of the building blocks
of future works."8 6 Therefore, the court attempted to weigh
those factors when dismissing the plaintiffs claims after
finding a lack of substantial similarity and that the sampled
material was de minimis. As expected, the district court
respected the precedent, evaluated the case under every
analysis available from case law, and found that the issue





85 ld. at 842.
86 id.
87 Following the Sixth Circuit's decision, the court granted a rehearing
based on the defendant's petition and an amicus brief filed by the
Recording Industry Association of America in support of that petition,
which resulted in a few changes to section II of the decision. See
Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.
2004) [hereinafter Bridgeport Rehearing]. Although this case synopsis
focuses primarily on section H of the decision, the amendments either
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IV. The Sixth Circuit Makes Its Own Rules in
Bridgeport H
In Bridgeport 11,88 the Sixth Circuit took a less
analytical approach to the issue of whether digital sampling
constitutes copyright infringement. The court created a
new bright line rule to address the district court's concern
with the scarcity of case law and general lack of clear
guidelines for the de minimis analysis. 89  However, the
Sixth Circuit departed from the district court's decision and
accepted the plaintiffs argument that a de minimis, or
substantial similarity, analysis was not necessary in cases
where the defendant concedes digital sampling. 90 The
court explained that by adopting this bright line rule, both
the music industry and the courts benefit from the newly
found clarity to determine whether digital sampling
amounts to copyright infringement.
91
In developing the rule, the court first called
attention to the statutory language of the Copyright Act,
92
specifically that the sound recording copyright owner has
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works of the
copyrighted material, including using fixed sounds from the
original recording. 93 The court's interpretation of section
I 14(b) allows a non-copyright holder to simulate or imitate
the sounds in a recording, but prohibits making an actual
copy of the recording,94 thus protecting the copyrighted
clarify the court's language or include additional footnote material that
has generally little effect on this synopsis.88 Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 390.
89Bridgeport Rehearing, 401 F.3d at 840.
90Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 395.
9' Id. at 397.92Id. at 399 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114).
93 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114(a)-(b) (1976).
94 Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 398.
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work without stifling the creativity of others. 95 Since a
sampling license fee could not be higher than either the cost
to reproduce the sounds by the non-copyright holder or the
cost to litigate the issue, the court explained that the market
would determine the fee.
96
In addition, the court pointed out that "sampling is
never accidental" and that the sampler knows that the
process of sampling is "taking another's work product."
97
Further, the court emphasized the value of the sample,
98
and interpreted the statute as not only prohibiting the
sampling of the whole work, but also smaller portions of
the whole. 99 Although a sample is only a portion of the
whole work, that portion still has value since the sampler
chose that portion to either reduce expenses, add value to
the new recording, or both.'00
In contrast, the court explained that following a de
minimis or substantial similarity analysis is not as
economical as adopting this new bright line rule. 101 In the
interest of the many digital sampling cases pending before
the courts, the new rule would eliminate additional analyses
and allow the courts to decide the cases quickly, efficiently,
and with little variance or error.1 02 The Bridgeport II court
claimed to be less concerned with the rule's judicial
economy and more interested in the benefits to the music
industry by making it cheaper for an artist to license a work
than risk the cost of litigation. 10 3 Yet, with more than 470
similar cases pending from the original litigation, this
bright line rule approach seems more self-serving for the
9 5
Id.








03 Id. at 399-400.
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court than beneficial to the music industry.
Recognizing that it was setting forth a new rule, the
court attempted to justify establishing its own precedent, as
well as its sharp departure from the traditional analysis-
based approach followed by earlier decisions. First, rather
than relying upon judicial precedent, the court followed the
statutory interpretation offered by numerous law review
articles addressing the issue of digital sampling.10 4 Such an
unorthodox approach will likely be criticized and followed
with caution. Second, the court reasoned that a licensing
requirement for digital sampling will in no way stifle
creativity, since several artists and companies already
choose to properly license the sampled material in their
works. 10 5 Third, the court noted that the responsibility of
working out guidelines for proper digital sampling
licensing rests with the record industry and not the
courts. 106 Fourth, the court pointed out that this new rule is
intended to apply only to cases arising after the Bridgeport
II decision and, thus, should not affect any pending or
already litigated cases. 0 7 Lastly, while the court took a
"literal reading approach" to the legislation that was passed
before digital sampling existed, it left any responsibility for
clarifying or updating the law to Congress, particularly
noting that the music industry may prompt such action on
its own. 1
08
In the end, the Sixth Circuit made digital sampling a
question of law when the defendant admits to the
unauthorized sampling. Although, a taking without
permission is infringement, the court disposed of the need
for a jury, and thus, presented digital sampling as a strict
liability offense. As a result, any flexibility in the
Copyright Act and case law that encouraged artistic
4Id. at 400.
105 Id. at 401.
106 id.
107 Id.
1' 8Id. at 401-02.
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expression has been quashed. With strict liability looming,
digital samplers are faced with a choice to license their
sampled material, no matter how insignificant, or face the
consequences.
V. Is a New Bright Line Rule Really What The
Music Industry Needs?
While the development of this new bright line rule
may appear to provide much needed guidance for assessing
how digital sampling infringes upon copyrighted works, the
rule may not have the desired effects. Although the court
appears to present the rap and hip-hop industry with the
"license or else" ultimatum, strict compliance by that
industry is unlikely. In fact, it might encourage less
obedient behavior and less-than-honest practices,
particularly among the newer, budding artists. Rising talent
in the music industry rarely is represented by counsel or
well-versed in copyright law. In hopes of one day "making
it" in the industry, up-and-coming artists frequently depend
on a grassroots following, creating and distributing demo
tapes, and performing in public as often as possible. This
approach can lead to the artist's popularity and, in turn, an
increased demand for that artist's work. As money begins
to exchange hands for the artist's recordings, whether
independently as demo tapes and self-produced recordings
or through a professional record company, any digital
sampling in the work has either been long-forgotten or
cannot be removed without significantly altering the work
and potentially lessening the demand. Despite the court's
position that many artists and companies already choose to
properly license their digital samples, those artists and
companies the court identified are already well-established
in the industry, represented by counsel, and therefore can
no longer operate below the radar. Unfortunately, the court
failed to account for the up-and-comer, the grassroots artist,
and the hobbyist, who may all one day become established
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artists.
As word of this decision spreads through the
industry, the potential for artists to become less forthright
about their use of digital samples and more creative in
altering the samples beyond any recognition will likely
reach a higher level than ever before. Although the court
offered the suggestion that artists are free to recreate the
sounds in a sound recording themselves by imitating or
simulating the sounds, it fails to recognize that a creative
staple of this genre often involves the use and creative
manipulation of other sound recordings. Artists and
producers are unlikely to change their creative processes
for the sake of avoiding the hassle or expense of licensing
other works. Just as a slight modification in another area of
strict liability-such as enforcing the speed limit-is not
likely to change most drivers' habits on the highway, this
bright line rule will have little effect on the habits of the
digital sampling community.
After several years of developing and employing
analyses for determining copyright infringement, other
courts may be hesitant to adopt the Sixth Circuit's new
rule. The response from the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits could determine the authority of this new rule and
whether they are likely to change their own precedent on
this issue. Especially notable would be the Ninth Circuit's
reaction to this decision after its own de minimis analysis in
Newton II just ten months before Bridgeport II. In contrast,
the Eleventh Circuit could emerge as the most willing to
adopt this new rule considering the burgeoning rap and hip-
hop industry in the Atlanta area and an even greater
scarcity of that circuit's own precedent in Copyright
infringement cases. On the other hand, the increased
influence of the genre's artists and companies in that circuit
could persuade the court to adopt a more sampling-friendly
approach. However, with a surge of copyright holders
filing infringement suits, courts may start adopting the
Sixth Circuit's rule, or a variation thereof, in an effort to
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insure their own judicial economy.
VI. Conclusion
Only time will tell whether Bridgeport's new bright
line rule will mean a whole new strict liability approach to
whether digital sampling amounts to copyright
infringement. While rejecting several years of case law
that allowed some sampling within confined circumstances,
the Sixth Circuit's decision prohibits any unlicensed digital
sampling. Amid criticism by some artists and companies,
the decision may have an effect on the industry's behavior,
but perhaps not the exact outcome that the court
envisioned.
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THE PRISONER AS MASTER OF His OWN LAWSUIT:
THE INTERPRETATION OF PRISONERS' § 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS
CLAIMS AFTER WILKINSON V. DOTSON
Lisa A. White*
I. Introduction
In Wilkinson v. Dotson, l the U.S. Supreme Court
explored the "jurisdictional periphery of habeas corpus
' 2
and re-examined 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a mechanism to
challenge incarceration procedures. 3 The issue before the
Court was whether prisoners may seek declaratory and
injunctive relief for alleged unconstitutional parole
procedures through a § 1983 challenge or "whether they
must instead seek relief exclusively under the federal
habeas corpus statutes."4 In Wilkinson, two Ohio prisoners
individually brought § 1983 claims against the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections for violating
their civil rights during parole considerations. 5 In each
case, the district court held that "the prisoner would have to
seek relief through a habeas corpus suit."6  After the
consolidation and reversal of the cases by the Sixth Circuit,
the State of Ohio petitioned the Supreme Court for
. J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Tennessee College of Law; M.A.
1996 University of Tennessee; B.A. 1993 University of Tennessee.
Author also served as Research Editor of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF
LAW & POLICY.
1 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
2 Franceski v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 04 Civ. 8667, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5961, at * 10-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that the Wilkinson
holding does not preclude a prisoner from bringing a single action in
habeas and under § 1983).
3 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 76.
4id.
5Id.
6 Id. at 77.
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certiorari.7
In granting review of Wilkinson, the Supreme Court
revisited and attempted to clarify the "somewhat
confusing ' 8 intersection between claims which must be
brought in habeas after complete exhaustion of state
remedies and other claims which are cognizable under §
1983, which only requires the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 9 In this case, William Dotson and Rogerico
Johnson, both long-term prisoners in Ohio, individually
brought § 1983 actions against the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections' 0 after the state parole board
applied recently adopted-and significantly harsher-
guidelines to each inmate's parole consideration.'
William Dotson, whose life sentence began in 1981,
claimed that the state violated the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto and Due Process Clauses when the parole board
determined that he "should not receive further
consideration for parole for at least five more years."' 2 To
make this determination, the parole board applied
guidelines adopted in 1998 rather than those in place when
Dotson committed his crime.' 3
Similarly, the parole board applied the 1998 parole
guidelines when it decided Rogerico Johnson was
"unsuitable for release" in 1999.14 Like Dotson, Johnson
began his sentence prior to the adoption of the 1998
guidelines 15 and claimed the corrections department
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by
7id.
8 Dotson v. Wilkinson, 329 F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2003), affd 544
U.S. 74 (2005).
9 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 92; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,477
(1973).
10 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 76.
11Id. at 76-77.
12 Id. at 76.
13 Id. at 76-77.
14 Id. at 77.
15 Id.
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applying the newer guidelines.' 6  Furthermore, Johnson
claimed that the parole board's proceedings violated the
Due Process Clause "by having too few members present
and by denying him an adequate opportunity to speak."'
17
Each prisoner sought (1) declarative relief prohibiting the
retroactive application of the 1998 parole guidelines, and
(2) concomitant injunctive relief.'8  The Supreme Court
held that the prisoners had cognizable claims under §
198319 because a judgment in their favor would neither
"necessarily spell speedier release" nor "imply the
invalidity of confinement." 20 Instead, a favorable judgment
would only affect the timing and proper procedure of their
parole considerations, neither of which "lies at the core of
habeas corpus."
21
This synopsis argues that the majority in Wilkinson
astutely weighs the importance of protecting the prisoners'
civil rights against the state's presumption that the
prisoners brought these cases "only because they believe[d]
that victory on their claims [would] lead to speedier release
from prison. 22 Thus, a deciding factor in whether a claim
is cognizable under § 1983, or alternately, whether it must
be brought under a habeas corpus suit, rests on the actual
relief sought by the plaintiff, rather than on the potential




1 Id. at 76.
'9 Id. at 82.
20 id.
21 Id. (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489) (internal quotations omitted).
22 Id. at 78.
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II. Differentiating Between Civil Rights Actions
and Habeas Corpus Petitions
A. The Intersection Between Habeas Corpus
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Prior to Wilkinson, the Supreme Court considered
the intersection between the habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in four key decisions,
beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez in 1973 .23 In Preiser,
three New York prisoners brought § 1983 actions,
combined with petitions for habeas corpus relief, against
the New York State Department of Correctional Services.
24
The prisoners sought injunctive relief to restore their good-
time credits, which were revoked through allegedly
unconstitutional disciplinary proceedings.25  For each
prisoner, a judgment restoring the good-time credits would
result in immediate release from prison.26 The Supreme
Court opined that their action "fell squarely within [the]
traditional scope of habeas corpus" 27 regardless of whether
restoration of the good-time credits resulted in immediate
release or simply shortened their confinement. 28 The Court
reasoned that exhaustion of state remedies, required by
habeas corpus, but not by a § 1983 claim, is "rooted in
considerations of federal-state comity," 29 in which the
state's interest is especially strong.30 Thus, the Court held
that when a state prisoner challenges "the very fact or
duration of his physical imprisonment ... his sole federal
23411 U.S. 475.
24 Id. at 476.
25 Id. "Good time credits" are reductions in an inmate's sentence for
§ ood behavior.
Id. at 476-77.
17 Id. at 487.
28 id.
29 Id. at 491.
30 id.
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remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." 3 1 The Preiser decision
specifically did not eliminate § 1983 claims, but instead
reaffirmed that "a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for...
a constitutional challenge to the conditions of. . .prison
life."
, 32
With its decision in Wolff v. McDonnell,33 the Court
began to clarify the edges of the intersection between §
1983 and habeas corpus petitions. In Wolf, a group of
prisoners brought a § 1983 class action suit against a
Nebraska state prison "challenging several of the practices,
rules, and regulations of the [prison] [c]omplex." 34 The
prisoners sought restoration of their good-time credits, but
the Court affirmed that Preiser properly foreclosed such a §
1983 claim.35 The prisoners also sought the "submission of
a plan by the prison authorities for a hearing procedure in
connection with withholding and forfeiture of good time
which complied with the requirements of due process; and
• ..damages for the deprivation of civil rights resulting
from the use of the allegedly unconstitutional
procedures." 36 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision, holding that the prisoners had
cognizable § 1983 claims in their request for procedural
modifications and damages.
37
Heck v. Humphrey,3 8 the third significant case heard
by the Supreme Court regarding the intersection between
habeas and § 1983, began to analyze the subtleties of the
potential outcome when a prisoner seeks relief through a §
1983 claim rather than a writ of habeas corpus. 39 In Heck,
31 Id. at 500.
31 Id. at 499.
3' 418 U.S. 539 (1974).34 Id. at 542.
35 Id. at 554.
36 Id. at 553.
31 Id. at 579-80.
38 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
39Id. at 480-90.
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the prisoner claimed that county prosecutors engaged in an
unlawful investigation and destroyed evidence.4° After the
dismissal of his first federal habeas corpus petition and the
denial of his second habeas petition, the prisoner filed a §
1983 civil rights claim. 41 As the Seventh Circuit pointed
out in its dismissal of his § 1983 claim, and as the Supreme
Court affirmed in its holding, if the prisoner is
challenging the legality of his conviction, so
that if he won his case the state would be
obliged to release him even if he hadn't
sought that relief, the suit is classified as an
application for habeas corpus and the
plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on
pain of dismissal if he fails to do so.
42
Furthermore, the Court clarified dictum in Preiser, which
indicated that a prisoner's claim for damages could be
sought under § 1983. 43 In Heck, the Court indicated that if
a "claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the
conviction.., the claimant can be said to be 'attacking...
the fact or length ... of confinement,"' thus resulting in an
unacceptable § 1983 suit.
4 4
Finally, in Edwards v. Balisok,45 the Court further
elaborated on the problem of whether a § 1983 claim
attacks a procedure, or whether it instead "impl[ies] the
invalidity of the judgment" if it is successful.46  In
Edwards, the court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims
for declaratory relief and damages for improper procedures
40 Id. at 479.
41id.
42 Id. at 479-80 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir.
1993)).
43 Id. at 481 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494).
4Id. at 481-82 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490).
4' 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
46Id. at 645.
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in a disciplinary hearing were non-cognizable because they
would render the judgment invalid.47  However, the
prisoner in this case also requested injunctive relief
regarding a request for a specific procedural modification,
the date-stamping of witness statements.48 On that claim,
the Supreme Court held the claim may be proper under §
1983, and remanded the case for the lower court to decide
whether the respondent met all of the other requirements
for injunctive relief.
49
B. Procedural History of Dotson v. Wilkinson
In Dotson v. Wilkinson, William Dotson and
Rogerico Johnson individually brought § 1983 actions in
federal district court against the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections.5 ° Each prisoner sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against the procedures
used by their respective parole boards, which used
guidelines adopted after each prisoner's conviction. 5 1 In
each case, the district court concluded that the claims must
be brought through a habeas corpus petition rather than
through a § 1983 claim. 52  After the district court's
dismissal of the cases as not cognizable under § 1983, the
Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and heard the appeals
en banc.53 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that "procedural challenges to parole eligibility and parole
suitability determinations... do not 'necessarily imply' the
invalidity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence and,





50 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 77 (discussing Dotson v. Wilkinson, No. 3:00
CV 7303 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 7, 2000); and Johnson v. Ghee, No. 4:00
CV 1075 (N.D. Ohio, July 16, 2000)).
51 Id
52 id.
53 Dotson, 329 F.3d at 470.
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therefore, may appropriately be brought as civil rights
actions, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . .. The state parole




A. The Issue Presented in Wilkinson v. Dotson
In granting review of Wilkinson, the Supreme Court
evaluated whether a prisoner may pursue relief claims
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than-or in addition to-
habeas corpus, where a favorable judgment for the prisoner
neither invalidates the state's judgment nor necessarily
hastens the prisoner's release from prison.56  Generally,
with a habeas corpus petition, a prisoner must pursue a
claim "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution," 57 but may file a § 1983 civil rights claim
to challenge the conditions of that confinement.
58
Although a habeas action requires the exhaustion of
available state remedies, 59 a § 1983 claim does not.
60
Therefore, procedurally, a prisoner may prefer a § 1983
claim to a habeas action.61
B. Application of Prior Precedent to Wilkinson
v. Dotson
In Wilkinson, each prisoner challenged the
procedures that the state applied to his parole hearing
54 Id. at 472.
55 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 77.
16 Id. at 82.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
58 See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 475.
'9 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
60 See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477.
61 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 87-88.
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instead of challenging the parole board decisions.6 2  For
Dotson, a successful claim would have resulted in "at most
new eligibility review, which at most [would] speed
consideration of a new parole application." 63 For Johnson,
a successful claim would have resulted in "at most a new
parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities may [have,
in their discretion, decline[d] to shorten his prison term.
' '4
As evaluated by the majority, neither prisoner challenged
the duration nor the legality of his confinement.
65
Furthermore, a favorable judgment for the prisoners would
not have necessarily affected the duration of their
confinement. 6 6  Thus, the Court observed that "neither
[prisoner's claim] lies at 'the core of habeas corpus."' 67 In
an eight to one decision, the Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
68
IV. Prisoner Requests for Relief v. Prisoner
Hopes for Release
A. The Prisoner is the Master of his Lawsuit
69
In Wilkinson, the Court astutely weighed the
importance of addressing prisoners' actual claims rather
than accepting the state's presumption that the prisoners
brought these cases "only because they believe[d] that





67 Id. (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489).681d. at 85.
69 The origins of the frequently used phrase, "A plaintiff is the master of
his lawsuit," are uncertain. I have intentionally misquoted this phrase
to emphasize that prisoners, like all other plaintiffs, have control over
the relief requested in their legal challenges as a result of the holding in
the Wilkinson case.
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victory on their claims [would] lead to speedier release
from prison."70 For the purpose of a fair judgment on the
merits of a case, the state's assumption that the prisoner
hopes that his legal claims will result in a reduced sentence
is both irrelevant and speculative. The holding in
Wilkinson indicates that a deciding factor between a
cognizable § 1983 claim and one which must be brought
under habeas is the actual relief sought, rather than the
remote and uncertain consequences of a favorable
judgment. The possibility of earlier release from a parole
hearing "is too tenuous here to achieve [the state's] legal
door-closing objective.",
7 1
In the majority opinion of Wilkinson, Justice Breyer
writes: "The problem with Ohio's argument lies in its jump
from a true premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners
hope these actions will help bring about earlier release) to a
faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole avenue for
relief)."72  Prisons, by their nature and design, are an
undesirable place to reside. More than most institutions,
the prison community relies on clearly established rules and
regulations, along with a series of administrative and legal
checks and balances, to function properly. To increase
prisoner obedience to expressions of authority, the state
offers parole and early release for prisoners' good behavior
and withholds parole for disciplinary problems.73  To
challenge the state's authority over the conditions and
procedures of their confinement, prisoners may
appropriately seek relief through civil rights claims,




73 See generally Edwards, 520 U.S. 641 (discussing the revocation of
good-time credits for alleged disciplinary infractions); Wolff, 418 U.S.
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prisoners in Wilkinson may hope their good behavior will
be rewarded with earlier freedom, their § 1983 challenges
to the application of harsher parole guidelines merely seek
to reign in the elusive "carrot" held out by the state for
good behavior.
In Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion, he argues
that the "inconsistency in the Court's treatment of
sentencing proceedings and parole proceedings is . .
difficult to justify. It is, furthermore, in tension with our
precedents., 75  Sentencing decisions, unlike parole
procedures, specifically address the duration of
confinement. Like the prisoners in Woff, Johnson and
Dotson sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the
unconstitutional procedures of their confinement, which
could remotely, but not necessarily, affect the length of
their sentences. 76  Although Kennedy's lone dissent
expresses a valid argument for consistency in decisions, it
misses the mark on the importance of the Wilkinson
decision. The majority wisely recognizes that, although we
may logically presume that all prisoners aspire to freedom,
the constitutionality of their confinement-in this case,
their parole proceedings-needs to be protected in the
meantime.
B. Wilkinson Reinforces the Preiser Standard
Rather than being in tension with the Court's earlier
decisions, the holding of Wilkinson reinforced the need to
closely examine the specific relief sought by a prisoner in a
§ 1983 civil rights claim. This case clarified the rules for
interpreting the precedent set in Preiser-that prisoners
must use habeas actions for "challenging the very fact or
75 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Challenges to
Farole proceedings are cognizable in habeas.").
Id. at 81-82.
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duration of [their] physical imprisonment." 77  Yet,
Wilkinson also reinforced the notion that prisoners have an
enforceable right to constitutional - conditions and
procedures during their confinement. This case clarified
the often fuzzy intersection between habeas petitions and §
1983 claims, while acknowledging that the prisoner has the
right to be the master of his own lawsuit.
77 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
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